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# West Europe Report

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18 January 1985

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## TOBBACK ON CRUISE MISSILES, SOCIALIST PARTY

Brussels DE RODE VAAN in Dutch 18/25 Oct 84 pp 15-18

[Interview with Louis Tobback, SP parliamentary party leader in the House, by Jan Vermeersch: "Our Credibility Stands or Falls With This"; date and place not given: passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] Louis Tobback (46 years old) is the parliamentary party leader of the Flemish socialists (SP [Socialist Party (Flemish)]) in the House. He is known there, and also far beyond it, as an extremely gifted man; a real "debater," with swift judgement and a wisdom which goes well beyond the parliamentary lobbies. This is one of the reasons, among others, why Louis Tobback is a coveted subject among reporters. He displays a directness which quickly pales other politicians.

Tobback's position in the broad spectrum of Flemish social democracy is known well enough. Together with a number of other figures, he embodies the left wing of Flemish socialism. The renewal of that Flemish socialism has been partly the result of this intellectual impetus, and as an illustration they like to refer to the leftist unification activities in Louvain, which are supported by Louis Tobback. It is to Tobback's credit that he did not abandon the initiative following the relative electoral defeat of the unitary list.

It is possible to have a difference of opinion with the Flemish socialists about the manner in which they evaluated the nuclear arms debate in the House (on 8 and 9 November 1983). At the time, Tobback was not soft with regard to the ACW [General Christian Workers Association] members of parliament, and he still is not: "I think that a number of them are sicker of those missiles than I am, but that is not the point," said Tobback in the following interview. That fits, but the question remains whether the situation on the ACW side is really as rigid as the SP side wants people to believe. Last June, KWB [expansion unknown] President Foubert pleaded for an end to the deployment activities in Florennes. His position was printed in DE VOLKSMACHT. But the same ACW



newspaper refused to pay any attention in its columns to the embrace of Florennes. At least not /before/ the demonstration.

We had a 40 minute interview with Tobback concerning the missile problem. In the process, the parliamentary party leader also extensively answered the very question which is on the lips of every peace activist: what if the SP were to get back in the government? Or in other words: how productive is the absolute no of the SP to the missiles? A frank and honest interview.

### Game of Dupes

Question: Let us, as a point of departure, look back for a moment to the missile debate of 8 and 9 November 1983 in the House. What conclusions did the Socialist Party [SP] draw for itself out of that debate?

Louis Tobback: The parliamentary debate especially produced greater clarity about the attitude of all sides. Whereas following the big demonstrations some illusions were still nourished in the attitude of a number of people within the ACW for example, it became clear after the debate that many of those people simply couldn't be counted on. When you see the manner in which Ignaas Lindemans (president of the Christian peace movement Pax Christi -- editor) tried to defend the attitude of the CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] in the GIDS OP MAATSCHAPPELIJK GEBIED, well then, I personally feel that that is a form of treason toward the people of the peace movement.

After the parliamentary debate we saw that enormous disappointment among many who had demonstrated in Brussels, but I wouldn't want to be too pessimistic today anyway. I note that the government has not yet dared, absolutely clearly, to say yes to the missiles. That seems significant to me. And what is even more important is that the missile question, undoubtedly in addition to other issues, will be an issue at the next elections.

Question: Let us return to the attitude of the ACW members of parliament for a moment. Did you have the impression that an agreement (bargain?) of sorts was made at the time between the ACW and the CVP concerning the missiles, let us say support for the government in exchange for a definite postponement of the decision until the end of 1985? At a meeting of the Planning Center for Peace [OCV], ACW Vice President Luc Delanghe officially denied the existence of such an agreement.

Tobback: I don't believe that such a form of horse trading took place. Furthermore, that would have been crazy. It is not in the least certain that the Americans will be able to deploy those missiles before the end of 1985. Defense Minister Vreven claims that the first elements could arrive in March 1985 and Tindemans contradicts that. Well, just as with the Pegard affair it is very well possible that it will not be possible to get a decisive answer from the government on this point either, but the outcome of the parliamentary debate was entirely a game of dupes. The deployment preparations in Florennes are

continuing, the ACW members of parliament have voted against a postponement of the work, and when we repeatedly introduced amendments to scrap that money from the national defense budget, the ACW members always voted against it as a single bloc. Currently 300 Americans are already working in Florennes. Hence, I don't see what one could have obtained in exchange for one's support.

Question: Meanwhile quite a number of contradictory statements have been made on the CVP side.

Tobback: But not by CVP members who have any interest in the decision making process...

Question: On 23 May, during the debate on the defense budget, member of parliament Van Wembeke (CVP) stated that the decision would be necessary only in 1987. Your colleague parliamentary party leader Luc Van den Brande (CVP) feels that there is no necessity at all to make a decision now, that this needs to be done only by the end of 1985.

Tobback: When Van den Brande told HET BELANG VAN LIMBURG in a recent interview that the issue must be looked at again or something to that effect, well what does that mean? I don't know what it means, you know. I don't understand that. But what I do know is that Van den Brande's opinion is of no importance at all in that discussion given that ultimately he will vote the way the government asks him to anyhow. Until further notice it will not be a parliamentary party leader, including Tobback, who will decide what the government will do in the matter; and if someone like Van den Brande first votes that the government may make the decision totally on its own, then his opinion is of no further importance at all either.

Question: You are quite without illusions concerning the changeability of things on the ACW side. Also, from a rather good series of articles in the weekly LINKS, written by one of your fellow workers, Bernard Tuytens, I gather that there is a complete loss of confidence in the ACW members of parliament, at least in the matter of the missiles. Is that right?

Tobback: Well, I think... You have to be able to give that its proper value. I do believe that a number of those ACW members are genuinely opposed to those missiles; I don't accuse them of bad intentions; I even believe that a number of them are even sicker of those missiles than I am. But that is not what it is about. The point is that they have to choose a position against the wishes of Martens and Tindemans. And I don't believe in that. As a matter of fact, I have never believed in that. Remember -- perhaps it was a little crazy, but... -- that even before the large demonstration of 25 October 1983 I made a bet with the people from VAKA [Flemish Action Committee Against Atomic Weapons] saying that I would put 1,000 francs in the box for every ACW vote. I did not have to put anything in the box. If they have to choose between their fear of the peace movement and their fear of Martens and Tindemans, then they will choose in favor of Martens and Tindemans. It is that simple. Hence I don't have any illusions at all about it; I do in terms of their rank and file, that is something different. I am sure that countless people there could be called on, and have often been more militant than a bunch of socialist or communist militants.

Look, the way ACW members of parliament in the House are constantly voting against the ACW program with regard to taxes, fraud, social affairs, family allowances, etcetera, they will naturally also vote against the ACW program in terms of missiles. It is not any more difficult than that, is it?

#### Philosophizing

Question: As you present things now, Mr Tobback, won't you sooner or later run into problems with your party? I mean: that properly absolute no concerning missiles could turn out to be not very productive at all if you have to negotiate with the CVP again shortly, after the elections. I assume that this has been discussed within chambers?

Tobback: (very formal) This is not being discussed at any time within the SP. We are indeed very much aware of the fact that any statement excluding other parties could become a difficulty if you have to negotiate with someone tomorrow. I would think that that is rather obvious. And it would be crazy not to realize that. Therefore, in a country where compromises are made you should not make exclusionary statements too often, because then it would simply be impossible for the state to function. Right then, we are aware of that difficulty. That is one. But, on the other hand, we are also aware of the fact that our credibility stands or falls with this issue. (Repeats slowly). And thirdly, people sometimes want to forget that nobody among us, Flemish socialists, has ever pleaded /for/ those missiles...

Question: But your party did also vote in favor of the NATO double decision of 1979...

Tobback: That was a discussion about the expediency of "how far do we push this," and "do we cause the fall of a government over this or not." But nobody ever said, as did Helmut Schmidt in the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany], or Max Van der Stoep in the PvdA [Labor Party (Netherlands)], or Simonet in the PS [Socialist Party (Belgium)], that those missiles were necessary. That expediency discussion at the time led to serious difficulties on 12 December 1979. And I maintain that we made a mistake at the time in dealing with the matter: as a matter of fact, we placed a rather reckless trust in Martens, who had promised that the decision should be interpreted this way and that, and then didn't do anything later on other than deceive everyone with that file. Yes, it can easily be written down that way.

Question: Nevertheless: you will have to convince me, and with me a large number of the peace activists, of the manageability of that no from the SP. Your party has been in the opposition for a couple years now, there are the statements by Prime Minister Martens in DE STANDAARD ("there is no governing with the socialists"), there are the "pragmatics" in your party. Won't that lead to a philosophizing about the productivity of that absolute no?

Tobback: Look, if you start from the basic premise that /all/ of us in the SP are disgusted by those missiles, then you end up in the not unimportant discussion about the expediency, the productivity and the achievability of our position. Right, then you can approach this in different keys, but there has



been nobody left for a long time who has doubts about the fact that our missile position has played a significant role in the recruitment capacity, the strength for action and the recovery of Flemish socialism. I will avoid the ugly word "electoral productivity," but in terms of the productivity relative to the ability to mobilize militants, there has been no argument about that for a long time; everybody knows that.

Secondly, and I repeat, everybody knows that the recovery of Flemish socialism will stand or fall with the missile question. And thirdly, everyone is convinced of the difficulty of what is achievable in our position. Because, at the conclusion of this discussion a simple answer must be found to this question: do we deploy them or don't we? You don't continue to philosophize. Ultimately it comes down to deployment or no deployment. Whereby you end up in the elementary situation where either one or the other is proven right. Well now, if we were to discuss a new government formation with the CVP and we were to say no fanatically to those missiles, well then I would like to see whether the CVP would be that fanatical about saying yes to them. I mean: is the position that easy to hold for them? I would want to wait and see whether they would really say: "Socialists, you are totally unacceptable to us because you don't want the missiles." Then the CVP will have to drop all its masks and come out as the party which really wants the missiles. At any cost, even if as a result they make the country ungovernable. I want to wait and see about that.

Final point in this context. Martens says today, Swaelen has said, Van Rompuy says ("oh, with what an audible physical revulsion Tobback spits out that name"), others have said, that there is no governing with the socialists, but believe me that has very little to do with the missiles. That has to do with all kinds of other aspects of their policy. You must be aware of that. What they want to pursue is their unjust fiscal policy, their a-social policy, their economic policy. The missiles are important, but they are not essential to them. This is why we must break up their majority. Together with the PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)], the People's Union and the Greens, we must break up their majority and then we will be in a position to want something. And then there will no longer be any more reason to assume that we will give in instead of them.

#### Lack of Character

Question: Let us assume then that the SP once again gets into the government; what impetus for policy do you envisage to keep this country from having to continue to suffer political enslavement by the United States?

Tobback: It is indeed a matter of political enslavement, and of economic enslavement, and to a certain degree also of cultural enslavement. But let me say especially: I put this problem much more at the door of our politicians than at the door of the Americans. Tindemans will continue to defend those missiles, even if for one reason or another the Americans would long have given up on them. That is the problem. The problem lies in a tendency by the Americans to dominate, but much more even in the unbelievable /lack of character/ of a number of Belgian politicians, with Tindemans in the lead. They feel fine only if every day they can do what pleases Washington. With every



word they say, they wonder whether the State Department will approve of it, even if it leaves the Americans completely cold.

Take the government of the FRG, with Kohl and Genscher. They are also in favor of the alliance, but they don't act like little slaves. The West Germans don't go to Washington to ask whether they may sell a "machine" to the Russians; those West Germans sell that "machine" because it is in the interest of the Federal Republic to do so. Hence, that /openly/ rightwing government in the FRG conducts itself much more independently toward Washington than the /ashamed/ rightwing government in Belgium.

Look, I hold the Americans liable for a lot, but to me the greatest problem is that some politicians constantly have a tendency to fall down before the Americans. Hence, a question of political courage. You cannot convince people with a slave mentality such as the "Tindemanses" that a different policy is needed. They are not able to command respect from the Americans.

Question: Do you have the feeling that the Americans are taking into account the valuable thinking relative to security questions going on within the SANDILUX dialogue?

Tobback: What is certain is that the Americans are highly concerned about what is being said there, but whether they take it into account? At the present time they don't even take the /International/ into account; just look at what is going on with the Contadora group. The Reagan administration only takes brute violence into account. Furthermore: not to want to see that there is a fundamental change in the attitude of Western Europe's new generations, I have my doubts about that. I think that the Americans are making a serious mistake there.

Question: Let us return to the SP problem with regard to the missiles. I read in the press folder of the SP press conference of 16 July last: "That minimal step which the Belgian government could take, consists of aligning itself politically with the Dutch position." Any clarification?

Tobback: First this: if I were a Dutchman I would fight the government position because I feel that it is hypocritical in many aspects. Hence its content does not satisfy us, Flemish socialists. But on the other hand, it is true of course that the Dutch government is much more daring than ours. If Belgium did the same thing, we would be a good bit better off. Because the Dutch are actually saying that the double decision of 1979 is not really necessary at all; because if the Russians do not call in any new SS-20's until the moment when they have to make a decision in the Hague, then it is OK with us, dixit the Hague. Well, in my opinion you undermine that whole NATO strategy that way. Hence, that is a step forward.

Question: You also see other advantages in the Dutch position. There would be more time, for example, to get to serious negotiations.

Tobback: That is true, yes, but you know, we naturally have nothing to negotiate. We are not sitting at any table where negotiations are taking place. Consequently, we have to make everybody understand clearly that we don't want to be dupes. We are not going to let ourselves be manipulated, by anybody. But in the meantime /our/ problem is in the first place a problem of manipulation by the United States. I can't help it either that I am in this camp. Hence my problem is with the Americans, /not/ with the Russians; and I am very well aware of the fact that my position suits the Russians quite well, but that leaves me totally cold. If it turned out to be bad for them, that would also be all the same to me.

#### West European Union [WEU]

Question: Finally, the West European Union. At the end of the month, the ministers of foreign affairs of the "Ten" will get together in Rome to discuss the future of that Union. Any comments?

Tobback: Let me first say this: I am in favor of a more independent European position, because that is the only way to achieve a more independent position for Eastern Europe. But what does reality teach us? When Tindemans skims the countries of Eastern Europe, that is no more than a form of public relations for the CVP, paid by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is that simple. Because what does that man have to offer? Nothing, nothing. After all, you cannot go to Prague and say: "Please take a more independent position," unless you yourself can say "do as we do." We could just as well send the second secretary of the American embassy in Brussels over there.

Right then, I am for a more independent position by western Europe, in order to make possible a more independent position for all of Europe. But anyone who thinks that this is what the West European Union is for is wrong. That is not what Tindemans and his associates want. When I hear Desmarets (PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)]) say in the House, "we are for the West European Union, but it cannot detract from the Atlantic Alliance," well then that is a contradiction in terms. If you want a West European pillar (of NATO) which really has a political significance, then you have to build it /against/ the Americans. Not with the Americans. They are happy with the situation as it exists. That is rather obvious. Hence, any greater West European independence will be realized partly at the expense of American influence. But once again: Tindemans prefers to be Washington's little slave. Besides, how could someone who is not even able to sell a "machine" against the wishes of Weinberger, be able to refuse Weinberger a missile? That cannot be. You cannot make the ordinary man in the street believe that.

Question: Isn't it a little strange -- or precisely not -- that the WEU conference is taking place specifically in Rome? Under socialist leader Craxi Italy has developed into one of the most loyal members of the Alliance.

Tobback: Look, I'll first say enough bad things about Craxi so that there will will not be any doubt about my attitude in the matter. As far as Craxi is concerned, that is a purely opportunistic attitude: when you have only 11 percent of the votes and you want to be prime minister of Italy, then of

course you will have to put many missiles in your wine. That is obvious. So I am saying that Craxi is the purest possible opportunist; he wants to be prime minister and is willing to pay any price for it. Period.

What is much more important though, is what we have heard recently from the mouth of Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti (Andreotti suggested that it would be best if both Germanies remained separated for ever -- editor). That idea is entrenched very deeply in Western Europe's Christian democracy. After all, what Andreotti said there is the whole Sonnenfeldt theory: Europe is divided, and it is divided well, and we should leave it that way, a sphere of influence for the Russians and then we are at ease here.

Which, in fact, implicitly says: Prague and Poland and who knows what else, those issues are welcome to the extent that we can use them to badger the Russians. But aside from that, the Tindemanses feel that it is best to keep the matter separated. Otherwise those gentlemen might run the risk that one day we may get something else here besides an ordinary free market economy.

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## TEXT OF LANDSTING RESOLUTION REQUESTING NUCLEAR FREE GREENLAND

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 28 Nov 84 pp 34-35

[Text] "Greenland must be nuclear weapon free, and therefore is opposed in the strongest way to giving permission for the stationing of nuclear weapons or launching devices for nuclear weapons in the Greenland area; also overflying or sea transit of Greenland airspace or sea territory by nuclear armed launching devices in peacetime and wartime should be prohibited." That is the wording of the statement which the Landsting recently approved, when the question of the utilization of radioactive substances in the Arctic was on the agenda. The following are the inputs of the parties to the debate in slightly shortened versions.

Siumut [Moderate leftist party favoring greater local autonomy] (Isak Lund)

In the first place we are completely against all forms of nuclear armaments. We have said that for many years in Greenland's recent history. We have always been against the stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland. We would like to emphasize once more: no nuclear weapons in Greenland, neither in wartime, crisis or peacetime.

We do not need to be experts on the subject to reiterate our request to the Home Government that the Danish Government and our Home Government must jointly agree, first to protect the Nordic countries as a nuclear weapon free zone and once more to point out our previous viewpoint that neither transit of our sea territory nor overflying of Greenland with nuclear weapon carrying ships or aircraft will ever be permitted either in peacetime or wartime.

In the second place we want to emphasize that Siumut supports the general geological mapping of our country. We believe that Siumut has clearly and correctly emphasized that we must know our land and its resources--both as to quality and quantity. Therefore we believe that the geological mapping must continue, and all mineralization must be included in the continuing reports to the Joint Council, which of course has the final word about giving permission to companies or individuals to continue eventual exploration for any type of mineral deposit in our country.



With these remarks we recommend to the Home Government that the coming conversations between the prime minister, the attorney general of the Faeroes and Jonathan will be used to emphasize Greenland's clear and strong position toward a nuclear weapon free zone in anticipation of discussions under NATO auspices.

Atassut [Centerist party favoring close ties to Denmark] (Otto Steenholdt)

All of Greenland's people want to live in a secure and peaceful land. Therefore we must state that we agree with the proposer about a nuclear weapon free Greenland. (Ed. note: It was Henriette Rasmussen of Inuit Ataqatigiit [Marxist-Leninist party favoring total independence from Denmark] who recommended that the subject be discussed in the Landsting.)

Unfortunately we must recognize that today we have a world in which a weapons race is taking place. Weapons which are capable of destroying the entire world's civilization and humanity with it are increasing in number and continuously improving in accuracy.

Greenland is a member of NATO because of the national union with Denmark, and at the same time we know that the defense field is within foreign affairs and therefore outside the auspices of the Home Government. But it is natural that the Landsting should direct an appeal to the Danish Government on behalf of the country and its people.

Our party, Atassut, is known for its raw materials policy, which maintains that all exploitable mineral products will be sought out and evaluated in anticipation of forming a correct basis for decisions in the future, and mostly to create permanent employment and a permanent economic foundation.

In connection with the Joint Council's annual report, we said that our party was restrained about a real extraction and utilization of uranium, because of unclear environmental and social consequences. But we agree with the chairman of the Home Government that we should allow geological exploration, such that it can contribute to giving a better and more certain picture of our mineral raw materials. And when we speak of uranium, we must not only think of nuclear bombs, for uranium is actually also used for health purposes.

Inuit Ataqatigiit [IA] (Aqqaluk Lynge)

IA is convinced that our position on security and defense questions is superfluous as long as the decisionmaking authority is in the Danish Folketing.

But since we live here every day, it is our duty to take a position. Our position derives mostly from the fact that the traditional Danish defense policy maintains that there will not be foreign troops or military installations on Danish soil in peacetime.

Since national unity remains and Greenland is still a part of the Danish kingdom, it is disgraceful to know that the Danes with their attitude toward defense have allowed Greenlanders to pay for their demand not to have foreign troops in peacetime. We have American troops and military installations here in this country. That makes us a bomb target in the event of war.

The same is the case for the entire Arctic, which is mainly inhabited by a few Eskimos, in the world's largest land area. We in the Arctic have learned that a war using intercontinental missiles will take place over the Arctic, and make our country a "road to hell." For IA it is important that we do not consider Greenland alone, but consider the entire Arctic in this connection, especially when through the ICC we have a cooperative organ in which the parties in Greenland have already taken a position in the conference in 1983. We believe, therefore, that it is natural for the Landsting to take a position on this.

We therefore entirely agree with the statement proposed by the chairman about a nuclear weapon free zone in our air and sea territory, but at the same time it lacks a clear position on prohibition against mining of uranium also. Because it is certainly not we who will decide if it will be used for peaceful or warlike purposes. That appears naive. As long as Denmark does not wish to take a position on nuclear power before the year 2000, why can we not once and for all decide that uranium will not be mined, and that we can take a position on that after the year 2000?

It is clear that we as a people are against war, we are against the arming of the major powers and we are against our country being used for that purpose. But at the same time we must be sure that we do not send the wrong signal to either side, the United States or the Soviet Union. We can neither get involved in worldwide security issues nor choose sides, because both the Warsaw Pact and NATO have the same intentions, and entirely limited geographical areas of interest. IA does not believe that at the present time it is possible to change our, although forced, membership in NATO.

We do not want to wage war on anyone, and we are opposed to anyone waging war from our country. That is our simple message.

#### We Can Not Be Forced to Mine Uranium

"I must refer to how the competence of the Joint Council concerning mineral raw materials in Greenland is established. It is by the right of veto, and that means that we can not be forced into anything by the Danish members of the council, including when it concerns uranium."

This was said by the chairman of the Home Government Jonathan Motzfeldt, when Aqqaluk Lynge as spokesman for IA requested a clearer statement from the chairman about Greenland uranium in connection with the debate on a nuclear free Greenland.

Jonathan Motzfeldt expressed pleasure that the Joint Council has functioned for several years without the right of veto being used at any time.

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## SWEDISH-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER REPORTS DEFENSE PANEL DEBATE

## Parliament Members Give Views

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 21 Nov 84 p 5

[Article by Larserik Haggman]

[Text] The parties are presently occupied with formulating their responses to an inquiry from the Defense Ministry. It concerns attitudes toward a new defense committee and apparently the responses of the parties in the opposition will be different from those in government.

The basis for the inquiry is the report of the parliament's third committee. This report calls for a new committee to be appointed if the need exists. The ministry wants to appoint the committee this fall in order for it to get its report finished by fall 1985 concerning material purchases for the 5-year period beginning in 1986. The third panel analyzed the situation concerning security policy and made long-range proposals.

Reference is made to this in the Defense Ministry's inquiry. Thus a mission is proposed which would call for "an analysis of Finland's situation as to security policy and a study" of how purchases are to be made.

The third item in the inquiry contains a proposal for a small committee of seven persons with each party represented. The Finnish Social Democratic Party would have two seats, and the Conservative Party, Center Party, People's Democratic League, Liberal Party and Swedish People's Party would have one seat each.

There is a tacit understanding that the Center Party would chair the committee.

What is intended is a so-called smaller panel than the former ones, with a mission that would pertain mainly to material acquisitions and, to a lesser extent, to security estimates.

The idea of a different panel has emerged during the past 6 months and is said by many to originate with the president, who reportedly wishes to avoid a "wrenching debate" or a "tug-of-war on security policy." Certain incidents

are said to have occurred in this direction during the work of the third committee when Keijo Korhonen, arguing as an expert witness, called for new formulations.

#### Unity within Government

The government today is eager to emphasize that great unanimity exists among the ruling parties for the committee to be constituted on the smaller model. This is also taken to mean that chief editor Jan-Magnus Jansson, considered just the man for the job in the event of a broader mission, is now less likely to play a role.

The declaration in favor of the smaller mission is based on the claim that there has actually been no change in the situation regarding security policy since the third committee issued its report. It is thus claimed that no broad panel is now needed, despite the fact that the deployment of cruise missiles on land is in full swing and that it is said that the deployment of ships, planes and submarines has begun, things that advocates of the broad alternative like to stress.

"Cruise missiles have already been observed," a commentary claimed.

#### Opposition Favors Broad Panel

While the ruling parties support the smaller base, it already seems clear that the opposition will not. SKP [Finnish Communist Party] leader Arvo Aalto has already appeared in public claiming that no new panel is necessary since the previous committees were "effective channels for the generals to channel public funds."

The People's Democrats earlier sought a broad panel on security policy and even wondered whether it should not be appointed by the Foreign Ministry instead of the Defense Ministry.

The Conservative Party is now adopting a critical attitude to the smaller committee. "If it is only a matter of material purchases, Defense has a delegation in the parliament's government committee"; nothing else is necessary.

#### 'Passive Policy'

Ilkka Kanerva, party executive and member of the parliament's foreign affairs committee, goes even further. He tells this newspaper that the premises of security policy must be tied to the international situation.

"A small mission is a reflection of a passive foreign policy, a lower profile."

"Instead of being two steps behind, we should be two steps ahead," says Kanerva.



He emphasizes that an active approach demands open debate, even if there might be opposition. He says that the third committee blazed the trail, but it should be traveled further now.

This suggests that the government must very quickly reach a decision on how it is to proceed. Observers are already asking whether a parliamentary committee is at all necessary if there can be no agreement reached on its mission.

#### Reduced Level

The government, it seems, has two alternatives today; either go forward with the small mission but reduce the level of party representation, or dispense with a committee at this time.

It is reported that both of these possibilities are under consideration, but the possibility of a broader mission for the committee is no longer being considered. The question is said to be already settled within the government and between the government and the president.

In practice, this is seen as to mean that there will be no continued analysis of the security situation at the parliamentary level at this time.

#### CP Chairman Against Convening

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 19 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] Arvo Aalto, Communist Party chairman, does not agree with the government that there is need for a parliamentary defense committee. Instead of this, Aalto believes, a committee is needed to study how reductions can be made in the army's expenditures without jeopardizing national security, and to what extent our army is at all able to maintain security in these times.

The parliamentary defense committee, according to Aalto, "have been effective channels for generals to raise money for arms, although everyone with any common sense knows that Finland cannot rely on armed force for its security."

Speaking Sunday in Tampere, Aalto pointed out that the defense committees differ from other committees in that their proposals have gone through virtually unmodified.

#### SDP Leader Denies Need

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 24 Nov 84 p 12

[Text] MP Paavo Lipponen stated Friday evening in Mariehamn that there is no need for a defense committee just to discuss funds for new weapons acquisitions.

Speaking at the 40th anniversary of the Finland-Soviet Union Society at Åland, Lipponen considered it self-evident that the committee should discuss all aspects of the military threat, including the threat of nuclear weapons.

"On the other hand, it is a mistake for anybody to imagine that the committee should completely review our doctrine of security and military policy," said Lipponen.

In his view, the world has not changed that much since the third parliamentary defense committee. Finland's security policy, anchored in the VSB (Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance) Pact is firmly set.

"One should also pay attention to the buildup of conventional weapons occurring in our part of the world, a high-tech buildup in certain ways more alarming than the buildup of nuclear weapons," said Lipponen.

#### Responsibility for Discussion

In his talk, he described also the work for a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries and stated that the NATO circles which label these discussions as baloney are showing very little consideration for the uneasiness we in the Nordic countries feel in the face of the nuclear threat to our area.

In Lipponen's opinion, it is in the interest of all the Nordic countries to reenforce the nuclear-free status of the Nordic area.

"It is the job of the governments to decide how we are to proceed. The pressure of public opinion is growing, but the policy of the government is affected by many other factors as well.

"Whereas the governments should show consideration for each other's problems, they should also keep the discussion alive with an eye to possible negotiations," Lipponen stressed.

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## SPOe'S CAP, WILLE DEBATE FUTURE OF PARTY

Vienna PROFIL in German 26 Nov 84 pp 20-22

[Interview with SPOe Deputy Josef Cap and Chairman Sepp Wille by correspondent Franz Ferdinand Wolf: "From Red and Blue to Red and Green"; date and place not given]

[Text] PROFIL: Deputy Cap, from time to time you have criticized the policies of the coalition, the government and chairman Sepp Wille. Last Friday it happened again at a press conference. Are you doing that only to keep the attention of the media?

Cap: I shall respond to that in a general way. We are facing the phenomenon that there is a gap between the political forces and not inconsiderable sections of the population, especially the youth. Between them on the one hand and the parties as well as the employers and employees on the other. This can be gathered from a lack of interest in party politics, also from the growing readiness to vote for a fourth party, for a green party. Their election successes so far--Kaspanaze--are signs of this. Therefore, I submit: We are caught up in a crisis of consensus regarding the forms in which policies are determined. I criticize many manifestations in the SPOe, government policies, certainly our coalition partner, but of course the OeVP too. Let us examine the crisis at the local and state levels: When the party chairman of the state of Salzburg compares donations to political parties with donations to a soccer club, this amounts to a denigration of the parties. Or the party chairman of the state of Lower Austria, who is unwilling to give up his immunity. Or city manager Bandion in Vienna. How can it be that he is so lax as to have another commitment--legally perhaps acceptable--which is hardly compatible with his position as city manager. Or the widely discussed inability to tolerate criticism shown by chairman of the state of Burgenland Theodor Kery. His additional activities, which he is now going to limit: He is a passionate collector of weapons. These are nothing but minor symptoms that support the growth of green potential. And now for the main problem: the lack of competence demonstrated in the making of political decisions and the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a few.

PROFIL: Chairman Wille, the accusation of the lack of openness is directed at you.

Wille: I welcome internal criticism too since we can then ask ourselves, "What is in need of improvement?" But all this criticism and also the criticism just voiced demonstrate that one can indeed criticize everything without really knowing what one is talking about.

Concerning state chairman Haslauer. Of course, you can say that the parties receive donations like soccer clubs. Legally that is correct. Maybe Haslauer was voicing criticism and meant that party finances are not properly regulated, because parties are financed as though they were soccer clubs.

Regarding Bandion: What I know is what I read in the newspapers, and that is also true of Cap. There is a court of honor. I do not see why one of us needs to express an opinion. I am patiently waiting for the court of honor to make a ruling, and then I will note the result, since I have neither time nor opportunities to investigate this complex of questions thoroughly and responsibly.

Karl Popper: criticism must always be specific. That is the professional ethic of the politician and it is absent everywhere.

What we know about Kery is also what we find out from the papers, and when we consider what accusations are being leveled against him, we see that his style is to a degree that of a territorial lord and collecting weapons is a hobby of his. I have not heard of any other accusations. I am by no means saying that Kery's style should not be criticized. But I am not entitled to do so and I think that I should not talk about everything because I know far too little.

PROFIL: The media have made allegations based on investigations of the aforementioned cases. It is certainly possible to form an opinion on the basis of these facts. The question is: Is there evidence of a lack of openness in club decisions?

Cap: First another thought on the previous topic. There exists a green movement, although everyone who opens his eyes knows that the government has done a great deal in the field of protection of the environment in the last few years. And this green movement is not only a movement for more green, but against specific phenomena in politics, against specific forms of power. To many, politics and that part of the political economy which also affects private and state matters appear to be a caste transcending party lines. That is the problem. Solidarity is partially misinterpreted. It is found in instances where it is indefensible.

Wille: If I say that one should not discuss everything, it is humility toward the truth. I refuse to dismiss this attitude as a caste state of mind. We can talk about everything. But then we must take the time to really deal with each specific case and draw proper conclusions instead of reacting to questions lightly and glibly.

PROFIL: So, specifically. What examples are there of a lack of openness in club decisions?

Cap: My criticism is that parliament is bypassed in a large number of decisions. The most important ones are made at the highest levels of the employer



and employee organizations of many an influential enterprise or in a public medium. The parliament is legally the body in which political decisionmaking processes end that often do not take place in parliament. It can be proved that this is one of the main problems. I believe that the entire area of employer-employee relations is not determined here, that economic matters are not decided here. Whether one is talking about pinning the blame on someone for success, politics is primarily responsible, but public discussion is thus shifted somewhat.

Wille: We must not forget that 90 to 95 percent of all bills are introduced by the government or parliament itself. It is correct that there is one area-- I am thinking of the Labor Relations Act, which is not to be amended, or the newly passed laws regulating markets--which is worked on by employer and employee organizations. One must ask: Does it not make sense for the legislator to delegate the business of laws concerning a major segment of society to its representatives. We hear and see young people and adherents of alternative policies complain of centralization at every opportunity. But when major tasks are entrusted to such important organizations as the OeGB, that is not acceptable either. You can approach these questions variously, but certainly this is not a case in which there is not sufficient openness. We know the process and are all part of it. All large institutions have collective responsibilities, and the delegation of responsibility is not always possible. We have to assume it jointly. I am responsible for the mistakes of my colleague Cap and he for mine.

Cap: There are some deputies that are closer than others to the pulse of decisionmaking, especially the deputies of the employer and employee organizations. They occupy seats in these parliamentary bodies and also in parliament itself. There is an imbalance which raises the question of openness. The chances to participate in decisionmaking processes vary.

PROFIL: Concrete examples. I am going to try it using key words. Acquisition of interceptor planes. Is that a field in which the many are overridden by the few who are familiar with it? Is it Zwentendorf?

Cap: I am also a member of the federal party executive and must include the party executive in my criticism of decisionmaking procedures. At the same time I must say that, in contrast to a while back, there is broader discussion. When Kreisky took part in meetings of the executive, everything was always absolutely certain.

Wille: If there is no discussion, it is the fault of the participants.

Cap: That is right. Now specifically: the ORF reform. On several occasions I have asked on purpose: How is the ORF reform coming along? The answer came when those from whom I expected it had made up their minds. The party executive is the decisionmaking body and the club is obligated to abide by these decisions. Now, by involvement I mean participation. The discussion about the interceptor planes has been a miserable failure. I cannot make a theoretical decision regarding interceptor or surveillance planes if I do not know what types are to be sold at what prices and on what terms. It is a senseless decision. The third is the famous amended version of the Chamber of Commerce Act to compensate for the loss of the tax on business capital. It has really not been discussed anywhere.

Wille: At every club meeting I attach the greatest importance to whether the ministers and the committee chairmen guarantee that everything that concerns their committee is planned according to schedule and has been discussed with the appropriate people.

On the subject of the interceptor planes. This is an excellent example of uninformed politicians. We have authored a letter to the deputies which states clearly that the government promised Swiss-type neutrality in negotiations concerning the state treaty back in 1955. Then we got the state treaty and passed the neutrality law, which states that we will voluntarily maintain and defend our perpetual neutrality by all possible means. Then in 1975 we amended the federal constitution, which says: Austria assumes the goal of general national defense. Independence from foreign countries and the inviolability and unity of federal territory must be preserved. Especially by maintaining and defending our perpetual neutrality. The lower house at that time determined what should be our doctrine of defense. It says that the federal army, in case of international tension or a conflict that might threaten to engulf Austria, is to counter such an expansion, protect our borders and keep control of the skies.

That means that the necessary pilot units must be established and the installations for the surveillance of air space are to be built. Then the United Nations was informed of these laws. Now they are part of international law. We are talking about a complete strategy that obligates us to proceed a certain way. If the government does not purchase the airplanes, it will be acting unconstitutionally according to a series of laws. A discussion about whether interceptor planes are to be purchased is highly superfluous. The only matter that can still be discussed is what interceptors and when.

Cap: It pays to argue with comrade Wille. But this is a discussion of interpretation. When you quote the words "by all possible means," then I tell you that at the present stage of the development of military technology, everything is done with satellites and missiles, maybe even lasers. Thus my interpretation: The 24 surveillance planes are not the way to guarantee control of our air space. I claim that the present stage of the development of weapons technology, small countries no longer have certain possibilities of defense. Therefore, I think that this is a pointless investment; we could use the money for other things. The party decision was a decision to prevent the anti-interceptor faction in the party from becoming a majority.

Wille: The legal situation clearly creates obligations. We must talk about to what extent our defense expenditures are sufficient. What I want is for the Austrian to have the will to defend himself. Like the Swiss or the Swedish socialists. They spend three times as much as we do for national defense. We spend 1 percent of our gross national product on defense, whereas the figure for Sweden is 3 percent.

PROFIL: In Josef Cap's eyes, what we do invest is still excessive.

Cap: Yes. Small countries ought to realize their possibilities, considering the insane arms race of the great powers. I am certainly for securing our borders militarily. But I am very skeptical about whatever goes beyond that.

What goes beyond that serves to ensure employment and to legitimize the arms industry, which has grown in the last 13 years. We ought to use our scarce funds sensibly. In times of economic weakness, it would be better to spend them on social programs.

Wille: This is a totally unacceptable argument. If the government accepted armed neutrality in 1955, we cannot suddenly say, when we have in the meantime increased our gross national product 400 percent, that we need the money for social needs. When Raab and Schaerf and Kreisky negotiated the state treaty, they knew that you have to pay a price for neutrality.

Cap: Due to the problems we are having in financing our welfare state, we must find the necessary funds by taking them from areas in which expenses are becoming increasingly dubious.

PROFIL: Disarm to increase social armaments?

Cap: Disarm to maintain our social standards.

Wille: We have never been as rich as we are today. I do not accept this argument.

Cap: If I look at the lowest pension or the price trends, I cannot imagine that it would not make sense to cut in certain areas such as national defense and to allocate the savings to social welfare.

PROFIL: Is this policy not socially fair enough and thus not socialistic enough?

Cap: Yes.

PROFIL: Let us summarize. Both the participants in our debate have very quickly agreed on a formula: Political decisions are made by the party executive; the club is--I exaggerate--an appendix. Somewhere the theory of the independent deputy and the free mandate has been lost. But now there is the insoluble problem of Zwentendorf. It is presented to parliament unresolved and now the deputies are to decide according to the dictates of their consciences. Freely.

Wille: The federal government has acted logically. Parliament passed the Nuclear Ban Act and has stipulated that it can be changed only by a two-thirds majority. Therefore the federal government does not have jurisdiction in this matter. While debating the energy report, the question arises whether the report is acceptable if it does not deal with nuclear energy or should nuclear energy be considered somewhere. It has been demonstrated that there are coalitions across party lines. There are good arguments for atomic energy; there are very convincing arguments against high technology. Since, however, the parties are obviously no longer in a position to decide the issue, they ought to find a way to present the question to the Austrians again. We would have to respect the results of a referendum. If the people vote no or if no referendum is held, then we will scrap Zwentendorf and sell at the annual fair a power station that once cost 10 billion.

Cap: On what basis were millions invested in preservation after there was a clear vote in 1978? This way the political problem, too, was preserved.

There is something about the procedure--parliament giveth and parliament taketh away--that smacks of a tactical ploy. One gets the impression that all efforts are being made to somehow make Zwentendorf operational.

I now want to raise the question of a certain personality and why he has attracted adherents. Kaspanaze goes to his cow barn, does his milking, then goes to the state parliament and says, "This is boring," and leaves. That is unpolitical and in the long run ineffective, but right now that corresponds to a mood in the population.

It is a weakness of the parliamentary system if it does not choose methods of action that are readily comprehensible to the people.

Wille: This tactic seems to me to be just as unsuitable to solve these problems as others. But energy enterprises want to know what is going to happen next.

As for Kaspanaze, he is generally considered to be a fine peasant who goes down the straight and narrow. My only comment is that there must certainly be 100,000 other Austrian peasants that are equally capable of going down this road.

PROFIL: Are you not afraid that the traditional politics that you describe and represent might lose out to Kaspanaze?

Wille: Green and alternative groups depend on the same experiences as the so-called traditional parties. After we have always been ahead in the realization of social goals, I am convinced that, when one fine day a green deputy comes to the great house, we will have reached or maybe passed the climax of green politics.

Cap: This is the most natural thing imaginable. People come together and say, "We will add a fourth party to the third one." But I think that so many of these issues can be resolved in our party that it is not a hollow cliché to say as I am doing that a red and green policy is possible in the SPOe. I even think that in the long run--should a fourth party establish itself--we can consider a change in color. From red-blue to red-green.

Wille: Such a strong party as the SPOe, which is rich in traditions and firmly rooted in society does not need a green or an alternative policy. We are challenged to listen constantly to society. And then we are compelled to find answers. I am confident that we will find these answers.

PROFIL: Are the reds stronger than the red-greens?

Wille: Great men of this century--from Einstein to Jaspers--have stated: All roads lead to socialism. There is nothing to add to this judgment.



## WITHDRAWAL FROM EC DELAYED AT LEAST ONE YEAR DUE TO FRG

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 18 Nov 84 p 1

[Text] West Germany will not recognize Greenland's departure on 1 January because the fishing issue is not clarified.

Brussels. Greenland's withdrawal from the Common Market ran into more difficulties when Denmark was unsuccessful in getting approval for a temporary economic and fishing settlement while waiting for ratification by all the members.

Permanent undersecretary K. E. Tygesen had to strike the table and remind his colleagues in the foreign ministry council that they had certainly forgotten that 1 January 1985 was "a historic day" for Greenland, and it was a deep disappointment for Greenlanders that it now looks like the day can not be observed.

After a debate of several hours in the Foreign Ministry, there were both parliamentary and fisheries problems.

Ireland's parliament can not ratify the agreement on Greenland's withdrawal and the new arrangements before the week of 20 January at the earliest.

Provisional French No

The French Senate--which last week rejected the agreement on Greenland--will again discuss the issue on Wednesday, and if the answer is again no a final approval is expected in the French National Assembly before the New Year.

But West Germany refuses to approve a provisional agreement for Greenland before there is a clarification of the large fishing problems on west Greenland.

That is due to Denmark's announcement on Monday that there would probably not be a codfish quota for EC, because biology experts have recommended a reduction of the total quota.

Monday afternoon the Danes said that the Germans had behaved "reasonably" in the discussions, but they were now awaiting the results of the negotiations about compensation for the loss of fish. In the meantime West Germany will not say yes to a temporary Greenland agreement.

Denmark has offered compensation so that permission could be given for fishing other species than cod, for example halibut and grenadier.

#### Financial Consequences

The financial part of Greenland's new arrangement involves 213 million kroner per year for 5 years as payment for EC fisheries. Therefore these moneys can not be paid out until later.

An extra complication is that EC does not have a budget for 1985, since the EC parliament rejected it last week. According to the rules no money can be paid to Greenland when the amount is not in the 1984 budget. But a Danish official emphasized on Monday that there is talk of a treaty obligation, and that therefore there can be no doubt that the amount will be paid--despite budget problems.

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## BRIEFS

CLOSING OF GREENLAND MINISTRY--After 1990 the Ministry of Greenland Affairs will hardly exist as an independent ministry with a full-time minister, said Minister of Greenland Affairs Tom Hoyem (Center Democrat). "Under the assumption that the Home Government is taking over KGH (The Royal Greenland Trading Company) I expect that in August 1985 I will present a plan for the closing of my ministry, which today has about 9.000 employees," said Tom Hoyem. [Text] [Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 26 Nov 84 p 6] 9287

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## DKP INFLUENCES ON PEACE GROUPS DOCUMENTED

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 23 Nov 84 p 5

[Article by Juergen Wahl, responsible editor for domestic politics: "Peace Slogans From the Pressing Machine"]

[Text] After every protest against Western defense, the leftists scream that nothing and no one is being influenced by the communists. They say the DKP is more likely a drop in the bucket in an ocean of upright democrats. But after what happened this autumn, there is proof that this is not so. The facts have been documented by the RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT.

The Wiesbaden publishing firm "Das Junge Wort" [the young word], whose analyses are accepted by the West German youth, compiled the findings which were openly evident. The firm's coworkers observed the course of the "Autumn Peace 84" from its inception to its implementation, especially the activity of the North, South, and Middle "regional committees."

As early as May, two different concepts and their supporters came to grips with one another in the peace movement and it wasn't the first time that they took stock of their forces. These two groups are as follows:

--the DKP and its relief agencies (more than 10) for large and concentrated activities, and

--the "autonomous" entities, Christian groups and members of the Green Party for decentralized activities.

At the beginning of May, the DKP camp represented, and not for the first time, more than half of the participants of the Cologne action conference. However, no sustaining concept emerged from this conference. Such was Sabine Sommer's complaint in the *BLAETTER FÜR DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK* [German and International Policy Journal] (Nr. 6/1984, p 715). The DKP officials received a directive "in any case not to push through any action against Christians, members of the Green Party and autonomous entities."

Gunnar Matthiessen, member of the Cologne "Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation" (KOFAZ) which is strongly influenced by the DKP explained, "Naturally in all these activities priority goes to those who can arrange the



largest mass mobilization. And so October 20th will...certainly be the high point of the peace movement this year." (DKP central organ "UZ"; 25 July 1984). One month later, the DKP committed its members once again to focal points: Hamburg rally, "human chain" Duisburg-Hasselbach, "star of peace" in Stuttgart and central rally in Bonn.

The aggressive changing of slogans and texts is one of the main tasks of the DKP agents in the using of these organizations as fronts. Several groups had again prepared texts for the autumn activities which showed that the demonstrations were not supposed to be only one-sided against Western armaments but also against Soviet missiles. The comparison of the texts before and after the DKP influence speaks loudest for itself. Excerpts of old and new texts regarding the major solutions have been printed below.

Old: "Join the human chain. Stop the weapons insanity! Peace through disarmament in the East and West! Let's start with ourselves!"

New: "Human and action chain! Put an end to the weapons insanity! No Pershing II and cruise missiles! Freeze arms--create more jobs."

Old: "Stop and rescind the stationing of the new medium-range missiles which has begun in Western and Eastern Europe."

New: "Stop and rescind the stationing of the new medium-range missiles which has begun."

Old: "Stop immediately all nuclear weapons tests."

New: ~~crossed out~~--no replacement.

Old: "Support the people's right to self-determination and the respect of human rights in every country!"

New: "Down with USA's interventionist policies especially in Central America."

The "KOFAB camp" to which also most of the SDP Jusos are affiliated added the following entirely new text to the appeal: "Withdraw all efforts to subordinate additional social areas to the armament program. Exclude women from the armed forces, withdraw the extension of civilian service, withdraw the basic rights curtailment to conscientious objection." It is obvious that not a single one of these demands can be described as typically communistic. Every democratic party may use the same words. However, it was the DKP members who wanted to make the text "tougher" through by adding further demands. They acted on Lenin's principle, "Link as many proposals of the bourgeois with your own as possible!"

Doctoring texts by itself is of no use to the DKP. Organizationally, therefore, it acts on directives from East Berlin. Just as its predecessor, the KDP [communistic party of Germany] did from 1945 to 1968. These directives are:

- to get their hands on positions of office,
- to offer technical help, and
- whenever possible, to influence finances, procure "contributions."

The DKP never opens up its own offices or party organization for these tasks. Rather, the "German Peace Union" (DFU) and especially its offices have been active for this purpose during the past two decades. It has been a long time since the DFU has been represented in elections. Even party members are also active in these organizational areas and they do not join the DKP by order of the party.

In the North one sees the threads: Wolfgang Gehrke, DKP district chairman, and Ingrid Kurz, member of the DFU directorate. They were able to occupy five of the eight seats in the regional committee. Of those five, they were able to place Fritz Seydel of the DKP district chairmanship Niedersachsen in one of them. Later other representatives of various groups joined the committee. They were unable to change the direction of the committee. The office had been active for a long time at the Hamburg address of Innocentiastrabe 21-- the headquarters of the DFU regional branch! The subscription account was opened with SHB official Angela Kroll's agreement. The three local branches for the North action in Kiel, Bremen and Hannover found themselves likewise in DFU places.

For the Middle, the starting signal came from a four person group in which the DKP had two reliable members available day and night. They were Ute Obermeyer and Gregor Witt. It was with difficulty that the "KOFAB spectrum," as the DKP groups and its allies are called in group jargon, could squeeze out a central rally in the Bonn Hofgarten and at the same time keep the "human chain" in hand. Sixty-one mobilization sectors were established. These 61 sectors depend on 7 "contact addresses," of which no less than 6 have to be attributed to the inner DKP organizational area. An editorial for circulars counted 12 persons, half of which are DKP and "KOFAB" members. This half was constantly on duty which is decisive for protest activities. Impromptu "initiative groups" are not able to keep up with this structure because they lack organizational staff.

In the South, the DKP's effect was so penetrating that independents kicked against it and in part withdrew, especially the Christian groups. Already the first general planning conference was taken firmly in hand by Marion Lehmiche, member of the DKP district chairmanship of South Bayern, together with an additional four DKP members. This was too much for those "hawks" close to the SPD. They stated, "We will only watch the development in the coordination committee since we have no interest in doing the work for the DKP spectrum."

In southern Germany, the DKP represented about a third of the actors on all organization levels. Since a three fourths majority had been established earlier at the "Esslinger Action Conference" for passing resolutions, there was absolutely no opposition to the DKP front. Fronts such as the DFU and VVN-BdA [Alliance of Persons Persecuted by the Nazi Regime/Association of Anti-Fascists] offered to take over "printing orders, including paper and a coworker." "Autumn 84," a special account, was issued to Dieter Lachenmayer, DFU coworker and activist in the DKP-associated student group "MSB-Spartakus." A trust account intended for "bail" and bearing the address "Action Office Autumn Peace 84" was administered by DKP official Hans-Dieter Wohlfahrt.

The analysts of the Wiesbaden office who are spread out in associations and social groups of all types have described numerous additional operations with names and addresses in the activities of the "Autumn Peace." Until now no one has officially denied the documentation.

12348

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## KARAMANLIS ALLEGEDLY OPPOSED BY BOTH POLITICAL EXTREMES

Athens ENA in Greek 13 Dec 84 p 10

[Text] Two small but hard core elements in the PASOK and the New Democracy have "joined forces" with the common aim of discouraging K. Karamanlis from accepting a renewal of the presidential term.

According to facts verified by ENA the "information" leaked in recent weeks to some of the government press but also to the press of the opposition originated from those two groups in connection with Karamanlis' and Papandreou's alleged "intentions", "negotiations," "conditions," and "exchanges" on the subject of the impending presidential elections in April. Although that "information" was leaked without either of the two centers establishing any connection between them, yet they achieved their aim through concurrent efforts. The first being an attempt to force K. Karamanlis to declare from now on that he does not intend to accept a new candidacy and the second to undermine public inclination and the votes for the candidate favored by the two chief parties.

The group of "hard core" ND members is mainly constituted by Evang. Averof's "personal guard" which, in numbers, does not exceed ten deputies. This group leaked the information that was converted into political reporting by the newspapers APOYEVMATINI and ELEVTHEROS TYPOS to the effect that: "K. Karamanlis has already decided not to accept a renewal of his term." The justification of that decision revealed also the aim of this kind of "information". According to those articles K. Karamanlis' refusal is "based" on his conviction that a renewal of his term would favor the PASOK in the elections since Mr. Karamanlis' presence in the highest political office constitutes for a percentage of A. Papandreou's voters (5 to 10%) a guarantee of normal developments, and on the need to reach a balance between the two largest political factions in the exercise of power.

As ND members note, this group of "hotheads" is the same one which, up to the present, expected K. Karamanlis to "oust Andreas," or to "clash with him to prevent marxism from spreading in the nation." Euro-elections came as a sad surprise to this group which expected that the PASOK would fall below 35% while the ND would reach 45%. Thus [its] inclinations and scenario were altered. The causes of the defeat were looked for in the presidential residence and K. Karamanlis found himself under fire for "the cover he provides for the government" or even for "his inclination to communicate with Andreas" with a view to a renewal of his term.



It must be noted that this rumor, faint as it was, did not meet with a strong denial. And this because any form of contradicting statement, coming either from the ND leaders or from the presidency would amount to a direct intervention by K. Karamanlis in the electoral confrontation, showing him to be a fellow combatant of one faction and an opponent of the other.

The impossibility of a denial was exploited to the full by the rumormongers and hard core PASOK followers rushed in their wake to exploit the matter in an attempt to increase the small pocket of Karamanlis opponents within the ND.

In order to achieve that aim, this PASOK group resorted to parallel information on the side which "confirmed" the Right's unease or suspicions about K. Karamanlis' stance.

Within the framework of this new unofficial information rumors of a "readjustment" of the president of the Republic's constitutional powers, of conditions set by the PASOK for a reelection of K. Karamanlis etc., were circulated.

Together with the ND's aims, this "information" emanating from hard core PASOK members also had another purpose: to convey to Kastro and to A. Papandreou personally that the party's Left is against the choice of K. Karamanlis. Or if there is no other choice, that the price of PASOK votes would be the subjection of the actual president to the conditions the Movement would set.

The tragicomic aspect of the whole question, as an important non-member of parliament notes, is that the anti-Karamanlism of "hard core" PASOK and ND followers stems from and is fed by diametrically opposed convictions. While the former believe that the Change did not make any progress because of Karamanlis, the latter maintain that the actual president "must be held equally responsible" for the advancement of the socialist reforms carried out up to the present by the PASOK. And that same person added: "Conversely, insofar as both groups are verging on the irrational, those who maintain that K. Karamanlis' presence in the highest political office is essential for the next five years are justified."

12278

CSO: 3521/120

## RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOMBINGS QUESTIONED

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 12 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Y. Lampsas in The Column "Topics of Our Time": "Self-Evident"]

[Text] Every time some bombs are planted somewhere and explode all the members of government reiterate that logically they cannot have been placed by the PASOK because it is impossible that the government itself would wish to destabilize the nation's political life. For instance, Antonis Stratis, the premier's political adviser in his article in last Sunday's VIMA wrote:

"Neither the PASOK nor the government benefit (from the bombs). This fact is self-evident so that any kind of explanation is superfluous. Neither does the traditional Left benefit since its entire policy is evolved within the framework of constitutional legality."

Who are those who stand to benefit according to Mr. Stratis? The remnants of Junta and fascist movements, small extreme left groups and the New Democracy which "exploits" those attempts in order to prove that the government is unable to maintain order.

Let us examine Mr. Stratis' reasoning a little. Why is it self-evident that the PASOK does not benefit from bombing acts? Logically, we can very well conceive a government which needs some pretexts to impose restrictive measures on the people's freedoms. I am not saying that this is what today's PASOK government is doing nor that it is responsible at all costs for the bombs. I just register the fact that this eventuality can't be excluded. Besides recent history gives us just one such very striking example: nearly 50 years ago, on 27 February 1933, Hitler's National Socialists, who had been in power since 1932 through legal elections, staged the great Reichstag fire in order to find a pretext to restrict the freedoms of the German people. The decree which gave unlimited control to Hitler was passed in the parliament with a wide majority.

In reality the fire had been started by a Dutch communist, Marinus van der Lubbe, who, as was proven later, was the Nazis' tool. And yet at the time Goebbels was saying:

Whys should we want to burn the Reichstag since we are the government? The fire was set by the Communists and the Jews!" By the same kind of logic, Mr. Papandreou might well be throwing the responsibility for the actions of his organs on the hateful Right...

Mr. Stratis also says something else: that the parties of the traditional Left do not benefit either, that is, chiefly the KKE. He will permit me to remark that neither is there here any self-evidence. It is a fact that this party's policy is evolved within the framework of constitutional legality. But the New Democracy too moves within the same framework, a fact which does not prevent Mr. Stratis from classifying it among the suspects. In the case of communist parties in particular, just the fact that they faithfully follow Moscow's international policy demolishes the argument of total "legality." For numerous foreign governments have denounced Moscow as being responsible for a series of terrorist acts on an international scale...

I repeat that in the case of our own bombs no one can prove (so far at least) that they were planted by the PASOK, the KKE or the New Democracy. But for the latter there is a fact which frees it from the suspicions that its presumed aim is to "destabilize" by such actions: the bombs were placed in locations where there were or might have been some of its own followers!

I am referring to the examples of the newspaper MESIMVRINI and to the ND meetings on Mesoyion Avenue. Is it conceivable that the leaders of such a large liberal faction would go to such lengths? Namely to kill their own followers in order to prove that something is wrong with the PASOK?

12278

CSO: 3521/120

## CARTOON DEPICTS TRIUMPHANT PAPANDREOU DROWNING IN MINED SEA

[Editorial Report] Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 30-31 December 1984 carries on page 16 a cartoon by internationally known cartoonist Lurie depicting those world leaders who will reportedly contribute to a happy or fateful 1985. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou is shown drowning in mined waters while holding up a hand in a "V" sign. Page 8 of the same newspaper carries a commentary on the cartoon in which the writer expresses surprise at this "unbelievably correct and realistic view of the situation in Greece." The article further noted that Lurie is surely not referring to the "personal tragedy of a politician," but actually to the picture of an entire country, an opinion which, it states, Lurie must have formed after discussing it with colleagues, newsmen, political figures with whom he "is closely associated." According to the writer, the situation in Greece was described to Lurie by many such people under the most somber colors but without fanaticism: "Papandreou is in bad shape and does not even know it; he pretends to be important and is angering everyone, he is getting rid of even his old friends and isolating himself, and he is drowning while simultaneously proclaiming victory." The writer notes that this description is surely not casual and is unrelated to any political sympathies or antipathies; rather, it constitutes "a journalistic expression based on a sense of humor which, nevertheless, hides an important message." The writer, who says that Greeks were taken aback by this pessimistic view, notes that this is the first year that Lurie consigns Greece to this worst of fates, surrounds her with mortal dangers and makes her unaware of reality, a view with which the writer fully agrees: "Papandreou is not committing suicide, he does not know he is drowning, he does not believe he has isolated himself and he is unaware of the traps that others have set around him--in fact, around Greece--or that, unfortunately, his own men, his flatters, will never point out to him the awful reality." The writer concludes by lamenting the fact that "Papandreou will never believe that we want to save him from drowning," but that, nevertheless, "there are still some reasonable Greeks who wish that next year, Lurie will depict our prime minister reaching shore safe and sound."

CSO: 3521/131



## PCI'S NATTA VIEWS GOVERNMENT ALTERNATIVES

Rome IL NUOVO SPETTATORE ITALIANO in Italian Nov 84 pp 9 - 13

[Interview with Alessandro Natta, PCI secretary general, by Piero Pratesi:  
"Natta: 'Secularity of Choices'"; date and place not identified]

[Text] A government with a program and the alternative, the moral question, DC [Christian Democratic Party] and the Catholic world, the communist "diversity": these are the topics covered by the PCI secretary in his interview with us.

In the face of the problems troubling our times, in the midst of the crisis paralyzing the politics of the ruling parties, in the discomfort and alienation brought about by corruption, the Communist Party still represents, and not only to the communists, a landmark and the fulcrum of a possible change. However, in a political climate which more easily allows humoral reactions and opposing views intentionally carried to the extreme, the Communist Party is also regarded with rejection and, by some people, with disappointment. The secretary general, the Hon Alessandro Natta, agreed to answer some questions closely related to this magazine's political commitment and intellectual thought: the moral question, going beyond the "material constitution", an alternative proposal for a government to take the place of the coalition regime which has already lasted too long and is now tired and dangerous, the unified perspective and the alternative, the Christian Democratic Party and the Catholic world, the communist "diversity".

[Question] Let's begin with a general type of question. The horizon is turning darker and darker from a moral standpoint and more and more confused and full of involutions from a political standpoint. Many, including the most alert ones, are asking themselves: is everything rotten? And if it is so, how can we save ourselves? And how can we avoid the risk of indifference and resignation?

[Answer] Of course, from an ethical standpoint and from the standpoint of propriety of administrative procedures, of loyalty to the constitution and concern for the public interest, the past and present behavior of those charged in the past and being charged today with the responsibility of governing and administering the public affairs (and the public money), appears to the country as a sequence of recurring episodes and actions which become more and more bewildering and alarming every day and even, I would say, more and more intolerable. The last episode (but will it be the last one?) was the government ordinance - the thousandth ordinance - boldly favoring a group

which is in the process of establishing a private television monopoly. Yet, if I assess the present situation in relationship to other moments in which the country was shaken by scandals, I would say that today the situation displays some new elements. One of them is the increasingly serious simultaneous occurrence of facts of a different nature: some of them of a definite moral (or immoral) nature; others of a specifically political and social nature. I will not list the disgraceful episodes, the collusions, the allowances which by now affect almost every facet of the public life, of the economic activity, of the institutions, of the secret service. Sometimes people accuse the PCI of scandalmongering. However, we did not make up any of the bewildering events that are taking place today. In fact, I must say that these events almost never explode as a result of our discovering them and publicizing them. From them we draw the political consequences, but we never stole nor intend to steal the job of the magistrates or of the police investigators. The disgraceful episodes taking place one after the other and overlapping one another demonstrate that a dangerous instrumental use of the levers of power and of the institutions has become widespread. In other words, in this way of governing there is something that isn't working any more and it is only harming the country.

[Question] Among the new elements you mentioned also the existence of facts of a specifically political nature.....

[Answer] Yes. In fact, we are witnessing today a political behavior of the government and of the ruling parties which is often unheard of: acts of force, prevarications, arrogant intrusions in the autonomous life of various institutions, of individual public authorities, whose functions and prerogatives, outlined and protected by the constitution, are thus harmed. In other words, there is an embezzlement, for biased or even private use, of what is public - that is of what belongs to everybody and should remain in the service of every one - even in very sensitive areas such as the secret services. Hence the spreading of those abusive acts, of those discriminations and even of those truly unlawful actions which generated a government policy, a behavior of the ruling parties, a way of administering the state that some jurists and political experts call "the material constitution". The material constitution is something that is in obvious contrast with the "written constitution". It is not by chance that, It has opened the way to the establishment and to the ill-omened operation of the occult and similar forces, attempting to overthrow the establishment and legitimate authorities.

It is therefore the combination of all these elements that change the moral question into a political and institutional question, a major democratic question which can no longer be eluded or sidestepped. It is a problem requiring a thorough renewal and healing of the parties, of the institutions, of the way of dealing in politics. If we do not face it, the Italian democracy is currently running a serious risk. However, I do not agree with the view that today there is a tendency to adjust. On the contrary, it seems to me that the public opinion is showing a more alert sensitivity. It demands a new type of politics which is not just administration of power for the sake of power, but which is also striving towards renewal, a push towards ideals and reference to values. To this we attribute, to a great extent, the PCI positive outcome in the June 17 European elections.

[Question] What we have is, therefore, a tangle of disgraceful episodes and also a policy by this coalition which, having inflicted a blow upon the workers' resistance, does not seem to be in the least able to bring about a change. In fact, the opposite seems true.

[Answer] Let me say it again: we challenge the political system that has established itself de facto, not the party system as defined by the constitution. And here, please, allow me to step back and mention the political reason which lies at the origin of the present political and institutional crisis: the preclusion, that is, of a force such as ours, a preclusion which has handicapped our democracy for 40 years. It is this preclusion which allowed the ruling parties to consider and use the institutions as their own property, not resisting to temptations, making mistakes and committing prevarications, mixing together their own interest and the interest of the state and often placing their own interest first. It was indeed Togliatti who expressed a far-sighted warning concerning the dangers for our democracy, when he stated that an "oligarch" of political leadership was taking shape in Italy.

[Question] In assessing the present circumstances, the present government, you upheld the need to step beyond the "material constitution", i.e. that body of consolidated policies whereby the ruling parties for decades considered themselves irreplaceable and unremovable, while the communists were not "legitimated" to rule. However, proportionally on the one side and a kind of tacit agreement on the other side give the PCI a sort of right of veto in the Parliament. Now it seems as though the Hon Craxi wants to go beyond that, breaking even this tacit compromise. He seems to be attempting to demonstrate that the political and parliamentary weight of the communist opposition to the five-party government can be ignored or that it does not need to be taken into consideration.

[Answer] It seems to me that the Hon Craxi simply tried to take the place of the Christian Democratic Party in its pivotal role in the government alliances which exclude the PCI and consider themselves the only ones possible. Perhaps he thought that he might reap some benefit for the elections. However, the most recent phase showed that this attempt does not succeed, that this approach brings no rewards. We do not harbor biased enmity towards the chairman of the Socialist Party. We only point out an unquestionable fact: the five-party government under socialist chairmanship brought out even more clearly the structural problems and the inner discrepancies of this type of government. The experience of these past years showed the unsurmountable inadequacy, under any leadership, of the solution that we would like to give to the Italian crisis through five-party governments. It also demonstrated the poverty of similar coalitions and, at the same time, the dangerousness of the paths that they take to prove an efficiency that is beyond them. We hear a lot about a strategic pause, but they can never find this kind of respite. On the contrary, their temporal and ideal horizon becomes shorter and shorter and more and more limited. The presence of our party and the constructive democratic force for change represented by our party should be an incentive to the socialists to open up. The urge causing them to lock themselves up

like an oyster in the five-party system is a mistake, corroborated by the facts.....

[Question] What is the DC today, what does it do? In your view, what are its goals? The Hon De Mita stated that only the alternative can save us.....

[Answer] Look: when the Hon De Mita came forth with this thesis, which, among other things, he chose to couple with the proclamation of the will for a deep renewal within his own party (the "self-renewal"), we considered it with interest and appreciation. We seemed to understand that with this step the DC was permanently setting aside its anachronistic bias concerning the PCI's unsuitability to participate in the government of Italy because of ideological reasons. The thesis of the alternative could have meant the acknowledgment by the Christian Democrats as well, of the fact that a democratic constitutional party with more than 33 percent of the votes such as the PCI has equal rights and dignity enabling it to rule the country.

[Question] But what happened after the Hon De Mita's perorations concerning the alternative and the DC's self-renewal?

[Answer] What happened was that the secretariat of the Christian Democratic Party quickly started again to uphold the old biased views against the PCI. Let us point out, and I want to emphasize it, that this took place much before the "Andreotti case", much before the so called "Natta's going crazy." The Hon De Mita cannot get away with saying that the alternative is legitimate and desirable for the proper functioning of our political system and at the same time state, as he does today, that it is a threat to democracy. In so doing he is retreating to the positions of the "preamble", just as he did in connection with the problem of the councils, when he stated, in this regard, that the communists could have access to local and regional governments only as an exception, when it could not be avoided: in essence, when and where they hold the absolute majority!

[Question] But it is not only the DC that today insists again on the PCI having to acquire an alleged "democratic legitimacy" in order to aim to be accepted as a ruling party.

[Answer] Nobody, except the Italian people, has the right to bestow legitimacy upon us. However, even if we want to take into consideration this foolish and arrogant demand, we cannot forget some things. Nobody wants to repeat the season of national solidarity, and in any case we communists do not intend to. However, we cannot erase it all together either. A phase of responsibility for the PCI in the parliamentary majority, if not in the government, took place. The 1979 break did not zero it. It created the need to proceed to more advanced experiences, not to go back to those already known and outlived. Nor can we summon the PCI for non-compliance. Also in foreign policy matters I would summon them, because of the way they interpreted and interpret documents concerning this matter, which we voted on together back in 1977.



That phase, therefore, cannot be repeated. However, we all lived through it. Therefore, we all need to draw a lesson from it in order to gain perspective. Moro, looking beyond the political moment that we were living in then, talked about a "third phase." I believe that the type of politics that Moro was envisioning, which implied deep-rooted changes in the Italian society and healing of the parties and of the state, is not at all incompatible with the altering of diverse forces at the government level. If, however, the alternative is presented as a threat, an institutional disintegration, then to promote the alternative is only a contrivance, a play of words.

[Question] Berlinguer was talking about not a simple alternative, but a democratic alternative.....

[Answer] And rightly so. But what does it mean? First of all, it means that we are dealing with an alternative which is neither secular nor, in a limited fashion, leftist. Second, it means that we absolutely do not intend, by upholding the alternative, to initiate a break with the constitutional picture. And finally, we do not repudiate the approach of a general unitary strategy, which the PCI nurtures for some time. Such approach comes from way back and is our inalienable inheritance. A transformation process of the country, let's even say in a socialist perspective, requires the contribution of the fundamental political forces, for the fundamental social forces: one must not mistake the diverse and changing political and government solutions with the basic strategy.

[Question] In a recent interview with Eugenio Scalfari you spoke of a majority structured around a program without discrimination such as to break the siege of the secretariats of the ruling parties and of the institutions. What kind of political and social alliances can take place around a proposal of this type?

[Answer] It is clear by now that governments based on the DC and on the PSI face negative results or, to say the least, disappointment. They embodied a serious crisis of political leadership. We want to overcome such crisis by building on the contents and not only on contents of moral healing, but also on contents of proper functioning of the institutions and of the parties, on contents which affect the economic life and strengthen the politics of disarmament and peace. I have never been told: there is a solution, there is a government formula, here it is, the communists are giving it to you. No. We believe that the current government is not the only one and the last one possible in this Parliament. We are also aware that we must run for the political leadership of the country, because a party with 33 percent of the votes cannot limit itself to work in the opposition and, in any case, must do it in pursuit of its own admission to the government. One can hypothesize intermediate steps. However, I remain strongly convinced that if we keep working exclusively on combinations of political leaderships, the changes are not enforceable, not even believable, not even if we ourselves promised them, remaining at the stage of agreements between the secretariats of the parties. We are not in any hurry to enter the game, this kind of a game. We are interested in building politics tied to programs, to contents. Today, this is essential.

With this new starting point, with this new choice, with this new priority, there would be a standard, a real, although limited scale with which and on which we would all be measured. There would be a way to compare political and social forces (and their placement as well as any possible convergence) no longer biased and arbitrarily discriminating, but objective, rational and tangible. In addition, adherence to a program fosters disorder not only of the parties and the political forces taken as they are, but also causes disorder within them. In fact, in an effective program of real recovery, even if gradual, renewal penetrates the political and social forces and cuts across them in a horizontal sense. It does not separate them, necessarily, in a vertical sense. I want to make clear, in other words, that since the parties, the classes, the social and cultural areas are not without differences among them, to place at the heart of politics the question of the contents, of the program, of the things that need to get done, does not translate into saying: let come whoever wants to come. We are not proposing governments ready to be dissolved, nor are we upholding the game of the interchangeability. If anything, it is the spirit and the process by which coalitions formed in the past and form today, which is in accordance with the logic of the alignment and with the ambiguity and inconsistency of the government programs.

[Question] How is the central role of the program connected with the problem of restoring relations between parties, government and Parliament back to normality?

[Answer] In this connection I noticed that your magazine stresses "free government based on a political program". It is a nice idea, but not a small thing. The choices determining the alignments which at the end appear as ideological choices, carry too much weight. We want to bring back into the formation of the majority the secular meaning of the political choices together with a unity of approach which can be achieved around a program. We want to avoid the unconstitutional procedure of the 'combines' between the party leaderships. What we are proposing should be the normality, the usual characteristic of what I would call - and that according to the constitution is defined as - a "parliamentary government." Today everybody calls for changes in the constitution and there are indeed some aspects of it that need to be changed. However, we want first of all to go back to the Constitution. Allow me to point out, however, that this is a very difficult step.

Should a future government move in this new direction, we would assume a different attitude towards such government. However, no one should expect that we serve as a stepping stone and as water carriers to anybody.....

[Question] The controversy on the Andreotti case has been interpreted or presented mostly as a permanent break between the two main Italian parties. What happened to the relations with the Catholic world? Doesn't the DC still represent a part of it? And is it right to consider it as a stumbling block, as a kind of firm and unchangeable reality?

[Answer] Please allow me to state a premise which I consider important and which I often repeated in recent times. No one has the right to interpret

a few critical comments, which I expressed concerning the congregational document for the Doctrine of the Faith, as a change in the PCI strategic approach to such a fundamental point as the dialogue with the Catholics. It is a biased portrayal of us which shows us as being engaged in some kind of religious war. I repeat that we are not about to invade someone else's turf. I limited myself to pointing out a few obvious political implications of that document. You see, I could even appreciate, personally, the fact that the Pope decided to go back to Latin as the language of the Mass, since people smile at my using quotes from the classics too often. However, I cannot refrain from wondering, just as many Catholics do, about the meaning of such a step backwards in the context of the overall attitude of the Church towards history, towards contemporary society. No, my dear Pratesi, we do not draw back, we will continue the dialogue with the Catholics. Have you seen the movie of Berlinguer's funerals? How many signs of faith were displayed by so many people that follow us in front of that coffin! The ones who say that we are the second Catholic party are not totally wrong. Who can deny this reality? Our attention has always been alert, even during the darkest times. You will recall Togliatti's appeal against the atomic threat in 1954. And certainly I don't need to remind you of the importance of the exchange of letters between the bishop of Ivrea, Mgr Bettazzi, and Enrico Berlinguer. On the other hand, we acknowledged the importance of certain stands taken by the Pope concerning peace and disarmament. We believe that the Catholic world is deeply interested in the moral question. By the same token, we are interested in the courageous activities of bishops such as Mgr Pappalardo and Mgr Triboldi against the mafia and the camorra.

[Question] Yes, but what about the Christian Democratic Party?

[Answer] I believe, and it seems to me obvious, that our continuing attention and initiative towards the Catholic community has a positive influence on the DC. The Christian Democratic Party is accusing us now of making it look like it was possessed by the demon, of having declared a war on it with no forbidden strikes. It isn't true. We never said that the DC belongs with the mafia and corruption. These are simplifications made for convenience sake. Our analysis leads us to point out the inconsistencies in a composite reality such as the DC, which represents the coexistence of different ideologies, different approaches and complex social relationships. Therefore, even if conservative thrusts often prevail in the DC, the whole party cannot be solely and wholly reduced to conservatism. Furthermore, we have absolutely no interest in pushing the DC in this direction or, even worse, on a reactionary path. Also in the very recent case, of which we hear so much, we did not start from biased positions. However, there are events and responsibilities to which the Christian Democratic leaders ought to give serious thought. It happened that 50 deputies expressed lack of confidence in Andreotti. Many of them, by their own admission, are just democrats. I am not interested in personal attacks. We fight the PSI and the DC on their policies, the ordinance, the ill-conceived initiatives, the lenience about the missiles. I am not interested at all in attacking Craxi or De Mita. I am interested, we are interested in the future of the country, of the Italian democracy, of justice. We are concerned about the citizens not losing their faith in the institutions.

[Question] One last question: what is, finally, this "diversity" that the PCI should give up in order to be accepted as an equal among the democratic parties?

[Answer] It is time to stop with this pretense. What is in fact this diversity of ours? It is indeed the identity itself, the distinguishing character of the history and the experience of the PCI. It is found in the substance of our politics. When Togliatti was talking about the "new party", he was laying the foundations of our diversity. It was the strategy, the pursuit of a socialist revolution in a place and at a time different from those in which it took place elsewhere decades before, in a new phase of European history, of the workers' movement, of the world as a whole. Hence, the anchoring of the party in the revived Christian Democratic Party, the acknowledgment of a joint influence of a plurality of forces on the development of the society. Hence the joining of our party based on the acceptance not of an ideological faith any longer, but of a political program. Togliatti went beyond the so called third-internationalist party. At the same time, however, he was keeping alive some traditional values. He did not explicitly speak of the "diversity" of the PCI. However, with a mischievous metaphor he spoke of a "giraffe" party: something with a weird and unusual look, but alive and real.

[Question] However, this is mostly diversity with respect to other communist parties.....

[Answer] Of course, but not only so. In the same way we define also our diversity with respect to the non-communist parties. There are other interpretations of the diversity that others would like to stick onto us, but that we reject. For instance, the one which says that we attribute to ourselves a moral superiority over every one else. I am not going to be the one to deny the virtues of the communists. However, virtues are not an inborn quality. They are the product of the moral tensions, of the sacrifices that we have undertaken, of the history that we have lived through. It is a fact that they are there (although sometimes corruption touched upon us too) and this is a fact that anyone is in a position to assess. Another totally distorted charge is that there is in us a presumption of truth, that we are dogmatic, carrying in our pockets solutions grounded in ideology as if they were unquestionable assumptions. This kind of attitude may have deep roots. However, the renewal of the party has been deep and undeniable. There is finally one last interpretation according to which the diversity that we are talking about is understood as something that would place the PCI sooner or later outside the democratic system. This is the most current, but also the most facile. It is the main argument, although the most remote from the truth, used by those who favor our preclusion.

[Question] However, as you said yourself, the PCI plans to transform the capitalistic economic system.

[Answer] Undoubtedly. Working towards a transformation of the economic structures and of the social relationships remains our inheritance and also



our reason for being. The present crisis and even the corruption are also the product of the problems generated by the coexistence of full democratic freedom with a capitalism that is no longer advancing, that is waddling and is bringing about not progress but alternating stagnation and inflation or a combination of both. The money clings to politics and corrupts it when it is no longer producing fruits in accordance with the law. The transformation of the economic structures and of the social order becomes then the main avenue in order for all of us to remain within the democracy and to make it stronger. The hope, the tenacity, the spirit of innovation that were so alive in Togliatti and Berlinguer are essential for us. We must keep alive our faith and sharpen our capability to build socialism in Italy and in the West, preserving the democracy and the peace.

12667

CSO: 3528/17

## POLL SHOWS MOTA AMARAL AS FAVORITE PSD CANDIDATE

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 23-29 Nov 84 pp 4-5

[Text] Mota Amaral, Mario Soares, Mota Pinto, and Alberto Joao Jardim--in that order--are the candidates that the PSD [Social Democratic Party] ought to support at this moment, according to a Marktest-O JORNAL poll conducted on the weekend of 10-11 November. Mota Amaral is the preferred candidate--by a good margin--in the opinion of the PSD's own voters. To some extent, the answers to the question "Which candidate should the PSD support for president of the republic?" reflect the current political situation.

The poll was conducted in 16 localities with over 10,000 inhabitants in all parts of the country, and 485 individuals were interviewed. In the first query, the question was presented without any names being mentioned, thus leaving the field open for any answer. Those interviewed therefore answered spontaneously, yielding the following results:

Mota Amaral: 10.6 percent; Mota Pinto: 10 percent; Mario Soares: 8.9 percent; Alberto Joao Jardim: 5.7 percent; Pinto Balsemao: 3.9 percent; Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo: 3 percent; Freitas do Amaral: 2.5 percent; and Firmino Miguel: 2.2 percent. Other names cited that also deserve mention were: Eurico de Melo: 1.3 percent; Helena Roseta: 0.4 percent; Lemos Ferreira: 0.4 percent; and Lucas Pires: 0.4 percent.

It is interesting to note immediately that in response to the second query, in which eight names were presented and the interviewee was required to choose only one, the most popular candidates were Alberto Joao Jardim and Helena Roseta, each with 5.5 percent, followed by Mota Amaral with 4.8 percent and Mario Soares with 3.7 percent. Firmino Miguel "garnered" 2.1 percent, Pinto Balsemao 1.6 percent, and Mota Pinto 1.3 percent.

Notice, however, that in the second query, 4.7 percent of those polled answered "none of the above," and 70.8 percent either said they did not know or did not answer. In the first query (in which no names were suggested), 3.7 percent of those polled answered "none," and 43.5 percent did not know or did not answer.

In an analysis by region, we find that in the first query (spontaneous answers), Mota Amaral did best in Lisbon (11.6 percent) and Porto (15.6 percent) and scored lowest in the North (3 percent) and the South (7.7 percent). On the

other hand, Mota Pinto achieved his best percentage in the North (18.6 percent), while in Lisbon he scored 8.9 percent, in Porto 9.4 percent, and in the South no more than 6.8 percent--exactly the same percentage achieved in the South by Mario Soares, who did well in Lisbon (10.3 percent) and the North (10.8 percent) and scored lowest in Porto (5.2 percent).

For his part, Alberto Joao Jardim garnered 8.2 percent in the Lisbon region, 5.2 percent in the Porto region, 0.8 percent in the North region, and 2.4 percent in the South region, while Balsemao's best percentages are in Porto (7.3 percent) and the South (4.2 percent), compared to 2.7 percent in Lisbon and 3.3 percent in the North. Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo was mentioned by 3.4 percent in Lisbon, 6.3 percent in Porto, 0 percent in the North, and 0.4 percent in the South.

By age group, and according to the results of the first query, we find the highest percentage for Mota Amaral in the 25-34 age group (15.3 percent), while Mota Pinto is preferred by young people between the ages of 18 and 24. The 45-54 age group is the one preferring Mario Soares (12.9 percent). The highest percentage for Joao Jardim also comes from the 18-24 age group, and the same is true for Lourdes Pintasilgo (3.7 percent), while Balsemao's situation is identical to that of Mario Soares, but with 5.7 percent.

#### Preferences of PSD Voters

If we judge by the vote in previous elections (for the Assembly of the Republic and president of the republic), we can conclude that in the first query (when no names were suggested, remember), the PSD's voters preferred Mota Pinto (15.9 percent), Mota Amaral (12.9 percent), and Alberto Joao Jardim (10.8 percent), followed by Firmino Miguel (7.7 percent), Pinto Balsemao (2.5 percent), and Eurico de Melo (2 percent).

Socialist Party [PS] voters prefer Mario Soares (16.6 percent), who is followed, although at a distance, by Mota Pinto (9.1 percent) and Mota Amaral (8.9 percent). Pinto Balsemao "garners" 4.3 percent, Lourdes Pintasilgo 6.3 percent, and Alberto Joao Jardim 4.3 percent. For their part, CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] voters "lean toward" Mota Amaral (28.2 percent), who is followed by Helena Roseta with 7.1 percent. Mario Soares is not mentioned, and Mota Pinto gets about 4.9 percent.

In the case of APU [United People's Alliance] voters, Mario Soares is mentioned by 13.8 percent, while 6.8 percent name Mota Amaral, 6 percent Eurico de Melo, and 5.5 percent Mota Pinto.

Of the interviewees who voted for General Ramalho Eanes, 10.4 percent feel that the PSD ought to support Mota Amaral, and 8 percent prefer Mota Pinto. The highest percentage, however, favors Mario Soares: 13.1 percent.

The results of the two questions (one with spontaneous answers and the other with names suggested) present us with some surprises in this area. The first has to do with the APU's voters, who place Mario Soares (15.6 percent) and Helena Roseta (13.3 percent) first and relegate Eurico de Melo (6.5 percent),

Mota Amaral (8.6 percent), Mota Pinto (5.5 percent), and Alberto Joao Jardim (5.3 percent) to secondary positions.

But Helena Roseta is also mentioned frequently by CDS voters (14.8 percent), although the great majority of them name Mota Amaral (43.3 percent). Mota Amaral (14.9 percent) and Mario Soares (17.1 percent) are also the names mentioned by the greatest percentages of those who voted for Ramalho Eanes, with Alberto Joao Jardim coming in third (10.6 percent).

Interpretation of the overall poll results indicates that PS voters are continuing to back Mario Soares (22 percent), followed by Mota Amaral (13.5 percent) and Alberto Joao Jardim (12.8 percent), with Mota Pinto getting about 9.3 percent.

In the case of the PSD's voters, 22.1 percent of those polled mentioned Mota Amaral, and 16.8 percent named Mota Pinto. Alberto Joao Jardim is a short distance behind with 16.5 percent. Interestingly, the highest percentage favoring Firmino Miguel is found among the PSD's voters (9.3 percent). He was mentioned by 3.4 percent of the PS voters, 3.3 percent of the APU's voters, 1 percent of the CDS voters, and 3.3 percent of those who voted for General Eanes. In the last-named group, Mario Soares is mentioned most frequently (17.1 percent), followed by Mota Amaral (14.9 percent) and Alberto Joao Jardim (10.6 percent). Mota Pinto has 9.5 percent and Helena Roseta 6.6 percent.

#### Mota Amaral and Soares "Beat" Mota Pinto

The total responses (the sum of both queries) enable us to draw up the following list: Mota Amaral: 15.2 percent; Mario Soares: 12.6 percent; Mota Pinto: 11.3 percent; Alberto Joao Jardim: 11.2 percent; Helena Roseta: 6.2 percent; Pinto Balsemao: 5.5 percent; Firmino Miguel: 4.3 percent; Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo: 3 percent; Freitas do Amaral: 2.5 percent; Eurico de Melo: 1.3 percent; Lucas Pires: 0.4 percent; and Lemos Ferreira: 0.4 percent. Other names: 3.2 percent; none: 1.8 percent; and "don't know" or no answer: 22.1 percent.

The responses by those polled in the Lisbon region give the "majority" to Mota Amaral and Alberto Joao Jardim (16.4 percent each), followed by Mario Soares (13.7 percent) and, behind him, Mota Pinto (10.3 percent) and Helena Roseta (8.2 percent). Those polled in the Porto region also name Mota Amaral (18.8 percent), while 9.4 percent mention Mota Pinto, Mario Soares, and Pinto Balsemao, and 8.3 percent mention Alberto Joao Jardim and Helena Roseta.

In the North, the name mentioned most frequently is that of Mota Pinto (22.3 percent of those polled), followed by Mario Soares (14 percent). At 11.2 percent, Mario Soares continues to be in second place in the South, where 13 percent of those polled prefer Mota Amaral.

By age group, we find that of the young people between 18 and 24 years of age, 20.8 percent mentioned Mota Pinto, 15.8 percent mentioned Mota Amaral, and 13.3 percent preferred Alberto Joao Jardim. Mota Amaral continues to be the favorite among those between 25 and 34 years of age (18 percent), but just behind him is Mario Soares with 15.7 percent, followed by Alberto Joao Jardim with



10.4 percent. Amaral and Soares are also the two mentioned most frequently by those polled in the 35-44 age group (15 and 13.1 percent respectively) and by those in the 45-54 age group (14.6 and 13.2 percent). Among those over 55 years of age, Alberto Joao Jardim is first with 16.5 percent, 16.4 percent [as published], and then Mario Soares with 14.6 percent.

Which Candidate Should the PSD Support?  
(vertical percentages)

Candidate	Region					Sex	
	Total	Lisbon	Porto	North	South	Male	Female
Mota Amaral	15.2	16.4	18.8	8.2	13.0	14.3	16.1
Mario Soares	12.6	13.7	9.4	14.0	11.2	16.0	9.1
Mota Pinto	11.3	10.3	9.4	22.3	7.3	9.6	13.1
Alberto J. Jardim	11.2	16.4	8.3	4.5	2.9	15.5	6.8
Helena Roseta	6.2	8.2	8.3	1.5	1.3	5.3	7.2
Pinto Balsemao	5.5	4.8	9.4	4.4	4.2	5.2	5.8
Firmino Miguel	4.3	6.2	0.0	2.9	4.4	6.3	2.3

Previous vote (for Assembly of the Republic  
and president of the republic) was for:

Candidate	Total	PS	PSD	APU	CDS	Eanes
						for president
Mota Amaral	15.2	13.5	22.1	8.6	43.3	14.9
Mario Soares	12.6	22.0	3.3	15.6	1.0	17.1
Mota Pinto	11.3	9.3	16.8	5.5	4.9	9.5
Alberto J. Jardim	11.2	12.8	16.5	5.3	8.0	10.6
Helena Roseta	6.2	3.7	8.3	13.3	14.8	6.6
Pinto Balsemao	5.5	8.2	3.6	8.6	10.2	7.3
Firmino Miguel	4.3	3.4	9.3	3.3	1.0	3.3

11798

CSO: 3542/59

## GOVERNMENT-COMMISSIONED POLL: SOARES NOT 'IDEAL' CANDIDATE

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Nov 84 pp 1, 29

[Text] The voter image of the current prime minister, Mario Soares, is the exact opposite of the profile that those same voters describe as ideal for the future president of the republic. This is revealed by the government-commissioned poll whose results helped set off the current political crisis.

Those results, to which EXPRESSO has had access, help explain the weak position occupied by the Socialist leader on the scale of voter preferences in connection with the next chief of state--a scale on which a comfortable lead is enjoyed by Lourdes Pintasilgo, who is well out in front of the figure in second place, Freitas do Amaral.

Whereas the former head of government is mentioned by 22 percent of the Portuguese, the founder of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] has the support of only 11 percent. Next in line are Mota Amaral (10 percent), Mario Soares (9 percent), Mota Pinto and Alberto Joao Jardim (each with 6 percent), Salgado Zenha (4 percent), and the military men, Firmino Miguel and Lemos Ferreira (each with around 2 percent). But almost one-third (28 percent) of the 2,600 individuals polled during the month of October still had no opinion or did not respond.

Lourdes Pintasilgo's lead is based especially in the country's most developed areas among the middle strata of the population and among voters who have displayed less party loyalty and a greater sense of the useful vote. Mario Soares, on the other hand, has stronger support in Greater Lisbon, while individuals in the highest social groups are the ones supporting Freitas do Amaral and Mota Amaral.

This poll, which was concerned especially with the presidential election, is also quite revealing as to the way in which the current supporters of the various parties react to the potential candidates. Only 35 percent of the Socialist voters would choose Mario Soares as president of the republic, and 15 percent would prefer Lourdes Pintasilgo.

For their part, Social Democratic voters are very divided, with Mota Amaral having a slight lead (21 percent). He is followed by Freitas do Amaral (17 percent), while the party leader, Mota Pinto, is only in third place (16 percent).

## Nonpartisan, Nonmilitary President

Another possible candidate, Alberto Joao Jardim, is supported by only 9 percent of the Social Democrats, putting him slightly ahead of Mario Soares (who has about 6 percent). Nor are the possible military candidates preferred by the party's voters: 4 percent say they would vote for Firmino Miguel, and 2 percent would choose Lemos Ferreira.

For her part, Lourdes Pintasilgo is more popular among APU [United People's Alliance] supporters--61 percent say they would vote for her--than among the potential voters for a possible "Eanist" party (44 percent). Freitas do Amaral stands alone in dominating the center's voters, being preferred by 47 percent, while Lourdes Pintasilgo, oddly enough, occupies second place with 9 percent, ahead of Mota Amaral with 8 percent.

Comparing present voting intentions if there were a legislative election with the preferred presidential candidate also yielded some interesting results. For example, more APU voters would choose Alberto Joao Jardim than would vote for Mario Soares, Mota Pinto, or Mota Amaral. At the same time, the second most popular figure among "Eanists" is also the chairman of the Madeira Regional Government, while it is the supporters of that party as well as of the PS [Socialist Party] and the PSD [Social Democratic Party] who would deliver the most votes to a military man (6 percent in all three cases, divided between Lemos Ferreira and Firmino Miguel). At the opposite extreme is the CDS, where only 2 percent of the voters would support a military candidate.

It is likely that these results--especially the good position occupied by Lourdes Pintasilgo, with Freitas do Amaral probably in second place--are also due to the clear preference by voters for a president of the republic who has no ties with the political parties. In fact, 59 percent of the Portuguese covered by the survey would choose a president relatively removed from the parties, while 26 percent favor close ties. This result is particularly significant in that it was one of the questions to which the largest number of those polled responded or on which they had an opinion: 85 percent.

As far as the poor results for Mario Soares are concerned, the explanation must lie in the wide gap--mentioned above--that exists between the image of the ideal president of the republic and the prime minister's image among voters. While 82 percent of those polled feel that honesty is an essential characteristic for the president of the republic, only 15 percent regard the current prime minister as honest. The public image of Mario Soares is also very poor when it comes to other characteristics regarded as basic, examples being firmness, fairness, and authority. In the eyes of the voters, the Socialist leader is also less dynamic, more corrupt, less humanistic, and less humble than an ideal president would be. The results are in relative balance only in the case of intelligence and culture. Lastly, Mario Soares receives really high marks only in those aspects of a chief of state's ideal image which are almost irrelevant--such as being likable, having friends abroad, and, to a lesser degree, having political experience (see the table).

Comparison Between the Image of Mario Soares and That  
of an Ideal President of the Republic (in percentages)

<u>Quality</u>	<u>President of of the republic</u>	<u>Mario Soares</u>
Honest	82	17
Firm	52	15
Experienced in politics	36	62
Friends abroad	10	63
Catholic	29	21
Intelligent	61	52
Tolerant	8	23
Fair	56	9
Cultured	29	34
Likable	14	36
Authority	30	19
Dynamic	23	15
Humble	16	7
Not corrupt	16	7
Humanist	22	14

The two images are therefore complete opposites and probably cannot be easily changed.

The results of this poll are also worrisome for the Socialist Party from the standpoint of the emergence of an "Eanist" party. If such a party were formed, the PS would drop from 37.8 percent of the vote in 1983 to 22.7 percent and wind up behind the PSD, whose results would be almost the same: 24.9 percent today, compared to 26.7 percent in 1983. The "Eanist" party itself would get 14.1 percent of the vote, mainly at the expense of the PS, whose defecting voters would account for half of that percentage. The other "Eanist" voters would come from among the abstainers (18 percent) and from the PSD (10 percent), the APU (16 percent), and the CDS (6 percent).

That shift in votes would therefore affect all of today's political forces. Out of every 10 voters that each party had in 1983, the PS would keep 5, the PSD and the CDS 7 each, and the APU 8.

All these figures must be interpreted with some caution, however, since the insertion into the poll of a hypothetical "Eanist" party which has not yet been formed and whose image is blurred is a debatable procedure. Moreover, in comparing 1984 with 1983, we must not forget that there was an election campaign in 1983 and that this poll was conducted at a time when the government's popularity was at one of its lowest points.

#### PS Most Eroded of Coalition Parties

Because of that, it is not surprising that according to information gathered by EXPRESSO, announcement of the results of this poll led the Socialist Party to hire a West German firm specializing in such matters to come up with a projection covering a universe of 5,000 individuals. According to that second



poll, continuation of the present electoral picture would mean that the PS would drop only to about 30 percent, while the PSD would stay at around 26 percent. The Socialist setback would be less severe, and in the opinion of party sources, it could be completely offset in an election campaign.

The signs remain, however, that the PS is the party that has suffered the most erosion as a result of the government's performance, and this tallies with another result of the poll commissioned by the government: whereas only 15 percent of those polled approve of the Socialist ministers in the current government, 23 percent like the Social Democrats, while 12 percent approve of both, and 25 percent do not like any of them.

One final interesting feature of this poll has to do with the suggested replacement for Mario Soares as secretary general of the PS. Jaime Gama is in first place, being preferred by 9 percent, and is followed by Salgado Zenha (7 percent), Almeida Santos (6 percent), and Victor Constancio (2 percent). Significantly, however, 72 percent of those polled did not know or declined to answer, a fact that gives the Socialist Party and Mario Soares considerable room for maneuver in studying and deciding on the future leadership of the party.

11798

CSO: 3542/59

## PRELIMINARY POLL FINDINGS: JARDIM TRAILS PINTASILGO

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 24 Nov 84 p 64

[Text] Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is up considerably from the previous month (from 15.4 to 22.5 percent) and is now the individual with the most support for election as president, although over 40 percent of the Portuguese did not choose any of the names suggested to them.

Alberto Joao Jardim would do better in a presidential election than Lucas Pires and Pinto Balsemao if they were running simultaneously, according to a NORMA poll that we will publish next week. In one of the hypothetical races, the candidates were assumed to be Cunhal, Pintasilgo, Soares, Balsemao, and Lucas Pires, while in the other they were Cunhal, Pintasilgo, Soares, and Jardim.

Another outstanding result is that Soares, Pintasilgo, and Cunhal keep the same percentages in both cases, with Jardim's four additional points (an increase of about 33 percent) coming from people who, in the other hypothetical case, did not respond or did not support any of the candidates listed.

Jardim would be ahead of Soares in Lisbon, Evora, and Coimbra but behind him in Porto, Vila Real, and Viseu. Nationwide, however, he would beat Soares by three points. In that case, the second round in the presidential election would be a runoff between Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo and Alberto Joao Jardim.

The immediate conclusions that can be drawn from this poll are that no votes would be transferred to the Left, that Jardim would probably mobilize sectors alienated from the political system and potential abstainers, that there is more relative support for Lucas Pires than for Pinto Balsemao, and that the Social Democratic Center Party's voters accept Alberto Joao Jardim.

On the other hand, it is significant that Cunhal has the support of 7 percent. This seems to represent the most disciplined core of Communists, since that was also the percentage obtained by Octavio Pato in 1976. The higher score for Pintasilgo--who may have benefited from the inclusion of Cunhal's name, which was not included in previous months (and which had the effect this time of shifting her toward the center of the spectrum)--brings the number of her supporters back up to the level achieved in May and July, her best months since we began this monthly barometer.

11798

CSO: 3542/59

## EANES ADMITS POLITICAL ROLE POSSIBLE IN FUTURE

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 10 Dec 84 p 3

[Report on interview with Gen Ramalho Eanes, president of the republic, on 9 December on RADIO RENASCENCA: "Ramalho Eanes Concedes Possibility of Participation Within Party Framework"; place and interviewer's name not given]

[Excerpts] The president of the republic conceded yesterday that personal participation in party politics was possible after his term expires. "If the governing policies of the existing political parties do not provide a satisfactory answer for the nation's problems, after my term expires I shall certainly play a political role, with different characteristics, but supporting the same values," Eanes asserted in an interview granted to the "Cards on the Table" program on RADIO RENASCENCA.

The chief of state emphasized that "this different political action, within the existing constitutional framework, must be accomplished through instruments of a party nature," adding, however, that as long as he is president he will be "president of the republic of the Portuguese."

He asserted that his attitude toward his future role is based upon the limitations that were imposed by the constitutional revision, which, he said, "reduced the possibilities for autonomous political participation by independents and created a situation in which the president of the republic, even though he had a political program, could not accomplish it," as well as preventing him from fulfilling his campaign promises, which he called his "letter of commitment to the voters."

Resignation: A Constitutional Possibility

Asked about the possibility of his resigning before the end of his term of office in order to participate in party politics, the president recalled his constitutional responsibilities, emphasizing particularly his being the guarantee of the "stable functioning of democratic institutions."

"I am not resigning from anything for which I am constitutionally responsible," he said.

"The president could never say that he will not use this or that instrument; that includes my resignation," he added, emphasizing that it can be considered "an

available instrument," that he will use or not, "depending upon how national politics develops and upon how useful this instrument could be at a given time for developing and stabilizing democracy in Portugal."

"Of course, I will never use an available instrument (including this one) in a gratuitous manner or in a way that is not ethically justified and politically necessary," he explained.

#### Nation May Find Solutions

At another point in the interview, and in reference to the current situation in Portugal, Ramalho Eanes expressed hope that the nation can manage to find other solutions within 10 years.

"There are favorable developments in economic policy, but they cannot convince us that things will change, and change for the better, in the immediate future," he said.

Ramalho Eanes said he accepts his share of responsibility for the nation's current situation but, he stressed, "only that."

After mentioning that his participation in government circles is quite limited, the president of the republic said that "in assuming responsibility" he is not willing "to assume the responsibility of others."

#### Military Coup Unthinkable At Present

Asked about the role of the Catholic Church in Portugal, he said that he viewed it as "special and with considerable cultural influence," advocating a "close relationship, without it signifying dependency, between the church and the state, in such a way as to make it possible to coordinate efforts.

"Whenever politicians have forgotten that the church has important social influence, there have been serious and unnecessary deviations," he stressed.

In another area, that of the armed forces, Gen Ramalho Eanes deemed a military coup d'etat at this time unthinkable.

"For the first time it is not possible, given the political awareness of the military and the objective conditions existing in Portugal."

8834

CSO: 3542/66



## LEMONS FERREIRA REPORTEDLY EYEING PRESIDENCY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 17 Nov 84 p 5

[Article by P.A.]

[Text] "Technically and professionally, General Lemos Ferreira is an excellent officer--very good indeed." That is what we were told by a former associate of the Armed Forces chief of staff, who hastened to add: "But he is a thoroughly ambitious man."

His controversial attitude in making a clear distinction--which can only be political--between Marshals Costa Gomes and Antonio Spínola is probably directly related to that ambition. In most political circles, Lemos Ferreira's action was in fact interpreted as a means of satisfying either NATO (it should be remembered that Costa Gomes is an outstanding figure on the World Council for Peace and Cooperation, an organization regarded as a vehicle for Soviet interests in connection with disarmament) or the Portuguese Right, the idea being to gain support for his candidacy in the upcoming presidential election. And interestingly, the controversial stand he has now taken coincides with the assertion by some sectors of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] that the party should make him, a military leader, its candidate as an alternative to Mario Soares. Those sectors claim there is a danger that Firmino Miguel might be supported by Eanes, and they regard that as undesirable.

In the long run, though, Lemos Ferreira may have helped reduce his own chances. He already has problems with some of the top officers in the Armed Forces (there are generals who will not even speak to him), and in an institution with a strongly corporative spirit, such an attitude only makes those problems worse. A military source told us that Lemos Ferreira's greatest enmities in the Armed Forces go back to his days as a brigadier general and his behavior at that time as a result of his burning desire to get ahead of his comrades in obtaining his four stars as a full general.

One thing is certain: while Firmino Miguel might obtain the support of Eanes, the current Armed Forces chief of staff will not only not obtain it but will also face permanent opposition from some of the high-ranking officers. The military source referred to above described him this way: "A second Soares Carneiro."

Jose Lemos Ferreira, 55 years old and a native of Portalegre, is a pilot who, according to his official biography, had a great aptitude for aerial acrobatics, "in which he became a very outstanding figure as a member of detachments participating in air shows both inside and outside the country and raised the wings of the Portuguese Air Force to a place of distinction."

Before 25 April [1974], he was considered politically independent, and he is not known to have had any commitment to the former regime. In Portuguese Guinea, he was nicknamed the "explainer" because of his detailed explanations concerning the war and the piloting of aircraft.

Immediately after the revolution, all the preparations were made for purging him on the basis of rumors concerning shady activities reportedly engaged in by him while in Portuguese Guinea. Lemos Ferreira himself then demanded an inquiry from which he emerged completely vindicated.

During the PREC, he distinguished himself above all by his professionalism and technical proficiency, appearing almost apolitical. In December 1976, he was appointed air force chief of staff, thus becoming automatically a member of the Council of the Revolution. From that point on, he began to work his way politically toward the Right.

In the 1980 presidential election, his name was discussed within the AD [Democratic Alliance] as a candidate for Belem Palace. But at the time, Sa Carneiro had other ideas, and he imposed them. But running for president seems indeed to be one of Lemos Ferreira's ambitions.

11798

CSO: 3542/59

## PROENCA DE CARVALHO STATES VIEWS ON PRESIDENCY

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Nov 84 p 24

[Report on speech by Daniel Proenca de Carvalho at a seminar on the presidential election, in Lisbon on 16 November 1984]

[Text] "It is not desirable for the presidential election to become simply a deal between parties, since that would mean an election incommensurate with the national project that is essential." That is what Daniel Proenca de Carvalho said last night at a seminar on "The What and Why of Presidential Elections" that was sponsored by the Lisbon District Committee of the Social Democratic Party.

Saying first that "it is possible to note very extensive consensus among the various political and cultural families regarding the diagnosis of the crisis, although there is disagreement as to its etiology and the required therapy," the speaker emphasized that "with 10 years having passed" since the Revolution of 25 April 1974, "the Portuguese, according to what is revealed by the polls, are still democrats but unhappy and disbelieving, and their morale is on the decline." He then drew attention to the "great myths" which stirred up and mobilized the revolution but which have now fallen into discredit.

In a brief summarization of what has happened in various spheres, Proenca de Carvalho recalled that "the revolution was relatively peaceful but far-reaching" and emphasized that it "undermined the confidence of private enterprise. It shook the military institution like an earthquake. For a time, it weakened the voice of the church. It gave strength to the communist movement through the latter's multiple infiltrations, particularly in the apparatus of the unions, the state, culture, and the media."

Proenca de Carvalho also recalled that throughout these years, "almost all the great names on our macroeconomic stage have passed through the Ministry of Finance" and "applied the usual technical remedies to the situation." He also emphasized that "the state has also ceased to merit confidence. It has not paid the indemnifications it promised, it does not pay its current debts on time, and the budget forecasts are not trustworthy. It has lost its authority. The citizens have to see to their own safety--private organizations for self-defense are proliferating. The mythology of social statistics has led to their multiplication."

## Factors for Resistance

First asking--and then answering--the question of why the current situation of economic crisis has not yet been turned around, Proenca de Carvalho said that "all those responsible for political power have been more or less aware of the irrationality and inefficiency of the social-economic system under which we live." He then emphasized that "few have had the will to reform it. No one has had sufficient power to carry out that task."

And after a brief assessment of the performance of the various governments--according to their ideological leanings--Proenca de Carvalho pointed to "three factors for resistance to change and modernity": the spirit of conservatism that is dominant in the nation's "intelligentsia," the existence of a new class brought into being by the revolution and having common interests as a social class regardless of the parties its members have joined, and the current president of the republic, with whom lies "chief responsibility for obstruction of the change that began to appear in 1979 and 1980 and even after that."

Dwelling then on an assessment of the "consulship" of Sa Carneiro, the former chairman of the RTP [Portuguese Television System] said that the late Social Democratic leader "had a premonition, misunderstood by many at the time, that the current president of the republic's horizons did not include the plan for a Portugal moving toward modernity with a responsible and dynamic civilian society and within the framework of a state endowed with maximum authority in the smallest possible range of functions."

## President's Role

Later in his speech, Proenca de Carvalho resumed his analysis of presidential behavior, saying:

"It is a serious mistake to minimize the president of the republic's role with the argument that his powers--somewhat reduced, by the way, as a result of the latest constitutional revision--are not intended and are not adequate for restoring politics as a factor for change rather than for preservation of the situation that exists."

Developing that theme, Proenca de Carvalho pointed out that "the president of the republic represents the only organ of sovereignty not suffering from internal dissension" and that his election "by direct and universal suffrage establishes a direct relationship--without intermediaries--with each and every citizen making up a nation and with the nation as a whole," a relationship that confers on him "a legitimacy and power not restricted solely to his legal powers as provided in the Constitution and the written law." He added:

"Would Portugal be the same today, in 1984, if its head of state had not been the gray individual who has actively or passively opposed every democratic government and every change in a liberal direction and whose decisions have won unanimous applause from the Communist Party, but rather an individual actively committed to the building of broad democratic consensus and to strong, stable



governments capable of dealing with the serious difficulties presented to us by the past and the present?

"Would Portugal be the same if, throughout the 8 years he has been in office, the president of the republic had been speaking positive words of hope and of confidence in ourselves?

"The upcoming presidential election can be of no interest only to those who consider it possible to break with the crisis and situation of decline by relying on nothing more than legislative measures intelligently applied by competent and serious governments."

Lastly, and "for better clarification, considering the situation we are passing through and the experience we have had," Proenca de Carvalho said that he personally gave priority to the "obligation to know who it is that we do not want as president." He said:

"Personally, and as a matter of priority, I reject: a president who is a new edition of the present one--one who meets the strategic needs of communism..., and a president who, although identified with democracy and freedom, is, on the other hand, the guarantor of the status quo--of preservation of the present situation."

11798

CSO: 3542/55

## SOARES CANDIDACY SEEN REASON FOR COALITION CRISIS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 16 Nov 84 p 6

[Editorial: "The Cost of Belem"]

[Text] All the controversy developing within the coalition--and threatening to destroy it--and outside of it in connection with the presidential candidacy of Mario Soares is not only deplorable but--to apply the words used by Socialist leader Antonio Campos to many people, including him--ridiculous and serious. One would think that "political Portugal" and the parties in power lived in a state of permanent obsession with electoral manipulation and were consumed by it--as though they were absorbed in a ludicrous operation of almost infantile proportions and as though the concerns of the Portuguese, which they are theoretically supposed to reflect, were exclusively a matter of arguing during the period between elections about whom they were going to elect in the next one. Unfortunately, that is not the way things are, and as a result, those most deeply involved in that somewhat absurd process are jeopardizing the image of "level-headedness" which is required of them and which some of them demand of the others while failing to do their own part. This is what has been happening in recent weeks with the "mutual displays" that have been occurring between officials of the coalition parties.

From the moment that the presidential issue became the pivot of all political activity--leading, on the one side, to not very sensible attempts at pressure by some Socialist officials (didn't Almeida Santos even say that the country would be crazy if it did not elect Mario Soares president?) and, on the other side, to a stoking of the internal guerrilla warfare of a PSD [Social Democratic Party] that lacks direction and has no clear strategy or leadership--it was to be expected that there would be a stalemate in which tensions between the coalition parties would become unbearable. That moment seems to have arrived, and from now on any outcome is possible, including the breakup of the coalition.

Underlying all that, willy-nilly, is the presidential campaign: the strategy outlined early on by the PS [Socialist Party] for getting its secretary general elected at all costs (but without openly naming its candidate) and the lack of strategy (or multiplicity of strategies) on the part of the PSD. It is in fact over that question, in the face of which the Social Democrats found themselves at a disadvantage, that the divisions within the PSD have deepened and that trends and susceptibilities have taken organized form and posed a growing

threat to Mota Pinto's position at the head of the party and led him to exert progressively greater pressure on the PS within the government.

To tell the truth, the Socialists have been showing a high degree of understanding and some acquiescence in response to the PSD leader's delicate position--but it must be noted that their understanding is not disinterested, since it is dictated by the greater importance represented by the party's presidential pretensions. But that attitude is costing the PS a great deal, judging from the results of polls placing the PS in a secondary position with respect to its coalition partner, which is systematically protecting itself behind a wall of ambiguities and moderate--if not openly critical--commitment to the coalition.

From the very first, Mario Soares has resolutely put his money on Mota Pinto, the only possible interlocutor in the PSD, with a view to achieving possible agreement in connection with the presidential election. At this stage, however, when voices in the PS are already being raised to ask "how much the political survival of Prof Mota Pinto has been costing" the secretary general himself and the party, the question presenting itself to the Socialists is that of whether the price of support in the race for the presidency--support that is growing less and less certain every day--is not too high for the PS. It appears that Mario Soares himself and the party leadership have realized, perhaps too late, that they must not pay it.

And if we say that it may be too late, the reason is that the Socialists have let the idea take hold that their acquiescence in response to the successive demands made by the PSD has been aimed solely at garnering Social Democratic support for the candidacy of Soares. In those conditions, the PSD is now in a position, now that its partner has urged it to take a definite stand, to give the answer that Antonio Capucho has already implied: the crisis in the coalition is due solely to the fact that the Socialists have tried to ensure at all costs that the Social Democrats will help Soares in the presidential campaign. Reduced to those terms, the apparent position of strength belatedly assumed by the PS may turn against the PS itself.

11798

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## CATHOLIC MAJORITY SEEN BECOMING POLITICAL MINORITY

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 10 Nov 84 p 12

[Commentary by Paulo Portas: "The Cross in the Voting"]

[Text] The church has no parties or presidential candidates, and if it did, it would no longer be a church. But since they elect and are elected like all other citizens, Catholics must participate in the life of the country and may have a shared preference for this party or that president. The fact is that experience shows that the world of ideology is not immune to antichrists and that the world of politics is frequently not inspired by principles of good--hence it is legitimate for Catholics to defend themselves politically. That legitimacy is all the more obvious in Portugal, where Catholicism is the community's primary point of reference and where, paradoxically, there are anti-clerical loyalties in the government and the idea in the system that the church does not count.

Just as a gap exists between the church and the system, so there will be little connection between the so-called "Catholic stump" [as published; presumably "Catholic vote" intended] and what is being assumed concerning the election in 1985. For the first time, many Catholics will theoretically have no choice among the presidential candidates. That fact is shocking and new. It ought to be an invitation to Catholics to reflect on a system which has little room for them.

It is obvious that when General Eanes was elected in 1976, he received most of the "Catholic vote." Everything converged to that end: as the national candidate emerging from the events of 25 November and the winning candidate backed by everyone against the PCP, Eanes was the church's guarantee that its vital interests would not again be threatened. And again in the presidential election of 1980, the free choice of the Catholics was not hampered by moral issues. It was clear that the reelection of Eanes was being helped along by "Marxist sectors" justly condemned in text and sermon. It was clear that Sa Carneiro was not peaceably inclined toward the church. And it was clear that Soares Carneiro was not a winner. But from the standpoint of the church's sectoral interests, there was no contest: while Soares Carneiro would defend them, Eanes would not attack them. With every indication being that Eanes would stay on in Belem Palace, the church remained silent, and the "Catholic vote" was divided. To sum it all up, the Catholics had a choice in the past.



In the 1985 presidential election, everything has changed. For the "Catholic vote" in general, and especially for the faithful with no leftwing commitment, this will be the most difficult choice ever, if not actually an impossible one. There are simple reasons for the skepticism. In the first place, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that the Right will agree on a national candidate who can win. This rules out the possibility that the next president will begin to heal the wounds opened by the state in its relations with the church. In the second place, there is no political argument that can take precedence over the questions of principle separating Mario Soares from the Catholics. It may seem that the current prime minister is the lesser evil in our politics. The truth is, however, that Mario Soares is the most perfect product of a reprehensible system and is responsible for the attack on the church's positions in 1984. Every attitude carries a price, and the complete insensitiveness shown by Mario Soares in his dealings with Catholic authority admits of no amendments--the church is not the budget, and the holes cannot be patched frivolously. In the third place, the candidacy of Lourdes Pintasilgo--dignified, it is true, by her position as a Catholic--may be an embarrassment to the church, but it does not delude the majority of Catholic voters. It is enough to recall the irresponsibility of her government, the demagoguery of her remarks, her "flirting" with the PCP, and the danger of her neutralism to suspect that Lourdes Pintasilgo comes from the church but is going over to the other side. In short, it may happen in 1985 that the Catholic majority will be a political minority.

With the system having reached this stage of absurdity, it would be advisable for the Catholics to start thinking about the system that will follow. Hope is worth much more than surrender.

11798

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## EX-CNARPE FIGURES CONSIDERS PCP 'DEMOCRATIC'

## Martinho Statement

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Dec 84 p 9

[Text] Engineer Herminho Martinho stated publicly yesterday (in a Radio Comercial broadcast) that "the communist party" is a "democratic party." He repeated the statement when asked to do so. Interesting. This is something that deserves to be followed.

## Martinho's Lapses

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 25 Dec 84 p 24

[Text] After we noted the symptomatic sympathy of the illustrious member of the ex-CNARPE [National Commission of Support for the Re-election of President Eanes] member, Mr Herminio Martinho, for the communist party, which he considers "democratic," going so far as showing his anger against those who "put obstacles in its path," the fellow corrected himself by saying that he was not referring to the party, but "to the 20 percent of the electorate that votes for him."

The thing is that Mr Martinho never explicitly or implicitly referred, in his interview on Radio Comercial, to the PCP electorate, something that would have cost him nothing, if he indeed wished to do so. But he didn't want to.

CSO. 3542/83

JCP: GOALS AT TIMES DIFFERENT FROM PCP'S

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Dec 84 pp 16-17

[Interview with Henrique Neves, Carlos Rabacal and Carlos Alfaia of Portuguese Communist Youth [JCP] by Henrique Monteiro: "We Do Not Always Agree With the PCP"; exact date and place of interview not given]

[Text] On the eve of their congress, O JORNAL interviewed two officials of the Portuguese Communist Youth: Henrique Neves, member of the Secretariat of the Executive Commission [CE] of the CC [Central Committee] of the JCP and also a member of the CC of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], and Carlos Rabacal, also of the Secretariat of the CE of the CC of the JCP. Also attending the interview was Carlos Alfaia, responsible for press relations of JUVENTUDE, the JCP's official newspaper.

It was an interview without restrictions, in which the young communist leaders offered to answer all questions. Issues such as drugs, military service, ecology are some of the subjects addressed by Henrique Neves and Carlos Rabacal, who acknowledged that at times they disagree with the PCP; notably in school, where JCP students are not always in agreement with PCP professors.

O JORNAL: What are the objectives of this Second Congress of the JCP?

Henrique Neves: The objectives of this congress have to do with improving our work at the internal level, with strengthening our organization in the various sectors where we are active and also with improving the liaison of our members and our organization with other youth movements and sectors. At the same time, we intend to make a diagnosis of the current situation of young people and to offer solutions.

O JORNAL: What type of solutions do you have for the major problems of youth, which we assume to be unemployment, finding the first job, employment for new graduates of professional schools and access to higher education?

Henrique Neves: The major problems are those that you mentioned, but not only those. We have 18 points for an alternative policy for youth that take into consideration not only those questions but also military service, conscientious

objection, use of free time, problems of farm youth, etc. This document, which is under discussion, suggests some solutions.

O JORNAL: Actually, how well established is the JCP among youth?

Henrique Neves: The number of members that we will report at the congress is about 25,000. Right now we have the largest number of members we have ever had in secondary schools and we are also growing among young workers.

O JORNAL: Do you have more members among workers or among students?

Henrique Neves: The numbers are substantially the same, but the majority are workers.

O JORNAL: Well, then, where does your main weakness lie?

Henrique Neves: Among farm youth... but in the universities also we feel that the number of organized members is far from corresponding to the influence we have.

'Leftists Follow Natural Path'

O JORNAL: After the leftist, or Maoist, generation had had great influence in the universities, about 10 years ago there was a period when the Left almost disappeared from the Associative Movement of Students [MA]. This correlation of forces is changing, but the communist students have not yet managed to recover the strength they once had, or am I wrong?

Carlos Rabacal: I don't see it that way. The Maoist generation, as you said, had some influence after 25 April [1974], but within the context of greater influence generally for all of the Left. Later there was, in fact, a rise of the Right, corresponding to what happened generally, throughout society. All this is, indeed, changing and over the short run we think that things will continue to evolve in that direction. The university situation is so deteriorated, in virtually a disruption of operation, that those who were on the wave of demagoguery have learned that this does not solve anything, any more than did the patchwork solutions that were imposed...

O JORNAL: A portion of that Maoist generation evolved toward positions of "university anti-communism," a highly elaborate anti-communism that accuses Marxism of being conservative. Didn't you encounter this ideological struggle in higher education?

Carlos Rabacal: In higher education there has always been a activist and essentially anti-communist Right. As for those who come from the Left, we must say that many are with us, or constitute a separate current of opinion; others followed their natural path.

O JORNAL: And what is their natural path?

Carlos Rabacal: The natural path for some of them was to join the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and the PSD [Social Democratic Party].



O JORNAL: But we were referring to the anti-communism that criticizes Marxism as conservative and the socialist countries as dictatorships, also conservative.

Carlos Rabacal: That type of evaluation exists throughout the country. But in the universities this is not the essential feature. Anti-communism there comes from the Right, from well-known sources. Some of these sectors don't even have room to advance, confronted with unemployment, teaching conditions, study conditions and the need for struggle and for unity, even among those with whom we do not agree, as occurred recently.

O JORNAL: Even with the JSD [Social Democratic Youth]?

Carlos Rabacal: It is not with the JSD, but it has been with students of the JSD and other organizations. What is happening in the university is that there is great unity of all student sectors against the policy that affects them strongly.

O JORNAL: Backing up a little, I would say that in the university, after the great influence that Marxism had as a method of analysis, it is under fire today, even in papers written by students.

Carlos Rabacal: As a matter of fact, after 25 April, any general idea was considered "Marxist." Even someone who had read two or three lines in a book called himself a "Marxist." What is happening in the university is a very strong anti-Marxist combat. In the specific case of schools where political sciences have great influence, such as law, we know of cases where the students must write their papers in keeping with the ideology of the professors. This is serious, but it happens.

JCP Not 'Shock Troops'

O JORNAL: From the 1920's to the 1940's, communist youth were considered as "shock troops" of the communist parties. After a certain point they also came to be viewed as agents of ideological and political renewal within the communist parties. What is the position of the JCP in relation to the PCP?

Henrique Neves: What I have read about communist youth of my party in the 1930's doesn't lead me to conclude that there was this concept of "shock troops"...

O JORNAL: But this was theorized even in Leninism and especially during the Stalinist period. Young people were to be the party's chief agitators and propagandists.

Henrique Neves: Well, I wanted to speak about what I am familiar with, which is the documents of that time that referred to communist youth. The idea that I have is that those were not the viewpoints of the studies. On the contrary, I understand that at that time there were warnings that are still valid today.

O JORNAL: The erstwhile Federation of Communist Youth of Portugal (FJCP), especially when led by Alvaro Cunhal, was very important in the reorganization of the PCP and even its renovation. Do you think that it could play a similar role today?

Henrique Neves: Right now two women from the JCP, Bernardina Sebastiao and Zita Seabra, are on the PCP Political Commission. Besides, over a score of the CC members are from the erstwhile UJC [Union of Communist Youth] and UEC [Union of Communist Students], the forerunners of the JCP.

O JORNAL: I was hoping you would discuss not only this renewal of personnel but also questions related to ideology and theory. Don't you think that in the PCP, with the exception of Alvaro Cunhal, there have been only a few theoretical contributions?

Henrique Neves: In both the JCP and the PCP there have been several collective documents to whose preparation all the members have contributed. I think these documents have reflected analyses of situations that correspond to studies of ideology. What you are telling me is that there haven't been individual documents.

O JORNAL: But why this lack of individual contributions? Isn't the younger generation of communists, who are now in the JCP, now free from the necessity to remain underground, capable of this?

Henrique Neves: I haven't the slightest intention of publishing a book! But I know that there are comrades who are doing so. I don't see any limitation. In fact, I know some young comrades whom I consider quite well qualified for this.

O JORNAL: Beyond youth issues, has the JCP made suggestions and contributions to the PCP regarding major policies?

Henrique Neves: As a matter of fact, the JCP is an organization that is independent of the PCP. We are not in the PCP; we are in agreement, we follow the general principles of the PCP...

O JORNAL: Does this mean that you can even contradict the PCP?

Henrique Neves: On many occasions we have disagreed with PCP viewpoints. Why, sometimes in school communist students disagree with communist professors in regard to specific points. What we have is a different understanding rather than a disagreement. The most important thing is to discuss the matter, and not run to the media every time a difference of opinion arises.

Carlos Rabacal: When we do not agree, we discuss. Sometimes we are right, sometimes not. Our opinions are taken into consideration also, as the outcome of a debate. For instance, our organizations right now are discussing the congress resolution. When we introduce it, it will already have contributions resulting from discussion among thousands of comrades.

O JORNAL: What is your evaluation of some of the new youth movements, such as the pacifists, the ecologists and those who favor legalization of "the weed"?

Carlos Rabacal: The ecologists and the pacifists have an essentially positive component, although there is much ideological confusion in their ranks.

In regard to drugs our opinion is that what young people seek in drugs can be found in life. We have nothing against youths who seek drugs, but we expose what is in back of it all and who profits from it.

Henrique Neves: We can readily understand the comrades who resort to so-called "light drugs." We have comrades who do so. However, we oppose their legalization because we consider them a step toward the others. Moreover, as Carlos said, we don't see what drugs can do for us that can't be found in real life.

'We Instill in Our Comrades the Need to Go to the Troops'

O JORNAL: You support compulsory military service. Why?

Carlos Rabacal: Most young people are in agreement with compulsory military service, as was verified by a survey made by the FAOJ [expansion unknown]. There are many young people who have criticism to offer, not about the fact that it is compulsory, but about the conditions under which it is rendered.

O JORNAL: What conditions, then, should be changed?

Henrique Neves: In cases where it is possible, realistically, to reduce its duration, we think this should be done. Moreover, there are aspects related to discipline that should be changed.

O JORNAL: What is your position in regard to conscientious objectors?

Henrique Neves: We contend that conscientious objection should be regulated, so as not to give occasion for the fraudulent situations that have arisen.

O JORNAL: Do you have conscientious objectors in your ranks?

Henrique Neves: We instill in our comrades the need to go to the troops by serving in the armed forces. We don't support it in the abstract, but as a necessity so that the armed forces do not become professionalized and become a body foreign to society.

O JORNAL: At this congress, are you going to present specific solutions, for example, for unemployment?

Henrique Neves: We cannot divorce the existence of constantly increasing numbers of unemployed from the general policy that has been followed, contrary to the economic viewpoint that we advocate and that, in this case, is that of our party. A policy of recession does not create employment. With this policy there can be no employment creation. So it is necessary to change the policy...

O JORNAL: And the same thing in regard to graduates of professional schools?

Carlos Rabacal: Yes. It is an opinion associated with the nation's development. There are those who say that there are more licensed professionals than are needed. This is false, as we have demonstrated. For development in keeping with the nation's real needs, there aren't enough university graduates. With this policy there are fewer students in the universities--and licensed professionals without employment. That is why some prefer to go abroad, or to remain there after completing their studies there. Here there are no conditions for work or for research. Without a new concept of development there is no solution.

## MOTA PINTO ADVISER RESIGNS ON MILITARY CANDIDACY ISSUE

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Dec 84 p 9

[Text] "The nation's stability requires, in fact, an understanding between the two parties and support for the candidacy of Mario Soares," O JORNAL was told by Dr Bingre do Amaral, who last week resigned as unofficial adviser of Prof Mota Pinto.

O JORNAL has learned that a few days ago Bingre do Amaral sent a letter to the president of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] in which he resigned as his adviser. When contacted, he would neither confirm nor deny, preferring to say: "I did not want the proximity or remoteness of my relations with Prof Mota Pinto to be discussed in the media."

## Specialist in Marxism

Bingre do Amaral, born in Coimbra 49 years ago, is licensed in law, having been, we were told, a colleague of Prof Mota Pinto.

An outstanding expert on Marxism and "Stalinist practice," according to a former Coimbra colleague, Bingre do Amaral is a person surrounded by secrecy who does not like public office. He has always accompanied Prof Mota Pinto in his political activities, being known for the great influence he exercises over the decisions of the current deputy prime minister.

He was an adjutant of Mota Pinto when he was minister of commerce and tourism in the First and Second Constitutional Governments. Later he was adviser to Mota Pinto, then prime minister of a government put together by the president, and he had returned again, with the Coimbra professor in the vice presidency and the Defense Ministry.

Bingre do Amaral was never a member of the PSD or of any other party. He is now a criminology official. "A harsh blow for Mota Pinto," is how Bingre do Amaral's resignation was described to us. Mota Pinto's preference for a military candidacy was said to be at the bottom of the disagreement between these two Coimbra "politicos."

8834

CSO: 3542/66



## POLL INDICATES YOUNG PEOPLE BELIEVE OTELO CULPABLE

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 7 Dec 84 p 13

[Text] The majority of those interviewed in a Euroexpansao/TEMPO poll do not know whether or not Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is connected with the 25 April People's Forces [FP-25]. On the other hand, over 36 percent are decisive in asserting that this connection exists, while only 16 percent believe in the innocence of this revolutionary military man.

Generally speaking, these are the findings of a poll conducted by Euroexpansao in which 816 individuals living in 126 localities nationwide were contacted.

Those interviewed were asked the following question: "Is Lt Col Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho connected with the FP-25?" As we have pointed out, the majority did not answer this question. However, among those who expressed an opinion, most had no doubt about this connection--36.7 percent--more than twice the number who believe Otelo is innocent of a connection with this terrorist organization.

Dwelling only upon those who answered "yes" or "no" to this question, we find that the region that believes most strongly in Otelo's guilt is the Inland North, whereas the South-Central Coastal region is where most of those who believe in his innocence reside (see column 5 of the table herewith).

Moreover, the persons who most believe in his innocence (16.4 percent) belong to the high/very high social class, which is certainly a curious enough finding.

In regard to occupational class, retirees are those who feel most strongly that Otelo is connected with the FP-25. Relative to the ages of those interviewed, Otelo is considered innocent mainly by those between 25 and 34 years of age (those who happen to have been teenagers or young people at the time of the 25 April [1974 revolution]). Inversely, most of those who consider him guilty are under 24 years of age (those who were too young at that time, and to whom Otelo today represents nothing).

In conclusion, it is pointed out that Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is given the benefit of the doubt by those of the female sex who were interviewed. As a matter of fact, the majority of the abstentions are on the part of the women.



	TOTAL	REGIÃO Region				DESENVOLVIMENTO (5)		STATUS			HABITAT (11)			
		LIT. NORTE (1)	INT. NORTE (2)	LIT. CT/SUL (3)	INT. SUL (4)	DESENVOLV. (6)	N/DESENVOLV. (7)	ALTO/M. ALTO (8)	MÉDIO SUP. (9)	MÉDIO INF. BAIXO (10)	ATE 1000 HABIT. (12)	1001 A 10 M. HABIT. (13)	10001 A 100 M. HABIT. (14)	+ DE 100 M. HABIT. (15)
SIM Yes	%H * 100.0 %V ** 36.7	39.8 38.3	17.0 40.5	35.0 35.5	8.2 19.4	67.0 34.7	33.0 41.7	11.5 45.0	35.4 45.2	53.1 31.5	48.8 39.2	16.4 27.9	19.0 35.8	15.8 43.7
NÃO No	%H * 100.0 %V ** 16.0	36.9 15.5	8.1 8.4	45.6 20.2	9.4 14.7	79.4 17.9	20.6 11.3	9.6 16.4	29.6 16.3	61.0 15.8	33.6 11.8	24.6 18.2	26.2 21.6	15.6 18.8
NÃO SABA Don't know	%H * 100.0 %V ** 47.3	37.4 46.3	16.7 51.1	33.8 44.3	12.1 55.9	71.2 47.4	28.8 46.9	7.6 38.5	23.4 38.4	69.0 52.7	47.4 49.0	24.6 53.9	17.5 42.6	10.5 37.5

\* %H: percentagem de respostas relativamente a cada rubrica (região sexo, etc)  
 \*\* %V: percentagem de cada resposta relativamente ao total dos quadros.

	OCUPAÇÃO Occupation						INSTRUÇÃO (22)			IDADE Age						Sex SEXO	
	QUADROS PATRÕES (16)	EMPREGADOS (17)	OPERÁRIOS (18)	DOMESTICAS (19)	REFORMADOS (20)	OUTROS INACTIV. (21)	7.º ANO E + (23)	ATE 5.º ANO (24)	4.º CL. E MENOS (25)	ATE 24 ANOS (26)	25-34 ANOS (27)	35-44 ANOS (28)	45-54 ANOS (29)	55 ANOS E MAIS (30)		HOMENS (32)	MULHERS (33)
SIM YES	6.2 42.0	22.0 38.2	22.3 32.3	13.7 25.5	13.7 38.9	22.2 52.5	25.1 54.2	23.5 42.8	51.4 30.0	32.1 52.0	15.0 33.3	15.2 31.5	12.9 27.6	24.7 35.2		52.4 41.4	47.6 32.7
NÃO NO	6.2 18.4	15.7 11.9	31.9 20.1	12.2 9.9	17.6 21.9	16.4 16.9	19.3 18.1	22.2 17.6	58.5 14.9	24.1 17.0	20.3 19.7	19.5 17.6	13.7 12.7	22.4 13.9		51.8 17.8	48.2 14.4
NÃO SABA do not know	4.5 39.6	22.3 49.9	25.5 47.6	27.0 64.7	10.7 39.2	10.0 30.6	10.0 27.7	16.9 39.6	73.1 55.1	14.9 31.0	16.5 47.1	19.2 51.0	21.7 59.7	27.8 50.9		40.2 40.8	59.8 52.9

Key:

\* %H: Percentage of answers relative to each heading (region, sex, etc.)  
 \*\* %V: Percentage of each answer relative to total of the tables.

- |                                   |                              |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Northern Coast                 | 19. Domestic                 |
| 2. Inland North                   | 20. Retired                  |
| 3. South-Central Coast            | 21. Others Not in Work Force |
| 4. Inland South                   | 22. Years of Schooling       |
| 5. Socio-economic Development     | 23. 7 Years and Over         |
| 6. Developed                      | 24. 5 Years                  |
| 7. Not Developed                  | 25. 4th Class or Lower       |
| 8. High/Very High                 | 26. Up to 24 Years           |
| 9. Upper Middle                   | 27. 25-34 Years              |
| 10. Lower Middle/Low              | 28. 35-44 Years              |
| 11. Population of Locality        | 29. 45-54 Years              |
| 12. Up to 1,000 Inhabitants       | 30. 55 Years and Over        |
| 13. 1,001 to 10,000 Inhabitants   | 31. [Omitted]                |
| 14. 10,001 to 100,000 Inhabitants | 32. Men                      |
| 15. Over 100,000 Inhabitants      | 33. Women                    |
| 16. Owners and Managers           |                              |
| 17. Employees                     |                              |
| 18. Blue-collar Workers           |                              |

## Methodological Data

Universe: Population registered in voters lists residing in continental Portugal in localities of 5 or more inhabitants.

Sample: 816 individuals contacted directly and personally. Random, multistage selection, structured on the basis of the following variables: region, socio-economic development and number of inhabitants. Adjusted on the basis of the following variables: sex, age and voting in April 1983.

Data Collection: Interviews conducted between 19 and 25 October of 1984, in 126 localities, by 39 supervised interviewers. Data collection was by the "Urna Euroexpansao" method, through a printed simulated ballot.

Reliability of Findings: The maximum confidence interval (at a +0.05 level of significance) is 3.4 percent at the level of the total.

Euroexpansao is responsible for the poll and TEMPO is responsible for the questions formulated and for the analysis of the findings.

8834

CSO: 3542/66

## BRIEFS

ASDI MEMBER IN NEW PARTY--Magalhaes Mota, current ASDI [Social-Democratic Independent Action] deputy, may be one of the figures in the new Eanist party, according to the opinion of sources associated with the erstwhile CNARPE [National Committee to Support Reelection of President Eanes]. Founding member of SEDES [Society of Studies for Economic and Social Development], deputy to the National Assembly between 1969 and 1973, Magalhaes Mota was one of the founders of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], along with Francisco Sa Carneiro and Pinto Balsemao. He has served in the cabinet several times, having been minister of internal administration as early as 16 May 1974, in the government headed by Palma Carlos. When he left the PSD, in the "Group of Unpostponables," Magalhaes helped found the ASDI and, joining the FRS [expansion unknown], returned to parliament. Considered one of the best and most active deputies, Magalhaes Mota was one of the members of the National Political Commission for Gen Ramalho Eanes' reelection campaign in 1980. He has made some hundreds of petitions to the AR [Assembly of the Republic] president throughout his years as a deputy. In one of his recent petitions, Magalhaes Pinto wants to know why so much time was given to Proenca de Carvalho on a television news broadcast--transmitting a session in which the ex-president of the RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System] spoke about the presidential elections--and the same thing did not happen with the other ex-president of the RTP, Soares Louro, in regard to an "open letter" that this Socialist leader sent to Mario Soares. [Text] [Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Dec 84 p 11] 8834

EANES INSISTENCE ON MELO ANTUNES--In a conversation with Herminio Martinho and Miguel Caetano, General Ramalho Eanes is said to have stated that Lt Col Ernesto Melo Antunes will have to play an outstanding role in the new party if that party gets off the ground, as its promoters plan, during the first half of 1985. The president of the republic reportedly explained that Melo Antunes had been sidelined as a candidate in 1980 and that there was no reason to exclude him from establishment of the party. Concerning his own attitude toward the party, General Eanes said he would not take a stand until after December, a period he considers very important for determining political developments in the near future. [Text] [Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 10 Nov 84 p 11] 11798

NEW ANGOLAN AMBASSADOR--The new ambassador from the People's Republic of Angola to Lisbon will be Mauet Joao Baptists, our newspaper was told this morning by a good source. Mauet Baptista, who will replace Franca Van-Dunem--believed to be the next minister of foreign affairs of Angola, as we had already announced--is a former FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] fighter and is still occupying the post of ambassador to Havana. In the opinion of many observers, this appointment represents a hardening of the already tenuous relations between Lisbon and Luanda. [Text]  
[Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 27 Dec 84 p 1]

CSO: 3542/83

## DIPLOMATIC TUG OF WAR OVER RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

Madrid ABC in Spanish 4 Dec 84 p 22

[Article by Alberto Miguez]

[Text] The thorny issue of full diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel seems to have reached an impasse at present, but the possibility of some progress being made in the next few weeks is not ruled out. The summary report by the official sector at the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] Congress will refer extensively to the problem of establishing relations.

The report in question for the first time asks the Executive to establish diplomatic relations with the State of Israel, although it leaves it up to the government to determine the appropriate time to complete this procedure initiated under the centrist administrations. According to our information, the delegates from two provinces, Cadiz and Ciudad Real, will go further than the summary report and request relations "with no conditions attached."

#### No Conditions Attached

Last September, President Felipe Gonzalez told the Israeli newspaper HAARETZ that "Spain will not set any prior conditions for establishing relations with Israel and intends to accomplish this in the not too distant future." The president also said that the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries "is not normal and should be corrected," and at the same time he pointed out that "the current administration is the first in Spain to give serious consideration to the subject."

Since these statements, nothing has been done towards acting on these words, except for the recent visit by the president of the Junta of Andalucia, Rodriguez de la Borbolla, to the Hebrew nation, basically to find out about "advances in cooperativism and agrarian technology." The trip by the Andalusian president to Israel was termed "political naivete" by other members of his religion who are opposed to normalizing relations.

Powerful pressure has been applied by certain Arab countries to convince the Spanish government to postpone indefinitely its decision. At a recent



meeting of Arab and European parliamentarians held in Madrid, Palestinian, Kuwaiti, Lebanese and Somalian representatives asked the Spanish government to "renege on its decision," since "recognition of Israel by Spain represents a political step backwards and an aggressive act vis-a-vis the Arab world." Although there was no official reaction to these warnings, nearly all political groups and influential circles made it known that they regarded them as unacceptable interference in internal affairs.

However, pressures of a broader scope are appearing at the diplomatic level, taking advantage perhaps of what some regard as the government's "ambiguity or fear" in the face of what is obviously a difficult decision. Economic relations with some Gulf countries, and especially with Saudi Arabia, are used as an "argument" behind these pressures.

Curiously, public opinion polls show that a significant change is occurring among Spaniards on this matter. Recent surveys indicate that increasing numbers of people are in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. While in a sampling taken last year (October), 38 percent of those surveyed were in favor of establishing relations and 15 percent against, a similar sampling in October of this year showed that 44 percent were in favor and 12 percent against.

To all this must be added the growing trade between the two countries, which, although still modest, is very favorable to Spain. In 1982, Spain sold goods valued at \$25 million to Israel. In 1983, Spanish exports doubled to over \$120 million. Imports from Israel have remained steady (30 million), although prospects are also dynamic.

#### Community Reservations

European diplomatic sources feel that Spain's entry into the Common Market will require a normalization of relations. During 1985, the parliaments of the "Ten" will discuss and ratify Spain's entry into the EEC, and although any possibility of a European parliament voting down ratification because of the "historical anomaly" of a failure to establish relations with Israel is totally ruled out, the same sources indicate that this situation is sure to create certain reservations on the part of countries such as Holland--a situation that Spain is keen on avoiding.

It is commonly believed that the president does not want to be pressured by anyone on a sovereign decision, and that when pressures mount, he usually postpones making a decision. This is perfectly true in the case of the Israeli problem, and would explain why, during the debate on the state of the nation, the opposition never once referred to the subject, although here at least there is a consensus.

9805

CSO: 3548/61

## ASSESSMENT OF GAINS, LOSSES IN GIBRALTAR TALKS

Madrid YA in Spanish 28 Nov 84 p 5

[Editorial: "The Disputable Agreement on Gibraltar"]

[Text] There is no place for a victory celebration. Nevertheless, the positive aspect of the Brussels declaration is expressed in the following words of the joint communique: "Both parties agree that the questions of sovereignty will be dealt with in the framework of this process." This expression has the advantage of mentioning the word "sovereignty," but it is ambiguous; the negotiations have no specific time limit--"neither the timetable nor the results of the negotiations can be foreseen," the Spanish minister admits--and in the light of the published text, the concessions made by the Spanish government are of importance. Therefore, it is not strange that Mr Moran is unwilling to celebrate a victory, although he goes on to assert euphorically that the signing of the Brussels declaration "is the most important instance to date in which Spanish diplomacy has achieved its objective in the matter of Gibraltar." The text of the agreement presents the old offer from London, rejected by Spain on another occasion, involving "the mutual concession of the rights enjoyed by the citizens of the countries belonging to the Community," and also "the establishment of free passage of persons, vehicles and goods between Gibraltar and the neighboring territory." This implies nothing more than an anticipation of what, when the time comes, would be the result of Spain's entry into the European Community, but with the peculiarity that no agreement has been made to date on said entry.

What is more, there is no reason to interpret this concession of free movement as implying that Spaniards will be able to settle in Gibraltar without obstacles of any kind. This is not what happens in practice among the countries that are already members of the Community, and French doctors, for example, cannot, without further ado, practice their profession in other countries that belong to the Community. After Spain's entry into the Community, Gibraltar may be able to pass laws that will, in fact, impose substantial restrictions on the aforementioned freedom to settle on the Rock. On the other hand, for the stifled economy of Gibraltar, free passage into Spanish territory will be a lifesaver and the businessmen of Gibraltar are already making plans to turn the Rock into an access road for the tourism promoted in London.

However, there are still two very definite points that put a damper on optimism. On the other hand, "the British government will, to the fullest extent,

keep its promise to respect the wishes of the people of Gibraltar--besides, Moran and Howe use the word "rights"--according to the terms established in the Constitution of 1969." This means simply that the British posture on this matter has not changed one whit and that, quite to the contrary, it is reaffirmed in a communique signed by the Spanish negotiators.

The second point is still more definite. The communique states: "As regards the air space of the region (?) of Gibraltar, the Spanish government promises to take swift action designed to permit secure and effective air communications." What do these words mean? That the Spanish government accepts de facto the British presence on the isthmus that London claimed as its own, contrary to all right--including the treaty of Utrecht--to build the airport? That it will not only revoke the restrictive measures that limited the landings and take-offs of aircraft calling at Gibraltar, but that, in addition, it promises to facilitate flight, landing and take-off operations "with all appropriate speed?"

These questions can be answered properly only if Great Britain recognizes the hispanicity of the isthmus on which the airport stands. But, in the meantime, the conversations that "will deal with the questions of sovereignty" have no specific time limit nor have they been clearly defined.

Mr Moran is right: this is no time to celebrate victories. With no such intention, but with satisfaction, Sir Geoffrey Howe, secretary of the Foreign Office, demonstrated on Spanish television how important for Gibraltar--the development of its economy and tourism--was the signing of the declaration at Brussels. Although he made no allusion to the fact, it is certain that London's threat to block Spain's entry into the European Community if the gates of Gibraltar were not thrown open, had borne its fruits. The British and the people of Gibraltar will harvest them before next 15 February.

8089

CSO: 3548/58

## NATO 'FOLLOW-ON-FORCE-ATTACK' DOCTRINE CRITICIZED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 26 Nov 84 pp 158, 160

[Text] Blitzing NATO

NATO is developing new methods of defense against a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact--and in the process may be directing weapons of the future at targets of the past.

For two years the NATO commander-in-chief in Europe has been pestering the politicians of the smaller alliance partners with his public laments. Then, finally, Gen Bernard W. Rogers was listened to.

Very quietly the defense planning committee of the Atlantic alliance in Brussels accepted a plan which in the jargon of NATO bureaucrats is called "long-range planning guidelines for the engagement of follow-on forces."

Concealed behind this name is the further development of a military doctrine which in the years ahead could saddle the alliance with a new arms race--thus making the already precarious balance of terror even shakier.

NATO planning has always suffered under the necessity of having to conduct a rigid defensive battle at the border of the Warsaw Pact in wartime. Because the FRG is too narrow, the defenders lack the hinterland to which to fall back during a Soviet offensive, from the depth of which they could then conduct the counterstrike all the more effectively.

The "reconquest" by NATO forces would lead across the ruined battlefield Germany--there would hardly be anything left worth fighting for.

A third of the population of the FRG lives in a strip measuring only 70 to 100 km wide along the GDR and Czechoslovakian border. According to NATO's forward defense doctrine, they are for the most part to be spared in an attack by the Warsaw Pact--a militarily nearly insoluble task.

Assuming the current balance of power, thus Rogers' repeated complaint, NATO's conventional forward defense would collapse after 3 to 4 days already.

As the NATO commander, he would then be forced to request the U.S. President for authority to use atomic weapons.

However, at the same time as he was making this thinly veiled threat, the general also provided the allies with the prescription for dealing with the strategic emergency.

The depth which NATO lacks in its own territory, thus Rogers, is to be gained by the allies from the enemy--through extension of the conventional battlefield, if need be, far into the hinterland of the Warsaw Pact, into Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even into the western military districts of the Soviet Union.

Explosives carried by aircraft, cruise missiles, or rockets would dot the runways of enemy airfields with craters, blow up bridges and railroad junctions, stop tank columns on their way to the front, destroy the command and communications system, and deal the second attack wave of the Warsaw Pact a devastating blow already during the movement forward.

Rogers' plan, also referred to as "FOFA" (follow-on-forces-attack), an attack on the forces that follow, seemed to make sense. For without altering the valid NATO doctrine of "flexible response," it promises the Europeans an elegant way out of the compulsion of having to resort to nuclear escalation already after a few days.

And yet FOFA was greeted by the allies with considerable skepticism. The defense ministers, all of them short of money as it was, were afraid of being given long wish lists with expensive procurement programs by the NATO military. Also for Manfred Woerner in Bonn, the "deep strike" a la Rogers was initially at the very bottom of the list of priorities.

The uppermost requirement for the Bundeswehr in case of war, he and his inspector general Wolfgang Altenburg assured, would be to repel the first Soviet attack echelon. Only then could thought be given to combating the follow-on troops.

But Rogers did not let up. For 2 years, in a series of lectures, papers and interviews, he repeated tirelessly that NATO would have to be able to carry out forward defense and at the same time strike the "follow-on forces of the enemy behind his back."

As yet, the approval given by NATO does not mean much more than a green light for map exercises. But Rogers will continue to apply pressure, and by May of next year at the latest the NATO staffs are to prepare their first shopping lists.

The American is counting on additional expenditures of 90 billion DM, spread over 10 years. This sum, the general believes, could be raised with an annual increase of the defense budgets in real terms of 4 percent. Most of the NATO countries, however, are not even meeting their own



goal of 3 percent that was set 6 years ago and is to last until 1986. From 1987 on, so plans the cabinet in London, the growth of the British military budget is even to be limited to 1 percent.

In addition, experts doubt that Rogers' calculation is realistic. Experience has shown that the cost of complex weapons systems chock-full of electronics multiplies many times over the years.

Thus the unit price for cruise missiles--armed with conventional warheads and an important building block in the new Rogers plan--was given in 1978, prior to the NATO two-tracked resolution, as 2.2 million dollars. When the first cruise missiles were installed in Europe last year, their cost had already climbed to 6.4 million dollars.

The amounts to be spent for FOFA make even the big-spending planners in the Pentagon feel uncomfortable. An example:

Six years ago the U.S., under the code name "Assault Breaker," began to develop a technology making it possible to locate and destroy the enemy's supplies far behind the forward line of defense. In the meantime, however, the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force have declined to request additional funds for the "Assault Breaker" missile: the weekly munitions requirement for just one NATO corps would cost 8 billion dollars.

The Europeans do not even have enough money to be able to stockpile enough munitions and equipment spares for forward defense. "Why should we attack the second echelon of the Soviets," asks a German NATO diplomat, "if we can't stop the first one?"

It is also uncertain if the new weapons will in fact be as effective as Rogers claims. British and U.S. experts have figured out that NATO would have to position 800 conventionally armed rockets just to put the 40 most important air bases of the Warsaw Pact out of action for only 3 days. If in addition the Western alliance planned to engage mobile targets such as tank columns far to the rear, it would need at least an additional 3,000 missiles, according to estimates of Pentagon advisor Donald Cotter.

There can be no questioning the fact that arms limitation negotiations with the Soviets in the face of such horrendous arsenals would be unthinkable. For no one could tell by looking at cruise missiles and ballistic missiles of the FOFA plan whether they would carry a conventional or a nuclear warhead. The firing of a large number of missiles already in the first few hours of an armed conflict, warns Timothy Garden, director of defense studies in the British Royal Air Force, "would leave the Soviets an extraordinarily short time to decide whether this was, or was not, a nuclear strike by NATO."

What is to happen, therefore, if the Soviets respond with an atomic counterstrike because they do not want to wait helplessly until the approaching FOFA projectiles have struck their targets?

But even the massive employment of conventionally armed rockets, according to U.S. military analyst Steven Canby, could probably not put "more than three Soviet divisions" out of action. NATO military men, however, expect the second echelon of Warsaw Pact forces to number circa 70 divisions.

The reason for the poor showing: the infrared sensors of target-seeking rockets are relatively easy to deceive. To be sure, American "Assault Breaker" rockets were successfully test-fired over great distances at small tank formations. But these tanks were standing with motors running in the desert, without cover for miles around, and thus presented the seeker head of the projectiles with targets in full view.

Soviet tanks which at the outbreak of hostilities would move toward the front would be transported on semitrailers via the tree-lined secondary roads of eastern Europe. In that case there would be none of the particularly hot exhaust gases typical of tanks to attract the heat-sensitive seeker heads of the warheads.

British, Dutch and German NATO officers, in a rare instance of unanimity, are thus opposed to attacking mobile targets deep in the rear echelons of the Warsaw Pact with the help of questionable technologies. General Rogers, they argue, was intentionally leaving unsaid what he understood by a "deep" strike. It made a decisive difference, however, whether NATO was looking for targets at a distance of 50 or 600 km.

The British strategy expert David Greenwood even feels that the time for the Rogers plan has perhaps already passed. For in the event of war the Soviet assault divisions would hardly attack as the FOFA plan expects them to. On the contrary, Rogers is running the risk of attacking yesterday's targets with tomorrow's weapons.

The principle of the FOFA plan is based on the assumption that the attacking armies of the Warsaw Pact will stage their assault against NATO's forward defense in successive attack waves. According to Rogers, the East could throw fresh troops into the front every 36 hours in order to maintain its offensive momentum.

In reality, however, thus claim authorities such as Christopher Donnelly of the British military academy in Sandhurst, the Soviets want to achieve the penetration by force of NATO's front line with their first wave alone.

For a rapid penetration, they are holding "strategic maneuver groups" in readiness directly behind the first attacking divisions--independently operating tank units of division and army strength, whose objective it is to operate behind the NATO front "if possible after 24 hours already" (Donnelly).

"Blitzing NATO" is the name given by the American news magazine "Newsweek" to this allegedly new Soviet strategy, with which Moscow

wants to for forestall a threatening NATO decision on the first use of atomic weapons and emerge from a conflict in Europe as victors within a matter of days and if at all possible with conventional weapons alone.

The Red Blitzkrieg troops could not only underrun a nuclear strike, they would also deprive Rogers' new wonder weapons of their effectiveness. "They would long since be in the areas of the conventional NATO missile sites," thus a U.S. expert, "even before a second Soviet echelon would appear on the battlefield."

And that echelon, of course, would then no longer be needed.

12689

CSO: 3620/147

## SOVIET GENERAL N. CHERVOV ON NORDIC COUNTRIES' SECURITY

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 20 Nov 84 p 3

[Op Ed Article by General N. Chervov, Chief of Department of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces: "Stability of Military Policy of Nordic Countries Disintegrating." The article was written by General Chervov specially for the Danish press. In the view of Soviet military spokesman, the Nordic countries have the choice between increased confrontation or joint efforts for relaxation.]

[Text] For a number of decades in the post-World War II period, indeed, even during the worst years of the cold-war era, the situation in the Nordic countries has been marked by a certain amount of stability and calmness.

This is primarily due to the development of traditions between the Soviet Union and the Nordic countries for good neighborly relations and the creation of objective conditions and the necessary legal standards for the development of relations in a spirit of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs, equality and cooperation.

The decisive role played by the Soviet people in the defeat of German fascism has made a deep impression on the peoples of the Nordic countries. The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union took a direct part in the liberation of part of Denmark, viz. the island of Bornholm, and they also liberated the northern parts of Norway. As a result of the historic victories of the Soviet army, Hitler's plan to occupy Sweden in 1942 as well as operation "Arctic Fox" in 1943 were destroyed.

The relative stability of the Nordic countries has, undoubtedly, also been due to the fact that Denmark and Norway announced their non-deployment policy, involving non-deployment of foreign troops and nuclear weapons in their territories in times of peace. The Swedish policy of non-alliance became a constructive component of the stability. Finland's pro-peace foreign policy, which is based on the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty, concluded with the Soviet Union in 1942, plays a positive role.

## Disturbing Trend

The more disturbing is the fact that since the late seventies there has been a trend in the Nordic countries to break down the stability of the military-policy situation.

It is not the Soviet Union nor any of the other countries of the Warsaw Pact which are the source of these alarming symptoms. The threat against the stability comes from the side of NATO.

It has been no secret neither at present nor in the previous years that in view of the military strategy situation of the Nordic countries in relation to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the United States and NATO give high priority to this region in their military plans. Already in the sixties and seventies, statements were made by representatives of the United States and NATO to the effect, for example, that it was Denmark's task to close the access to the belts from the Baltic and, together with the Faroes and Greenland, which belong to Denmark, and in cooperation with Norway and the American forces stationed in Iceland, to "confine" the fleet of the Soviet Union and prevent it from entering into the open sea.

Of recent years, during which the United States government has intensified its efforts to defeat socialism and has embarked on a course of drastic intensification of the arms race and the development of new offensive military doctrines and concepts, the demands of the United States on its NATO allies have increased considerably. Those of the Nordic countries which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty are, of course, also included in the plans for the implementation of the extensive military programs of the United States and NATO.

## No Accidental Visits

Of course, it is no accident that a number of representatives of the U.S. and NATO leadership have been visiting Denmark this year. Their efforts in their public statements to instruct the Danish people to comply with the militarist decisions of NATO have been quite obvious. One even hesitates to repeat all of the abusive language used by the American visitors toward the procrastinating Danes. For it is a fact that in conjunction with the decision by the Folketing not to pay any contribution to the NATO infrastructure for the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe, it was pointed out to Denmark that taxpayers in the United States who fail to pay their taxes are "simply put in jail."

By which standard for a civilized society is it possible to measure the panicky statements by General Rogers to the effect that "if things continue the same way in the future," Denmark will certainly risk landing in the situation where it "cannot secure coverage for the reinforcements" which will have to be sent elsewhere in case of war? However, even more eager blackmailers have come up with an entirely indecent statement to the effect



that Denmark is trying to "remain with NATO as a stowaway." A certain American "specialist on East-West relations," Mr. E. Luttwak, who, apparently, had decided to give the peace-loving Danes a scare, also appeared, stating: "NATO may throw Denmark out if it will not agree to the terms of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty."

#### Not for Us to Worry

It is, of course, not for us to worry about how Denmark's allies within NATO treat that country. Participation in the alliance is voluntary. However, one wonders if anybody really believes that statements like that do not have an extremely negative effect on the political atmosphere in the Nordic countries.

And words are followed by action. In the Scandinavian NATO countries, existing military installations are being expanded and new ones are being built. For example, at the military base at Skrydstrup in Denmark, a new control center for the AWACS system has been put into operation, and, according to press statements, a new long-range radar station is being constructed on Bornholm. In May 1984, an American-Danish agreement was signed to ensure the reception of approximately 100 fighters belonging to the American Marine, which will considerably increase the number of aircraft previously scheduled for transfer to Denmark in case of a "crisis situation." And now it is already a question of deploying combat equipment for those aircraft on Danish territory. The work to modernize various military NATO installations on Danish territory is in full progress.

Norway is being increasingly incorporated in the U.S. global strategy. Several dozen NATO installations have already been placed within Norwegian territory: radar stations along the entire coastline; navigating systems of the Loran-C type, serving American missile-carrying submarines; electronic monitoring systems. At the Erlann military air base, AWACS aircraft have been based which regularly undertake espionage flights along the north-western border of the Soviet Union. Upwards of 20 Norwegian airports are used by the air forces of the United States, Great Britain and other NATO countries, especially during military maneuvers. According to an agreement between Norway and the United States, 350 fighter aircraft are scheduled to be received on these bases in a so-called "crisis situation," including aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

Plans are being carried through to deploy heavy arms in Norway for troops from the United States, Great Britain and Canada, which will be transferred in a "crisis situation." Weapons intended for American marines are being transferred to depots in the area around Trondheim in Norway. In Washington, plans are being discussed to deploy cruise missiles in Denmark, Norway and Iceland--initially with conventional warheads, which may subsequently be readily replaced by nuclear warheads.

#### More Maneuvers

An increasing number of maneuvers with participation of armed forces from the United States, West Germany and Great Britain are being held within the

territory of the Nordic NATO-member countries. The number of British troops participating in the Danish section of the NATO maneuver Autumn Forge-84 was thus 13,000, which is the largest contingent of British troops ever participating in such maneuvers in that area.

One may ask whether anybody may have the right to prohibit the Nordic NATO-member countries from carrying through military measures of that kind in co-operation with their allies: the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and others. Of course, nobody can prohibit it, nor the attempt at it.

However, it is equally legitimate to ask the opposite question: Might all of these military measures not have an effect on the "policy of non-deployment" announced by Denmark and Norway, will they not tend gradually to dilute it and will it not be detrimental to the military policy stability of the Nordic countries?

This other question does not only emerge in the countries against which the military measures taken by the United States and NATO in the Nordic countries are directed. It is a question which many people in the Nordic countries ask themselves. They are primarily concerned about their own future, about how the security of their countries and their homes may be increased--and that is quite understandable. They talk about it, discuss it and argue about it.

#### Threat Against Nordic Countries

The author of this article does not consider it his right to intervene in the discussion taking place among Danes concerning their country's defense policy. However, he would like to say one thing clearly and firmly: It is time for those who have not yet understood it to realize that the threat against the security of the Nordic countries does not come from the Soviet Union and its allies but from the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race. This is an objective reality which cannot possibly be disregarded, a political and military reality, a reality which is particularly topical in our times, today, at present.

One need not search long for evidence in support of this simple viewpoint. An analysis of the U.S. military policy shows indisputably that it has never been the goal of the U.S. post-World War II policy and strategy to bring about the genuine security of Europe. To the United States, at any rate to the American circles in power today, "European security" ends where the danger arises for themselves, where their global interests are affected.

When, in the late forties and fifties, the United States was strategically superior, the American strategic nuclear forces were, in the words of John Foster Dulles, a means to "push back," to "roll back" socialism. As is well-known, nothing came of it. The appearance in the defense potential of the Soviet Union of an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles which were

capable of being targeted on U.S. territory, led to important changes in the entire situation. The American leadership introduced new elements in the U.S. strategic doctrines as well. It started planning and preparing a variant of nuclear war where one might try to reach global targets without risk of becoming destroyed oneself. Ideas emerged of "limited nuclear warfare," "Euro-strategic war," and "long-term nuclear warfare," which clearly were calculated, at the outbreak of a nuclear conflict in Europe, at the same time to save the American continent from a nuclear conflagration. Such calculations naturally are quite illusory: the Aggressor will not be able to avoid a reaction which will destroy everything. But this will not make it any easier for the Europeans.

### Europe, a Spearhead

The very deployment of Pershing missiles and cruise missiles in certain West European countries is aimed at realizing these purposes. The West European allies of the United States are landing at the spearhead of the American doctrine of a "first nuclear strike" and are turned into the hostages of the American nuclear strategy, for the United States will not, of course, ask its allies when, where and how it will use the American nuclear arms, the total number of which in the arsenals of NATO in Europe already now exceeds 7,000 units. In that context, it should not be forgotten that the use of "small nuclear arms" as well will have disastrous consequences for the majority of the European NATO member countries.

One cannot possibly imagine that the peoples of Denmark and the other Nordic countries may be interested in such a course of events. But what about the Soviet Union which is the neighbor of the Nordic countries, what kind of military policy situation does it desire in the Nordic area?

Our answer is as follows: We are not, also on the basis of considerations of our own security, less interested than the Nordic countries in avoiding that the situation in that part of Europe as well as in the entire European continent develops into a worsening of the military tension, but in reducing it, in strengthening the military and political stability and in lowering the level of confrontation. For that very reason, we present a program with concise measures to check the arms race and to strengthen the European security as a whole, including the security within the Nordic region.

### Avoiding the Use of Power

The collective proposal from the Warsaw Pact countries to the NATO countries to enter into a treaty involving a mutual promise to avoid the use of military power and to maintain peace assumes importance in the present tense situation. The essence of such a treaty will be a mutual commitment on the part of the member states of both alliances not to use nuclear weapons nor conventional weapons against one another. This commitment must apply to the territories of all member states of the two alliances as well as to their military and civilian personnel, their maritime vessels as well as air and space vessels and other objects belonging to them, wherever they may be.

The conclusion of such a treaty will in itself help to lower the levels of political and military confrontations between the two military state groups in Europe and will confirm their declared desire to live in peace with one another.

## Unilateral Step

But that is far from everything. The Soviet Union has already unilaterally taken a big step which is most directly related to ensuring the security of states such as Denmark and Norway. The Soviet Union has officially and unequivocally declared that it will not use nuclear weapons against the states which refuse to produce and procure weapons and which do not have them on their territories.

The Soviet Union has also, on several occasions, stated its positive attitude toward the proposal to establish a nuclear-arms-free zone in the Nordic countries. It is ready to commit itself not to use nuclear arms against the Nordic countries which will participate in that zone, in other words, to guarantee the zone. Our state has declared its readiness to consider the question of certain measures concerning its own territory adjoining a Nordic nuclear-arms-free zone, and also to discuss with interested parties the question of giving the Baltic a nuclear-arms-free status.

The positive attitude to this idea was confirmed anew in Konstantin Chernenko's answer to the request from the International Conference on Nuclear-Arms-Free Zones which took place in Manchester last April. "The establishment of nuclear-arms-free zones is an important aspect of the struggle to strengthen the security," Konstantin Chernenko states. "Together with the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union strongly advocates the establishment of nuclear-arms-free zones, comprising, among other places, the Nordic countries and the Baltic, and advocates liberating Europe altogether from intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons."

## Choice of Nordic Countries

It is difficult to believe that anybody after all of this may with a clear conscience doubt our country's political will to preserve and strengthen the peace, security and military policy stability of the Nordic countries.

What is the conclusion drawn from all of this? The conclusion is that the time has come for the Nordic countries to make a choice: Either to take the course of an intensification of the arms race, increased confrontation between East and West, thus also in the Nordic area and thus to increase the threat of an all-destructive war.

Or by joint efforts from all interested parties to reduce the military and political tension, to reinforce the confidence among the states, to reinforce the stability, based on the just principles for relations among states which were agreed upon at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and incorporated in the final document from Helsinki.

The Soviet Union advocates that all people within the Nordic countries live as good neighbors. That it is feasible. But it depends, first and foremost, on the Nordic countries themselves.

7262

CSO: 3613/45

## NEWSPAPER ATTACKS ASSERTIONS COUNTRY IS UNRELIABLE AS ALLY

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 20 Nov 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Arrogance of Power"]

[Text] Denmark has lost its credibility in international security policy matters, says a report issued over the weekend by the MANAGEMENT publishing house.

It is not quite as bad as that, however. It appears from the report that it is top-level people within the U.S. defense department and state department as well as certain persons within the French and American security policy elite who find that Denmark has become an untrustworthy partner in their crusade against the Soviet Union. This is not surprising but rather gratifying.

The most alarming aspect, however, is that NATO's secretary-general, Lord Carrington, has joined in the uproar. His voice is so shrill, however, that it is hardly calculated to reinforce his reputation for sober-mindedness: If Denmark does not want to have nuclear weapons in times of war, this will become the "beginning of the end of NATO."

The report will, undoubtedly, be used eagerly in the criticism of the security policy decisions of the Folketing. A considerable portion of it will, however, reinforce the dissociation on the part of the Danes from the nuclear policy pursued by NATO and from the country's membership in the alliance.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard Perle of the United States says that "in view of Denmark's common border with Germany, Denmark, actually, already has got nuclear weapons." According to Perle, the Danish Air Force will attack Soviet invasion forces with tactical nuclear weapons. And James Dobbins of the State Department says: "One cannot produce a special defense tailored to the needs of Denmark in case of a confrontation in which every country except Denmark would be a potential user of nuclear weapons. Such an idea is naive and dangerous."



The reassuring words of Danish ministers in the Folketing have thus been given a mortal blow. They have repeatedly stressed that it is the Danish authorities which decide whether reinforcements may take along nuclear weapons. The possibility of choice appears a bit artificial after the words of the Americans. The difficult balancing act of the Social Democrats has also been shaken. They have more than hinted that the use of nuclear weapons in Denmark is inconceivable. Lasse Budtz has said that if one accepts that nuclear weapons may be used in Denmark, one ought to see a psychiatrist. (Did you grasp that, Lord Carrington?) With such argumentation, the Social Democrats could maintain the loyalty toward NATO in the opinion polls because the membership would not be tantamount to a nuclear threat to Denmark. They might also damp those who find that an unequivocal, statutory Danish No to nuclear weapons is urgent. After the report of the MANAGEMENT publishing house, these problems have become considerably clarified.

The condemnation of Denmark is not an "international" one, even if the publishing house, in its introduction, attempts to convey that impression. If the government would advocate the standpoints of the Folketing more intelligently and eagerly, we should have a security policy which would advocate in a very trustworthy manner relaxation and disarmament. The report is an interesting piece of journalism in which a group of powerful people rage against a small country which has stated its disagreement with the new policy of confrontation of the West. The conclusion was obvious in advance if one asked those people.

Denmark's role may be viewed quite differently. Within the paper, a prominent Soviet military spokesman states that the Nordic countries are increasingly becoming a springboard for American aggression, and he does not appear exceedingly impressed with the resolutions of the Folketing. The fact is after all that, in actual fact, Denmark is becoming more and more afflicted with increasingly comprehensive maneuvers and reinforcement agreements than within the NATO military machine. In Soviet ears, the condemnation of Denmark is apparently only a pressure to ensure that we shall join in the U.S. armament obediently.

It is also obvious that the strong words against Denmark are so exaggerated that the actual targets for the criticism cannot possibly be Anker Jorgensen and Lasse Budtz. It is characteristic of the level among our French critics that Pierre Lellouche, who, among other things, is a military adviser at the Ministry of Defense in Paris, says that "the Danish Social Democrats are totally isolated from the other European Social Democrats." The opposite is the case. Denmark is the country where the security policy of the majority of European social democratic parties has become "official" policy because the party members in Denmark are the only ones who are able to support their words by parliamentary power.

The criticism reeks of the arrogance of people in power. Probably because the words are addressed to a small country, the tone of the arguments is extremely condescending.

One of the former top people of the U.S. Department of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, says: "Denmark has gone too far. It will have to tell us clearly whether it belongs to the West or the East." And Pierre Gallois, who undoubtedly is "the father of the French nuclear striking force," says: "At the outside, I may understand that the ordinary Dane dreams (of a nuclear-free zone), but any politician who contributes to such a utopia ought to lose his right ever to set foot in a parliament again. None of the arguments of the West German or Scandinavian Social Democrats can withstand an analysis lasting 3 seconds." The American Edward Luttwak, the super hawk of hawks, says that the Social Democrats are "extraordinarily gifted parrots of the Soviet propaganda machine."

It is a serious matter when those in power in Allied countries attack with such terms. It is an even more serious matter because they apparently want to use Denmark to make an example of Denmark which will have a deterrent effect on Social Democrats in countries which are of far greater importance to NATO. It is possible to put pressure on Denmark and to drag our country through the mud at a relatively low risk because our importance to the Alliance is small. Dangers are associated with a Danish sole action on this issue, and it is primarily a problem for the government. It is untenable in the long run that the men behind the Danish nuclear policy do not have the actual responsibility. The costs of the Danish course ought to be analyzed and met by a government which itself advocates these viewpoints.

The most interesting feature of the said report is, however, that it has revealed definitively the deep chasm between the participants in the broad coalitions which were behind the security policy of the West for some decades. The disagreement with the Reagan-Mitterrand line is shared by prominent people within the traditional security policy elite of the United States and broad popular movements in Western Europe. The vehement attacks reveal the hate on the part of the new cold-warmongers. It is a chasm which it is not possible to bridge. It is more obvious than it used to be that the Atlantic cooperation cannot continue on the present basis.

7262

CSO: 3613/45

## NAVAL SUPPORT COMMAND'S ROLE IN NAVAL LOGISTICS SYSTEM

Koblenz MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in German Nov 84 pp 492-500

[Article by Rear Admiral Hansjakob Kratzmair: "The Naval Support Command and Its Central Tasks in the Logistics System of the Navy"]

[Text] Logistics: Definition, Mission, Context

Today the term "logistics" is used not only by the combat forces but also increasingly in business and industry. It is frequently used to describe different individual functions, but as the term is generally employed it refers to methods employed in supplying or giving administrative support to organizations or projects.

For the naval combat forces and hence also for the navy itself logistics means the planning, preparation and use of forces and facilities for the material support of naval groups, units and agencies. Under this aspect the logistics of the navy is oriented toward its mission and takes into account the factors of space and time. In peacetime it has the task of establishing and maintaining material readiness for combat, together with the ability to enhance this readiness in a crisis and the ability in wartime to correspondingly meet operational requirements. In addition to a certain extent it also supports other organizational areas of the German defense forces, agencies of other departments and also the combat forces of NATO partners.

The fulfillment of this mission is affected by many factors and contextual elements. The linking of various sea combat forces which is today such a matter of course also exercises especially lasting effects here: in contrast to the situation in the army and in the air force, in the naval branch of the service groups and units of very different structure and having very different characteristics must be supported logistically.

Our sea combat forces are applied flexibly and with rapidly changing focal points and in varying composition within an operational area which may embrace about 10 to 15 times the area of the FRG.

Our naval air combat forces operate from fixed bases on their own territory, but must also be capable of shifting their bases to a certain extent. Moreover, in the case of on-board helicopters these forces are subject to the special conditions of the sea combat forces.

Land units of the navy encompass both fixed installations (e.g., communications posts) and also mobile groups (e.g., transport units). For the latter the area of operations can also extend into the territory of neighboring alliance partners.

Therefore the space in which logistics support must be effective cannot be constrained by narrow regional boundaries. It is determined by the nature of operational focal points. Its own territory, at least with respect to the operational area of the sea combat forces, occupies an unfavorable marginal situation.

Naval forces are particularly suitable for dealing with crises. This makes the element of time an important factor: logistics support cannot be optimized one-sidedly in relation to peacetime operation. Rather it must be able to unfold its full effectiveness without delay and also be capable of maintaining this effectiveness over an extended period.

#### The Logistics System of the Navy

Mission and context thus require a logistics system which remains largely independent of the machinery of mobilization. Consistently with the peculiar characteristics of the apparatus of naval warfare the system must yield the required support throughout the entire operations area with sufficient reliability and adequate efficiency.

This is achieved through a union of the support units at sea and land-based logistics facilities both at home and abroad which gain their effectiveness through appropriate cooperation. Within this system the logistics command is at all levels a component of the military command. Therefore the logistics responsibility together with the forces and facilities which it requires are assigned to the command structure of the navy.

The fleet commander is responsible for the direct support of his units and groups. To this end he has at his disposal in the supply flotilla such sea-borne support units as supply ships, munitions carriers and fuel vessels, tenders in the smaller craft squadrons and in addition to these he has the logistics facilities of naval flight squadrons.

The chief of the Naval Office is responsible for supplying the units and service agencies within his sector. This responsibility is limited essentially to troop supply.

But over and above this the Naval Office exercises in two areas a fundamental influence on the logistics system of the navy. Within the context of the development and procurement of military materiel the Naval Office by establishing a fully up-to-date supply system creates prerequisites which have a decisive effect upon later operations. In training logistic personnel it has a quite substantial effect upon the quality of work performed in the logistics system.

Logistics support of the fleet and of the Naval Office is conducted by the chief of the Naval Support Command with the assistance of two naval section commands. Under their authority there are numerous on-shore facilities serving the armed forces:

- i. naval maintenance commands and their external agencies supply the sea combat forces and naval land units with up to 20,000 different supply articles. In addition, these commands have at their disposal facilities for road transport and harbor operations;
- ii. naval materiel depots and naval munitions depots take care of the acquisition, maintenance and delivery of supply goods--a broad spectrum ranging from munitions to articles of daily consumption;
- iii. transport battalions carry out requisite road transport in support of the navy.

In peacetime the logistics support which covers operational areas is primarily guaranteed by the seaborne supply organization and the latter falls within the responsibility of the fleet. In crises and in war there are added to this two repair ships from the military engineering sector together with maintenance points on the margin of the area of operations. A part of the defense supplies is moreover stocked in logistic facilities of the German defense forces in neighboring countries of the alliance.

#### Central Tasks in the Logistics System

The chief of the Naval Support Command has the mission of providing central coordination in the logistics system of the navy. In addition, he has specific guidance tasks within the three classical functions of logistics: he exercises materiel control, controls maintenance operations and governs transport for the entire navy. Besides this, there is technical-logistics support, a uniform maintenance of weapons systems and devices with the object of obtaining economical use of operational equipment in peacetime. In addition to guidance of subordinate logistics units these central tasks define the work of the agencies of the chief's command.


Command and direction within the logistics system require an appropriate organization which must be planned, created and maintained. This includes the development of logistics regulations and international agreements as well as the further development of structures and facilities against the background of a changing context.

With its specifications and procedures, including their data processing support, the Naval Support Command controls the cooperation of all participants in the logistics system. Finally, it is necessary to maintain data banks for the materiel information service and to work up specifications also for governing the use and operation of weapons systems.


In carrying out its task of materiel direction the command is performing the central materiel supply service and materiel procurement service of the navy.



The materiel needed must be calculated, materiel procurement orders must be initiated and the materiel in the depots must be properly distributed. Tight budget funds and procurement times which often range over years require continuous attention to detail if the supply of approximately 290,000 different articles is to be assured at any time and at the desired location. Failures in this area have bad consequences, whether because replacement parts are lacking for repair or stock clerk errors give rise to uneconomic storage and unnecessary tying up of capital.



- Key:
1. Naval Office
  2. Schools, training ships, instructional and experimental facilities as well as other services
  3. Naval Liaison Office
  4. Federal minister of defense
  5. Naval Chief of Staff
  6. Fleet Command
  7. Chief of the North Sea Naval Combat Forces
  8. Groups assigned from time to time
  9. Naval aircraft division
  10. Speedboat flotilla
  11. Submarine flotilla
  12. Naval command services
  13. Destroyer flotilla
  14. Mine Combat Forces flotilla
  15. Supply flotilla
  16. Amphibian group
  17. Naval Support Command
  18. North Sea Naval Section Command
  19. Baltic Naval Section Command
  20. Support groups/facilities



- Key:
- |   |                                |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 1. Naval Support Command                        |                                |
| 2. North Sea Naval Section Command              |                                |
| 3. Baltic Naval Section Command                 |                                |
| 4. Cuxhaven external agency                     |                                |
| 5. Emden external agency                        |                                |
| 6. Farge Subdepot                               |                                |
| 7. Wilhelmshaven Naval Maintenance Command      |                                |
| 8. Borkum Naval Maintenance Command             |                                |
| 9. Naval Materiel Depot ...                     |                                |
| 10. Naval Munitions Depot ...                   |                                |
| 11. Naval Transport Battalion ...               |                                |
| 12. North Sea Naval [?] Corps                   |                                |
| 13. Kiel Naval Maintenance Command              |                                |
| 14. Olpenitz Naval Maintenance Command          |                                |
| 15. Flensburg-Muerwik Naval Maintenance Command |                                |
| 16. Baltic Naval [?] Corps                      |                                |
| 17. Eckernfoerde external agency                | 20. Toenning Subdepot          |
| 18. Neustadt external agency                    | 21. Kropp external storage     |
| 19. Dietrichsdorf external storage              | 22. Weidefeld external storage |

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In carrying out its task of materiel direction the command is performing the central materiel supply service and materiel procurement service of the navy. The materiel needed must be calculated, materiel procurement orders must be initiated and the materiel in the depots must be properly distributed. Tight budget funds and procurement times which often range over years require continuous attention to detail if the supply of approximately 290,000 different articles is to be assured at any time and at the desired location. Failures in this area have bad consequences, whether because replacement parts are lacking for repair or stock clerk errors give rise to uneconomic storage and unnecessary tying up of capital.

About 15 percent of the supply articles are replacement parts which can themselves be repaired when damaged and recycled into the supply chain. At the same time they are preponderantly high-technology parts which absorb more than 80 percent of the funds spent on replacement parts. The Naval Support Command must therefore pay particular attention to these parts and keep their use and repair under special surveillance.

Not least in importance also are the supply inspections within groups and service agencies of the navy as carried out by the command within the framework of materiel management. In first place here are the auditings prescribed by federal budget legislation. But in addition to these required auditings the command has a special interest in supporting the units in effective materiel management.

In the area of materiel conservation the control of repair operations is the task of the Naval Support Command for all projects which cannot be handled by the personnel and resources of the troops themselves. The aim here is to re-establish the material utility of military material with the least expense in time and money. For this purpose there has been set up in the command a military management planning and control administration. This administration, by combining locally, also cooperates successfully with the operations management of the military engineering sector.

The Naval Support Command does not possess capacities of its own for repair. For this purpose there are assigned to the Naval Support Command as partners the naval arsenal with its facilities in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven as well as some other external agencies. Commercial firms are also engaged under contract. At the present time the contract volume annually managed by the office

of control of repair operations amounts to more than half a billion marks. This fact is of decisive economic importance for the North German coastal region and especially for the shipyard industry and their suppliers everywhere in the entire FRG.

Transport is the bonding element in logistics. Through its central transport control office the Naval Support Command plans, coordinates and supervises the requisite transport movements of the navy. The goal is an economical exploitation of transport facilities in peacetime and an efficient control of these facilities during times of crisis and war.

At the present time annually about 1.4 million persons and 130,000 tons of materiel are transported. In addition to the use of its own facilities the navy also cooperates with other branches of the combat services. Thus in a highway transport linkup within the Federal Armed Forces specific transport routes are routinely employed jointly with the army and the air force.

In addition to the classical tasks of logistics which have been described up to this point the Naval Support Command recognize a further focal point of its work in engineering logistics support. This process starts when the use of military materiel begins and aims at maintaining the economic operation of weapons systems and equipment. This type of support is based upon operational experience and audits.


Essential instruments of engineering logistics support are the periodic weapons system evaluation (PERWAB), the weapons system conferences and the evaluation conferences for the modification of military materiel and equipment supply.

As a result it is possible to furnish the command staff of the navy with decision aids showing, for example, how the overall efficiency of a weapons system can be increased, what changes in systems and apparatus should be made and with what priority and what expenditure of funds will be necessary for these purposes.

Using engineering logistics support numerous further advantages accrue to the Naval Support Command. The spectrum ranges from planning, management and evaluation of ballistic projects to military geography, military hydrography and environmental protection. Rounding off this area of services there is also the civil law surveillance of working conditions on ships of war, the planning management and control management of software maintenance and replacement as well as the management of construction operations.

#### Further Development of the Logistics System

The tasks of logistics are on many levels and have their effects in all areas of the navy. In particular the central tasks within the logistics system are becoming increasingly complex. The Naval Support Command handles its logistics task with about 2,000 soldiers and 4,300 civilian employees. In view of a personnel situation which is becoming ever more restricted there is certainly no possibility of an expansion of these forces; in fact it will be necessary for existing staff to handle a larger number of tasks.



- Key:
1. Legal Council
  2. Naval Support Command
  3. Commander
  4. Adjutant
  5. Deputy commander and chief of staff
  6. Agent for naval salvage investigations
  7. Central interpreter group
  8. Administrative division
  9. Troop administration
  10. Commandant staff quarters
  11. Division I. Logistics principles/Procedures and specifications/  
Materiel information service
  12. Group IA. Principles in the logistics system of the navy
  13. Group IB. Procedures and specifications for logistics support
  14. Group IC. Material information service/Principles, specifications/  
Specifications and procedures for applications and operations
  15. Division II. Materiel supply/Material management
  16. Group IIA. Supply inspection/Profiling tasks
  17. Group IIB. Material supply



Key (continued)

18. Group IIC. Materiel inventory
19. Division III. System maintenance/Transport and vehicles
20. Group IIIA. System maintenance, ships, boats, naval command system
21. Group IIIB. Engineering logistics services for naval air combat forces
22. Group IIIC. Transport and vehicles
23. Group IIID. Repair planning and control for ships, boats, land facilities, equipment at sea
24. Division IV. Operations and engineering
25. Group IVA. Weapons and munitions
26. Group IVB. Marine engineering
27. Group IVC. Command service facilities
28. Group IVD. Industrial worker protection and radiation protection, environmental protection
29. Group IVE. Profiling tasks

That there will be progressively greater demands imposed on the logistics system is already evident when one considers the following circumstances, which are giving rise increasingly to concern:

i. Older weapons systems are clearly having to be kept in service for a longer time than is desirable in view of the existing threat and material circumstances. Expensive measures are becoming necessary to maintain combat-worthiness and to prolong service life.

ii. Weapons systems can be procured only in small numbers; the supply time is being stretched out. But a large fraction of operating cost is independent of the quantities involved. This must result in increased demand for financing unless there is success in achieving extensive standardization at least in equipment and in procedures.

The Naval Support Command must adapt itself at its operations to growing and changing demands. Only in this way can it continue to be equal to its tasks. To this end a number of measures have been initiated which already promise improvement over the short term and medium term.

i. By taking up the management of construction for newly introduced weapons systems the command will be in a position to follow up engineering logistics support even more effectively. Through these measures it should be possible to achieve fundamental improvement in the elimination of weak points and a better provisioning of replacement parts.

ii. With the introduction and use of the procedure for managing individual consumer goods among the troops, supply goods should in the future be supplied to combat units only in those quantities which correspond to actual need. In this way the troops will be induced to use facilities more economically and efficiently.

iii. Data processing is being employed for logistics in information subsystems which later on will be intermeshed in a stepwise process of construction.

This process will primarily support the materiel management in the naval maintenance commands, in the naval materiel depots and on ships and in boat squadrons. Simultaneously, this will also involve a process of improving existing procedures and their evaluation.

iv. Finally, the Naval Support Command must take into account changes in requirements also by improving and adapting the structure of the logistics system itself. The investigations necessitated by this process have been completed.

But there can be no doubt that all efforts to optimize the logistics system can only have an effect upon the use of the military materiel. These efforts can at the most influence only 20 percent of the lifetime costs of a weapons system. The remaining 80 percent is already fixed during development and procurement.

Thus it becomes a question of including experience and knowledge gained during operations in the development and procurement of military materiel to a much greater degree than hitherto in order to suitably influence the design of the materiel and its readiness to enter the process of supply. Therefore those command offices in which this experience and knowledge accumulates should work cooperatively even during origination of the military materiel. It is here, too, that the Naval Support Command recognizes a focal point of its future work.

Those tasks of naval support which look toward the future represent, in this situation in which available facilities are limited, a challenge to the efficiency of the logistics system of the navy. To this challenge we must devote our special attention.

The Naval Support Command will address itself to this challenge in order also in future to carry out its commission in supporting the entire province of the navy. Here as in the past it will be the primary task of these higher command authorities to guarantee the readiness of units of our fleet in terms of materiel.

8008

CSO: 3620/149

## STORTING MUST CONSIDER KOLA BUILDUP IN SECURITY DEBATE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "The Defense of Norway"]

[Text] In our immediate security area, the modernization of Soviet forces at Kola continues at approximately the same pace as that for Soviet forces in general. That this has significance for our relative defense capability is clear beyond doubt. The introduction of large helicopter divisions, with both attack and transport helicopters, increases the Soviet forces' mobility and their capability for advanced operations, at the same time that new types of fighter planes have achieved increased range and combat potential.

This is part of the reality the Storting and the Government must confront in the development of a defense budget. With the very considerable needs that are making themselves manifest in the area of materiel, a projection of 3.5 percent annual real growth in defense appropriations will not be sufficient to maintain an adequate national defense. Granted today's situation, there is a clear incongruity between what on the one hand stands at our disposal for investment and modernization and what on the other hand are the purely operating expenses.

The bourgeois parties' Defense Committee members have in fact underscored the need to work systematically to reduce operating expenses wherever possible in order to meet the increasing needs for improvements in materiel. This applies primarily to anti-aircraft defense, ammunition reserves, and anti-submarine defense. Granted these factual circumstances, everyone must ponder more closely what it would entail for our own defense if Norway were to detach herself from NATO's nuclear strategy, as some here at home advocate. How should we then be able to maintain a sufficient capability to deter attack? Are we in that case prepared to pay the many billions it would cost to strengthen our conventional defense?

This central problem underscores how important it is that the Norwegian defense effort be evaluated in connection with the NATO countries' collective defense capability and their strategy for the deterrence of war. Its credibility will depend on NATO having a military force that gives evidence of a political will and a military capacity to protect the integrity of its member nations. Not least of all has the Willoch government repeatedly pointed out that it is in

this connection of the greatest importance to link Western Europe and North America politically and militarily in the event of a possible conflict.

As a link in an active war-deterrent effort on the Norwegian side, but also in order to be able to withstand an attack in case of catastrophe, conditions must be optimized to the extent possible, so that we can receive and support the allied forces. In a war situation, Norway will be totally dependent upon support from her NATO partners.

We note, therefore, with satisfaction that the government places great weight on carrying out as quickly as possible the advance stockpiling projects designed for allied reinforcements. This will to a significant degree increase the credibility of Norway's defense plans. But it is still a good way off before we can say with certainty that our own defense will be in a position to solve its part of the problem.

12723

CSO: 3639/31

## LARGE-SCALE HUNT FOR SUBMARINE IN OSLO FJORD CONFIRMED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Nov 84 p 15

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Submarine Hunt in Oslo Fjord"]

[Text] The Commander of Naval Forces in South Norway, Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, confirmed to AFTENPOSTEN that a major search took place on Wednesday for a submarine in Oslo Fjord. He said that the area will be kept under surveillance, but he does not believe that the operation will be stepped up unless new reports come in to the Navy.

Rear Admiral Pedersen says that the report of a submarine-like object in Oslo Fjord led to a large-scale operation by the Navy. Both long-range Orions, helicopters, fighter planes, and Coast Guard vessels were deployed during the search, but no submarine was found.

There were three fishermen aboard the shrimp-trawler "Astrid Ann" of Porsgrunn who, throughout the morning, believed they saw a submarine-like object in the sea south of Svenner Lighthouse. Naval Maritime Operations Center (MAROPS) in Jattanuten near Stavanger received notice of the sighting at 1330 hours, and a plane, already in the Oslo vicinity, was promptly re-routed.

The area around Svenner was overflown several times by fighter planes, helicopters and an Air Force Orion reconnaissance plane, but the search yielded no results. A Coast Guard vessel also sped to the area, but the submarine-like object was not to be seen, the NORSK TELEGRAM BYRA (NTB) announced.

The three fishermen became aware of the object as they were on their way into Tonsberg. Against the light, all three believed they saw the object moving northeastward a good distance out into the fjord. The object was observed during the course of one half-hour, NTB disclosed.

Over the years the Defense Ministry has made a number of similar announcements of suspicious objects in Norwegian fjords, but submarine reports from Oslo Fjord are rare. In the last year, submarine "alerts" within the South Norway Defense Command region were concentrated on Hardanger Fjord, Sogne Fjord and North Trondelag.



The Maritime Operations Center (MAROPS) would not disclose Wednesday evening whether Oslo Fjord would be searched again during the night by Air Force and Navy vessels. In a press release from MAROPS at 2100 hours it was briefly stated:

"Nothing abnormal is observed."

12723

CSO: 3639/31

MILITARY

NORWAY

BRIEFS

SUBMARINE SEARCH NEAR SVENNER--The Navy has launched a search operation for a possible submarine in the vicinity of Svenner lighthouse. It has been confirmed to AFTENPOSTEN that there was neither any Norwegian nor allied submarine in the waters off Svenner at the time the suspected submarine is likely to have visited there. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Nov 84 p 4] 12723

CSO: 3639/31

## MILITARY STRATEGIST ON DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMIES, FRIENDS

Lisbon NACAO E DEFESA in Portuguese Jul 84 pp 11-17

[Article by Virgilio de Carvalho: "Allies, Friends and Defense"]

[Excerpts] The Question of Threats

Anticipating the threats to a country represents a particularly difficult and sensitive problem. Because being a threat, by definition the product of material capability and the intention to use it, various perceptions and opinions are possible, from the most ingenuous to the most tendentious, which can nullify or exaggerate the result.

It is for that reason that, for purposes of defense, it may be more acceptable and advisable to take the approach of the vulnerabilities of the countries, inasmuch as those can be translated into risks of exploitation by antagonists of its interests for purpose of interference, coercion or even the imposition of their will by force; and also because the strategies of the countries tend to align themselves according to their principal concerns. This method also has the advantages of not limiting the concept of a threat to the possibility of military aggression and to the existence of well-outlined and identified enemies, and of viewing as a form of defense the prudent and legitimate adoption of preventive measures intended to minimize those risks. It is in this sense, for example, that the autonomous military defense of the countries appears as a means of deterrence and as an instrument of freedom of action, taking as a reference for its make-up the military capability of probable antagonists more than their hypothetical intentions and keeping in mind that in the area of international relations, it is the interests that usually prevail and not the friendships.

## The Case of Portugal

Portugal's identity and freedom of action depend much more clearly than the majority of countries on the sovereignty it is able to exercise over its own geostrategic space which, for that reason, should constitute the essential concern to be expressed in its Strategic Concept of National Defense. That is so because Portugal's identity and freedom of action were built at the cost of the painful acquisition of geostrategic

potential that has guaranteed it a "de-Iberianized" existence in the face of a Spain geographically enveloping Continental Portugal. It began with the territorial expansion toward Lisbon-Alcacer, continued to the Algarve and was consolidated with the projection toward the archipelagoes of Madeira and the Azores. This means that in order for Portugal to be able to express itself geopolitically different from the rest of the Iberian Peninsula and to enjoy the bargaining power that its important geostrategic space can provide, it needs to preserve the cohesion and Euro-Atlantic condition of its territory and to be concerned with the control of its geographic patrimony, the more so because there are two friendly countries that have their eyes on it. One of them, naturally, is Spain, which would not disdain to assume control of the military management of the whole Ibero-Atlantic space on the pretext of its own security and that of the West, which would contribute to strengthening its bargaining power at the expense of dimming Portugal's. The other is the United States, which openly tends to see in the Azores not only an element of its own in-depth military defense but also a key piece in military assistance to Europe and other regions where the security of the West--for which it is aware of being mainly responsible--may be endangered.

#### Interests and Friendships

Having friends and allies and good relations with them should not hinder a country from priding itself on unequivocally and openly assuming the defense of its legitimate interests. It will be much worse to fall into concessions and ambiguous situations that will end up poisoning those same relations sooner or later by the fact of the national interest not having been properly safeguarded. Thus, refusing Madrid unified military commands or all-embracing concepts of the peninsula which would lead to the same thing, on the pretext of logistically supporting the allied defense against exaggerated or hypothetical threats from the East or from North Africa, is not in any way an unfriendly or chauvinistic act, nor contrary to good relations; rather, it is an essential and legitimate defensive attitude. The fact is that the all-embracing concepts of the peninsula would tend to turn Continental Portugal into an appendage of Spain and isolate it from the Islands and expose the continental and insular segments of the national territory to the operational control of two different allied powers with the loss, at the minimum, of Portugal's cohesion, identity and Euro-Atlantic personality, which constitute the pillars of its independence and bargaining power.

To insist with NATO and with the United States that the Azores leave the American "Westlant" Command to join Madeira and Continental Portugal in the Portuguese "Iberlant" represents an attitude consistent with the need for the psychological preservation of the country's interterritorial cohesion and bargaining power. It is the duty of and even advisable for Portugal's allies and friends to understand this. Because, while Portugal may be a small country today, the Maritime West, nevertheless, owes its

very existence to Portugal, having resulted from the first attempt to break with the geopolitical thinking of the continental orientation of Europe, produced by the circumnavigation of Africa by the Portuguese (Saul Cohen in "Geography and Politics"). Spain and England appeared on the sea later than Portugal, in the wake of the taming and building of the Portuguese maritime empire, which extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Portugal's allies and friends cannot ignore all of this (nor do they have reasons of a military nature to do so), mainly because the Portuguese maritime feat--unparalleled in the history of the world--was the natural consequence of the competitiveness, the scientific spirit, the technology, the naval art, the spirit of adventure and the genius that were developed by the Portuguese people to achieve the geostrategic viability of their country. Euro-Atlantic Portugal, as the point of departure for the braving of the Maritime West, is really an authentic, historic-cultural and strategic patrimony of the Maritime West the preservation of which should be the last thing to be called into question by a security arrangement of that same West.

#### Portugal's Atlantic Option

Like any small peripheral country of great geostrategic importance, Portugal has its special concerns about the preservation of its identity, sovereignty and survival, especially because the mainland of its noncontiguous territory is geographically enclaved between Spain and the Atlantic. That is why it befits Portugal, when it does not have sufficient autonomous power to pursue its course alone, as it did in the golden age when it itself was the maritime power, to run a smaller risk in order to protect itself against a larger one; thus, its historic propensity to ally itself toward the sea. But because the understanding with the so-called maritime power also carries with it some risks, as national history well attests, precautions of the "Defense Against Help" type with reference to the so-called maritime power are justified. Which does not mean that we should seek to pursue the course of stereotypes such as neutralism and others that do not take into account Portugal's geostrategic and historic-cultural duty to participate in the defense of the common interests of the Western countries. Not even the neutralism of Europe that, dreaming of being able to situate themselves between the two superpowers, run the risk of helping Moscow divide the West, and of losing it.

#### Need for Autonomous Military Defense

Therefore, it does not appear to be valid to say that Portugal today is not running risks that justify an autonomous military apparatus of some development. It runs those risks from the Warsaw Pact and also from friends and allies. Participation in the Atlantic Alliance responds to those from the East. But with reference to the friends and allies, if Portugal itself should not be capable of assuming its own military security responsibilities within the framework of NATO



in its own territory, and of exercising the presence and vigilance which the requirements of collective security justify in its important air-sea space in times of peace and of crisis, it will run the risk of others having to take charge of it, with serious detriment to national sovereignty, identity, cohesion and bargaining power.

#### Final Comments

One cannot expect friends and allies to have, or want to show that they have, full awareness of what the preservation of the cohesion of its noncontiguous territory and the exercise of national control over it and over its encompassing geostrategic space mean to Portugal. And this occurs in large measure because the larger countries have a natural difficulty in understanding them or in attributing importance to them since such problems do not present themselves to them. It is up to the Portuguese to duly enlighten them. For example, through the thoughtful and persistent action of its civil and military representations in the Atlantic Alliance and in the allied and friendly countries, and the regular publication of a Defense White Paper, a type of document in which the countries usually disseminate their positions regarding questions of national and international security. It is up to the Portuguese not to let themselves unwisely fall into situations of dependence that limit their freedom of action, specifically in the critical areas of economic relations, energy supply, land transportation and defense, among others.

But let it be emphasized that the measures suggested will not be capable of being completely understood, nor have the desired credibility and effectiveness if the meantime a clear will for defense--the product of a national security philosophy accredited by being consistent with the geostrategic reality and historic direction of Portugal--does not exist and is not duly perceived; its recovery is long overdue. And because one of the most evident manifestations of a people's will for defense consists in their determination to maintain an autonomous military defense capability, Portugal cannot dispense with having its own, conceived in conformity with the aforementioned national defense philosophy.

The Atlantic solidarity and good understanding among the allies are certainly decisive factors for an indirect war that can be lost [text missing] military for a hypothetical direct war and the allied solidarity that can help not to lose the indirect one that NATO really has in hand, it will certainly be wise to give preference to solutions that do not pit allies against allies. That being the case, in the event that Spain should decide to join NATO's military structure, as would be fitting to strengthen deterrence, it would seem to be indicated that the command areas assigned to Portugal and to its neighbor should respect the national sovereignty in their respective territorial complexes and encompassing space in a sound and intelligent perspective of complementation and multilateralism and should never be governed by

theoretical geographic criteria devoid of any historic and geopolitical content. The fact is that such criteria would be unacceptable to Portugal because it is not proper that an alliance of which it is a founding member should be able to create a subordinate situation for it in the very geostrategic space that it created precisely to escape that.

8711

CSO: 3542/68

## CRITICISM OF EME DECISION GROWING IN OPORTO GARRISON

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 30 Nov 84 p 13

[Text] Criticism has been growing quietly among the field grade officers of the Oporto military garrison regarding a recent directive from the Army General Staff (EME) pertaining to transfers. It is regarded among certain military circles as "detrimental to the legitimate rights" of majors and lieutenant colonels attached to the Northern Military Region.

The tense atmosphere is connected with an Army General Staff decision that in practice benefits the officers of the Lisbon garrison to the detriment of those who serve in the Northern Military Region with reference to transfers either to the NATO Brigade stationed in Santa Margarida or to the Azores and Madeira garrisons.

Traditionally, those transfers were governed by a roster that included field grade officers attached to all the military regions in Continental Portugal. Nevertheless, by decision of the Army General Staff, the officers who serve in Lisbon have ceased to participate in that roster, for which reason assignment (sometimes lengthy) to Santa Margarida and to the Islands falls almost exclusively on the officers of the Northern Military Region.

A few days before the next transfers (the transfers are processed in December of each year), it is not yet possible to determine the scope of that quiet but sensitive conflict that is upsetting Oporto military circles, indignant over the fact of the general staff "favoring the officers in Lisbon to the detriment of those who are serving in the north."

We have learned that there are 95 majors and lieutenant colonels serving in the Oporto military garrison, whereas there are 634 in the Lisbon Military Region (which the Army General Staff considers to be deficient in terms of field grade officers).

8711

CSO: 3542/68

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

RESERVE POSSIBILITY FOR RC MILITARY--The military men who served as members of the Council of the Revolution and are in active service can request transfer to the reserve and will be credited with 36 years of service. The directive was published in the DIARIO DA REPUBLICA yesterday and specifically states that the 36 years of service will be credited irrespective "of the time actually served." The decree-law adds that the military men in the same situation who are already in the reserve and who have not been credited with 36 years of actual service "may request a revision," thus having their reserve pension increased. The decision adopted by the government taken following a recommendation to that effect by the Superior National Defense Council, according to the official text of the directive. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Dec 84 p 1] 8711

CSO: 3542/68

## ARMY COMMANDER HITS LAX MANEUVERS, CITES FUNDS NEED

## Criticism of Exercises Justified

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Nov 84 p 6

[Article by Ingemar Lofgren]

[Text] "I hope that the officers responsible in Upper Norrland's Military District read my position very carefully. Bad training exercises must simply not be repeated." These are the words of Army Commander Erik G. Bengtsson in response to the criticism delivered by a reserve soldier against the exercises at Ing 3 [engineer regiment] in Boden.

"There is no reason for any special measures to be taken against the military personnel who are responsible. But I want them to strictly observe my response that they must realize they have to do better," Gen Bengtsson tells DAGENS NYHETER.

"I cannot accept badly executed training exercises; they may as well be canceled. It is my responsibility that we have a combat-ready army, and for this reason the exercises must be a positive experience rather than a negative one," says Bengtsson.

## Open Letter

The background to the army commander's harsh criticism of the officers involved in Upper Norrland is an open letter written by a disgruntled soldier just 2 weeks ago.

Reserve soldier Ragnvald Jonsson from Skellefteå<sup>0</sup> had gone through a refresher course between 17 September and 5 October.

For him the training exercises turned out to be a terrifying experience. The organization and planning were deficient, efficiency was non-existent, and the officers displayed an inappropriate regard for people.

He recorded several concrete examples on two large, closely written sheets of paper.



Erik G. Bengtsson reacted strongly to the charges in Jonsson's letter and promptly ordered an investigation. It is now complete.

#### Justified Criticism

"I am forced to say that the incidents described by Ragnvald Jonsson in his letter actually occurred. Aside from certain exaggerations, I must agree with him in his criticism," says Bengtsson.

One of the questions the army commander wanted answered in his investigation was who had responsibility for the planning, execution and follow-up of the exercise.

Today Bengtsson says:

"It was primarily the head of the military unit who was responsible for the exercise in question. But the head of the regiment is over him, and the commander of the Upper Norrland Military District is the one who is directly responsible to me."

Erik G. Bengtsson has been army commander for about 6 months. He was formerly head of this same Upper Norrland District. What role does he himself have in the bad planning?

"That is not at all relevant. It is of course a question of long-range planning, which must be followed up constantly by the head of the regiment, especially just before a training exercise takes place. And I was no longer there then."

#### Disagreements

In the opinion of the army commander, part of the reason that the training exercise at Ing 3 in Boden was so ineffective is the fact that there were disagreements between the company chief and the platoon heads.

"This affected the spirit of the company and their confidence in the officers. It is the higher authority's responsibility to keep himself informed of the moods in the subordinate unit. But they didn't do this in this case."

According to Ragnvald Jonsson, communication between the recruits and the officers was bad. Although the officers were young and should have applied more modern forms of operation, the reserve soldiers met with indifference and abusive language.

"I take a very serious view of the criticism concerning the treatment of the personnel by the officers of the company and the exercise," says Bengtsson.

"Open communications are crucial for an effective reserve training maneuver. Only then is it possible to make use of the good will which many recruits are willing to demonstrate during the exercises."

### Only 73 Came

When Jonsson did his training exercise, it was thought that a total of 115 men would take part. But after deferments and medical excuses, it turned out that only 73 came.

"This is a major problem. Last-minute applications for deferment obviously affect efficiency, and in this case 80 percent of the deferment petitions arrived during the last month before the exercise."

In order to cope with the problem, the army commander now intends to work "vigorously" to get the deferment regulations tightened up.

In spite of the fact that Bengtsson is leveling such hard criticism against the officers in charge at Ing 3 in Boden, he does not believe that it applies to the training exercises in general.

"My basic view after my inspections is that the majority of the training exercises yield good results."

### Can be Improved

The army commander thinks that the investigation of conditions at Ing 3 will have an effect on the efficiency of future training exercises. He believes that, although most of them are good, they can be improved.

But if in the future a reserve soldier does not think that he is getting a fair hearing from the command, he can write to Erik G. Bengtsson--just as Ragnvald Jonsson did.

"If a reserve person experiences the training exercises as something unendurable and if he thinks it's appropriate, he can write, of course. But I stress that he should first direct the criticism to the officers who are nearest in line at the base."

### Letter Came at Right Time

"If Army Commander Erik G. Bengtsson can get his views across to all the officers down the line, I believe that the training exercises can turn out to be good," says Ragnvald Jonsson, the reservist who 2 months ago delivered the strong criticism of a training exercise in Boden.

"It is a positive thing that people now realize that a problem exists concerning training exercises. It is a problem of motivation that has to be discussed," Jonsson tells DAGENS NYHETER. According to Jonsson the purpose of his open letter was to initiate a debate on something that generally everybody knew about.

"Apparently the letter came at precisely the right time. I believe that people recognize the problems from their own training exercises." The harsh criticism Jonsson directed at the officers in Boden attacked their disregard for people and their careless attitude.

"It must of course be assumed that one can work together and feel team spirit, that everyone feels the same commitment."

"Unfortunately, however, there is too much time-serving in the military. Whenever a higher officer comes to the base, everything is put in shape and the soldiers are kept busy so that it looks like everything is OK."

#### Armed Forces Commander Backs

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Nov 84 p 6

[Article by Anders Ohman]

[Text] "We haven't pushed hard enough..." Armed Forces Commander Lennart Ljung made this remark recently when the subject of Defense's training exercises came up. Large gaps in the units often result in sluggish exercises, the soldiers' motivation drops and grumbling increases.

The cause of the large gaps in the units is partially due to the fact that so many recruits apply and receive deferments from the exercises of the military units.

Forty percent of the soldiers seek deferment, and half of these receive approval.

The system favors mostly the ranks of officers. The managers and executives who can demonstrate "serious inconvenience" in their work have an easier time of avoiding military service than do workers and employees. There are visible signs that the military deferment system discriminates along class lines--the established professions get out of training for Sweden's defense.

It has become somewhat harder to get a deferment the past several years: this year 50 percent of those who applied for a deferment received one, whereas 60 percent received a deferment last year.

The most favored are the officers who are employed in trade and industry.

"It is desirable that as many as possible attend the training exercises. A unit that has trained together from the first should conduct exercises together and be intact," say Colonel Stig Magnusson, head of the eastern recruiting office. He does not think that those who apply for deferment should be treated too generously.

The rules governing deferment are contained in the 1969 recruiting law. A considerable disadvantage to studies in progress can be grounds for deferment. Other grounds are serious inconvenience in one's work or severe hardship for relatives.

The notification time can be decisive for granting deferments. If the recruit was notified 4 to 6 months previous to the exercise, it can be assumed that was able to make plans to report for active duty.

### Funds Shortage Cited

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Nov 84 p 6

[Article by Ingemar Lofgren: "Lacking 50 Million"]

[Text] Swedish defense will be compromised if the army does not get an additional 50 million kronor from the government, claims Army Commander Erik G. Bengtsson. If he does not get the funds soon, he will be forced to cancel the training exercises for 9,000 men this spring.

In all, the army commander would need 300 million kronor to compensate for inflation. Otherwise, he will not be able to carry out the planned training exercises.

Bengtsson has been able to "find" 250 million kronor so far.

"We have made reductions in everything possible in the way of materiel, and even a little in personnel. But as for cuts during the current budget year, there is not much other than the training maneuvers to turn to," Bengtsson tells DAGENS NYHETER.

To avoid touching this spring's planned training exercises, the army commander has asked the government for the remaining 50 million. Bengtsson does not know when the government may reply.

He only knows that the money must come very soon. Actually, the call-up notices to this spring's approximately 9,000 reserve soldiers should begin going out in the next 2 weeks.

The papers have been processed and can actually be mailed out any time. But if the army does not receive its requested 50 million, the refresher training courses will have to be canceled, Bengtsson claims. In that case, it will be primarily the local defense units with older personnel that will be affected.

"This in its turn means that these units will not be combat-ready immediately following a mobilization. Naturally, that is very serious," says the army commander.

### Refresher Training Funds Approved

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Dec 84 p 6

[Text] The government decided on Tuesday to allocate 40 million kronor from price control funds in order that the army's training exercises might be conducted as planned. Commander of the army Lt Gen Erik G. Bengtsson said earlier that 50 million kronor were needed for the planned exercises.

With the 40 million kronor now granted by the government, the army will be able this spring to conduct the planned exercises, judged by the army commander to be crucial.

## ECONOMIC SITUATION, BALANCE OF TRADE DISCUSSED

## Increased Balance of Trade Deficit

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 11 Dec 84 p 12

/Text/ According to a report of the Statistics and Research Unit, many positive developments in our foreign trade were noted during the first 9 months of 1984. Overall exports of goods (domestic export and re-export of goods) showed an increase of 34.4 percent and amounted to 253.4 million pounds compared with a 5.3 percent drop during the January-September 1983 period. Domestic exports during the same period increased 31.2 percent and re-exports 43.5 percent and amounted to 182.6 million pounds and 70.9 million pounds respectively.

The more significant increases were noted in the export of potatoes, canned goods, soya oil, travel items and clothing.

Imports for local consumption, as a result of the expenditure for the purchase of two aircraft by Cyprus Airways in March 1984, increased by 30.8 percent and amounted to 538.3 million pounds compared to 411.7 million pounds during the January-September 1983 period. Subtracting the expenditure for the purchase of the two aircraft, the increase was limited to 16.2 percent. Between January and September 1984, imports of raw materials, due primarily to the resurgence of international demand for our industrial products, increased by 22.7 percent, while imports of petroleum products increased by 22.3 percent and imports of capital goods increased by 18.3 percent. Imports of consumer goods showed a small 5.7 percent increase.

The greater rate of increase of overall exports compared with overall imports (subtracting the expenditure for the purchase of the two aircraft) led to a significant improvement of the balance of trade. Thus, while the deficit in the balance of trade increased by 56.4 million pounds or 25.3 percent during the first 9 months of 1983, in the corresponding period of this year the increase in the balance of trade was limited to 21.9 million pounds or 7.8 percent. Taking into consideration the expenditure for the purchase of the two aircraft, the deficit in the balance of trade shows an increase of 81.7 million pounds or 29.3 percent.

## Government Protests Bankruptcy Charges

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 11 Dec 84 p 1

/Text/ The government has rejected charges about bankruptcy that appeared in the press and has stressed that to the contrary its economic policy is justified and that the Cypriot economy is improving. Referring to published reports, the government spokesman said the following yesterday:



"It is an undeniable fact that our economic situation in 1984 improved substantially in all sectors. Simply put, indicative of this is the fact that the growth rate this year will surpass 5 percent compared with 3 percent in 1983, while the unemployment percentage will remain at the same low level of last year, namely 3.3 percent. Export of goods will increase by 30 percent while revenues from tourism will increase by 31 percent.

"Also, The deficit in the balance of current trade, once the value of the two Cyprus Airways aircraft is subtracted, will decrease from 8.6 percent to 4.9 percent of the gross domestic products despite the increased payments of interest on our foreign debt and despite the decrease of transferable payments from abroad.

"The inflation rate, despite unfavorable weather conditions that propelled agricultural product prices upwards, registered only a slight rise.

"The improvement noted in 1984 is to a great extent the result of various measures taken by the government at the end of 1983 and the first part of 1984.

"Of course, various fortuitous outside factors contributed positively to the shaping of developments in 1984. Such factors included the Lebanese crisis and the high price of potatoes on the British market. Nevertheless, other outside factors also contributed negatively, such as, for example, the continued rise in the value of the dollar, the high international interest rates and the continuation of the Iraqi-Iranian war.

"The developments in 1984 completely justify the measures taken by the government and for which it has been unjustly criticized."

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CSO: 3521/130

FRANKE: EARLY RETIREMENT COULD EASE UNEMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20 Nov 84 p 32

[Interview with Heinrich Franke, director of Federal Labor Office in Nuernberg; interview conducted by SZ staffers Hubert Neumann and Franz Thoma, data and place not indicated: "Possible Relief through Early Retirement: Since 1974 Nearly 1.5 Million Positions Lost/Almost 1 Million More Jobseekers Competing for Them"]

[Text] The first prognoses of the Scientific Institute for the 1985 Labor Market in the Federal Republic of Germany are not rosy. Moreover, they start with high numbers of unemployed people. Thus, with a potential work force of 28,580,000 and a demand for 25,100,000, the IFO Institute in Munich expects a surplus of 3,458,000 workers. The monthly number of registered unemployed may range between 2,230,000 and 2,260,000 during this year. The Sueddeutsche Zeitung asked Heinrich Franke, the President of the Federal Institute for Labor in Nuernberg, about the prospective development in 1985.

SZ: Is the high unemployment figure persisting?

Franke: Unemployment is much too high. Unfortunately, nothing will change too rapidly. The Federal Institute estimates between 2,200,000 and 2,250,000 unemployed for a yearly average in the 1985 budget.

SZ: Therefore, hardly a difference from this year?

Franke: Well, we can't overlook the fact that the potential in German wage earners will actually climb by about 120,000 in 1985. But on the other side--among other things--we can count on relief from the early retirement law. Our budget contains the means to cope with 80,000 recipients of early retirement money. In addition, it is to be expected that the return of foreign workers to their homelands will continue. That confines the potential growth of the work force more narrowly.

SZ: What causes you to make the assumption that so many employees will claim early retirement money?

Franke: We conclude that from the number of wage agreements that have been concluded up to now.

SZ: What relief is coming from the reduction in work hours that has been fought for in strikes?

Franke: Reductions in work hours, irrespective of what kind they are, can only have a flanking effect.

SZ: Does IG Metall's wage contract with its 38.5-hour work week have a relieving effect?

Franke: Yes. It is being put into effect in a supplementary way, or at least there are fewer being retired. However, we cannot expect too much. The wage contract doesn't go into effect until April 1, 1985. It will have a long-term effect, not a short-term one.

SZ: Will entry into the shortened work week increase efficiency?

Franke: The tempo of efficiency could be speeded up. However, that must not have any additional negative effects on the labor market. Frequently, the only efficiencies that are preferred here are the ones which are somehow foreseen.

SZ: By way of example, the automobile industry--which already operates with industrial robots to a great extent--has never given employment to more workers than at present.

Franke: The auto industry has held its employment position in the last several years in contrast to industry in general. Improvements in production--that is to say, efficiency--have not lead to high unemployment.

SZ: Then what causes lie at the bottom of unemployment?

Franke: Several. First of all, there has been a reduction in worker positions in the Federal Republic in the last ten years by about 1.5 million slots due to cuts in demand. At the same time--just between 1978 and 1983 alone--there has been a growth in the number of potential workers by at least a million. The divergence between supply and demand went even farther apart. Because of two oil price rises, which led to recessions, purchasing power was reduced; furthermore, acceptable wage contracts did not appear on the scene.

SZ: Which agreements do you mean?

Franke: I can recall wage agreements from the beginning of the 1970's of up to 12 percent. That lead to an explosion in wage costs. Production in the Federal Republic became very expensive.

SZ: What must be done now to reduce unemployment?

Franke: The number one factor is growth; increase in national production.

SZ: In recent years in the US, in spite of moderate growth in the last few decades, new jobs have been created by tens of millions. Is that a miracle?

Franke: No. The computer industry and the "think tanks" of Silicon Valley have created new jobs. Europe, and the Federal Republic too, must follow along in both areas. In addition to the area of high technology, new jobs have come into being in the service sector.

SZ: Are the political measures of the work market that are foreseen in the work promotion law (AFG) sufficient to alleviate the strong pressure brought about by high unemployment?

Franke: AFG offers many possibilities. But we are striving for the modification of several paragraphs in close collaboration with government, regional government, and the Federal Labor Ministry.

SZ: In which direction are your proposals aimed?

Franke: I have made a whole set of proposals to Federal Labor Minister Bluem. These have been for fighting unemployment of young people, for continuing education and retraining, for expansion of employment for hard-to-place personnel, for aid to older employees, and also for the establishment of independent livelihoods.

SZ: Does your set of proposals also foresee improvements in social safeguards for the long-term unemployed?

Franke: I have been occupied with this problem since my entry into office. Not only have I proposed lengthening the maximum claim period for unemployment compensation from 12 to 18 months for unemployed persons upon completion of their 49th year, but I have also proposed the introduction of new kinds of jobs, increase in the tax allowance for computation of income in unemployment benefit earnings and, analogous to the early retirement regulation, also a stipend for early retirement of short-time workers.

SZ: What relief is to be expected from these actions?

Franke: Through implementation of short-time employment, retraining, further vocational training, and creation of new jobs, unemployment in this year alone is lower by 300,000 than it would have been without these measures.

SZ: Can the success of your steps to create work be measured?

Franke: Yes. We have had good results with it. As a result, many participants have found permanent positions.

SZ: Who is actually entered into the statistics of the unemployment figures? Are there any "non-active members"?

Franke: People who report for unemployment and are available for any kind of reasonable work are regarded by AFG as unemployed. There are no "non-active members". If there is no contact with an unemployed person for three months, he is notified for a placement interview. Whoever does not respond to this loses his unemployment status. Incidentally, that was decided in 1981 under the Socialist-Liberal coalition in Bonn.

SZ: There is a drop in unemployment. It looks more favorable in the south than elsewhere.

Franke: That's true. Failures in structural policies during boom periods cannot be balanced during periods of weak growth; Baden-Wuerttemberg and southern Bavaria have unemployment figures that are, in part, considerably below the general rate.

SZ: How many youths have not obtained a place to train this year?

Franke: At the end of September there were 58,000 who were not yet arranged for. Our entire concern is with them. We are certain that, of the 58,000 still unplaced applicants, a large number will still get a chance for a job by the end of March 1985. Youth unemployment is a special problem of labor market politics. In discussing this we must not forget that trade, industry, commerce, and various administrations have filled more than 700,000 training jobs in each of the last few years-records which have not been achieved in any other country in Europe.

SZ: Is there a "hard core" in youth unemployment?

Franke: Yes. They are the untrained youths. In the past it has been shown that qualified, trained youths have more favorable chances of finding placement than all other groups even if there is only a slight improvement in the work market. For this reason we are so much at pains to help as many youths as possible to get training.

SZ: Are trained youths better off?

Franke: Take the October figures. Altogether unemployment rose, in fact, by about 1000. Among youths under 20, however, the number distinctly decreased by 14,300 down to 158,500. That was 28,200 or 15.1 percent less than a year ago. At the same point in time, there were-altogether-only 3,200 fewer unemployed than in October 1983.

12521

CSO: 3620/154



## POLL POINTS TO GREATER LABOR TROUBLES IN 1985

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 30 Nov 84 pp 20-21

[Text] In the view of about 60 percent of those interviewed in a poll taken by Euroexpansao-TEMPO, next year will see an increase in labor conflict. Only 12 percent of those interviewed believe that such conflict will decrease in 1985. If the pessimistic predictions revealed by this poll are borne out, the coming year will not be a promising one for the national economy, which is already so much weakened.

This survey was made by the specialized Euroexpansao enterprise at the end of last month, covering 816 individuals living in 126 localities in all parts of continental Portugal. Those questioned were asked if, in their view, the coming year would see greater or lesser labor conflict.

The overall results were as follows, by order of importance: 59.5 percent of those interviewed said there will be more conflict in 1985; 17 percent said "everything will remain the same"; 12 percent did not know or did not choose to respond; and finally, 11.5 percent of those interviewed said labor conflict will decline.

A study of Table I yields several conclusions. With regard to the occupation of those interviewed, the pertinent column shows that cadres and owners expressed their views as follows: 50.8 percent believe that the conflict will increase; 22.8 percent believe it will remain stable; and finally, only 20.8 percent believe that labor conflict will decrease in 1985.

As to employees, it is curious to note that they are more pessimistic than their employers: 59.6 percent answered that the conflict will increase as compared to 11.7 percent who believe it will decline.

More pessimistic still were the answers of the workers interviewed. In the view of 62.9 percent, labor conflict will increase, while 10.7 percent believe it will decline.

On the basis of these results, it can be seen that owners and employees agree to a greater or lesser degree in believing that labor relations in the enterprises will suffer a substantial deterioration in 1985.

The same table also shows that pessimism concerning social agreement declines with the increasing age of those interviewed. In other words, it is the youngest who have the greatest belief in the intensification of labor tension.

Table 1

		Region			Development		Economic Stratum		Population Category						
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	
Will increase	%H	100.0	49.1	13.4	36.8	7.8	71.3	28.7	8.1	32.6	59.3	45.1	21.0	21.7	12.2
	%V	59.5	65.3	51.7	60.6	45.5	59.8	58.7	51.5	67.3	57.0	58.7	57.7	66.4	54.8
Will remain the same	%H	100.0	36.3	9.6	41.1	13.1	74.7	25.3	11.8	26.8	61.5	40.3	19.1	16.0	22.6
	%V	17.0	16.1	10.5	19.3	21.7	17.9	14.8	21.3	15.8	16.9	15.0	15.0	15.7	29.0
Will decline	%H	100.0	30.3	16.9	35.6	17.3	67.1	32.9	17.6	28.3	54.1	41.4	31.9	12.7	14.0
	%V	11.5	9.1	12.6	11.4	19.5	10.9	13.1	21.7	11.4	10.1	10.4	17.0	7.6	12.1
Don't know or no answer	%H	100.0	30.1	32.3	26.2	11.4	67.6	32.4	4.3	13.2	82.6	60.3	18.5	16.7	4.5
	%V	12.0	9.5	25.2	8.7	13.4	11.5	13.4	5.5	5.6	16.0	15.9	10.3	10.3	4.1

		Occupation							Educational Level			Age			Sex			
		(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	
Will increase	%H	100.0	4.6	21.1	26.8	19.4	9.9	18.1	16.1	24.6	59.3	27.5	17.2	18.8	16.0	20.5	45.7	54.3
	%V	59.5	50.8	59.6	62.9	58.5	46.0	69.2	56.2	72.5	59.2	72.0	61.9	62.8	55.5	47.2	58.4	60.4
Will remain the same	%H	100.0	7.3	22.7	31.0	11.1	16.0	11.9	26.4	16.3	57.2	20.2	18.0	22.0	13.6	26.3	50.0	50.0
	%V	17.0	22.8	18.3	20.8	9.5	21.1	13.0	26.3	13.7	15.5	15.1	18.4	21.0	13.4	17.3	18.2	15.9
Will decline	%H	100.0	9.8	21.4	23.6	17.4	15.9	12.0	20.7	15.5	63.8	15.3	19.0	13.5	23.2	29.0	59.2	40.8
	%V	11.5	20.8	11.7	10.7	10.1	14.3	8.9	14.0	8.9	11.7	7.8	13.2	8.6	15.6	13.0	14.8	8.7
Don't know or no answer	%H	100.0	2.5	18.3	11.8	35.9	20.0	11.4	4.8	8.1	87.1	9.6	8.9	10.9	22.2	48.4	33.1	66.9
	%V	12.0	5.6	10.5	5.6	21.9	18.7	8.9	3.4	4.8	16.7	5.1	6.5	7.4	15.5	22.5	8.5	15.1

Notes: %H--Percentage of answers relative to each category (region, sex, etc.)

%V--Percentage of each response relative to the total for the tables.

Key:

1. Northern coast	8. Middle-higher	14. Employees	21. Fourth-class or below
2. Northern interior	9. Middle-lower	15. Workers	22. Up to 24
3. Central-southern coast	10. Up to 1,000	16. Household employees	23. 25-34
4. Southern interior	11. 1,001 to 10,000	17. Pensioners	24. 35-44
5. Developed	12. 10,001 to 100,000	18. Other retired persons	25. 45-54
6. Undeveloped	13. Over 100,000	19. 7 or more years	26. 55 or over
7. Upper-middle upper	14. Cadres and owners	20. Up to 5 years	27. Men
			28. Women

Those interviewed in this Euroexpansao-TEMPO poll were also asked to justify their answer to the question.

Thus, as can be seen from Table II, the majority of those who believe that labor conflict will increase in 1985 justify this concern by the belief that the economic crisis will become more acute (26.2 percent). Immediately following is the justification that the standard of living will be lower. Unemployment, low wages, bad government policy, a poor social environment and increased economic differences were the other reasons given by those interviewed in this poll for believing in an increase in labor tension. The fact that there will be a presidential election in 1985 was also one of the reasons mentioned, although by a limited number.

Table II--Reasons Labor Conflict Will Increase

Living standard will drop	21.4
Economic differences will be more acute	5.5
Crisis	26.2
Bad social environment	3.9
Bad policy	15.4
Unemployment	17.1
Low wages	15.8
Don't see improvement	6.3
Election is close	5.5
Other reasons	1.8
Don't know or no answer	4.9

As to those who answered that conflict will decrease (see Table III), the following arguments were given to justify this view: the financial balance (43 percent), the unprofitability of strikes (19.2), lack of conditions leading to strikes (17.4 percent) and improvement in the country's situation in the coming year (14.2 percent).

Table III--Reasons Labor Conflict Will Decline

Strikes are unprofitable	19.2
Financial balance	43.0
Conditions for strikes lacking	17.4
Country will improve	14.2
Other reasons	3.2
Don't know or no answer	3.2

Finally (see Table IV), those who answered that conflict will remain at the current level justified this production on the basis of several arguments. The majority (41 percent) believe this because the national situation will not improve in 1985. Other reasons given were that the workers are tired of strikes (11.6 percent); because the poor governmental policy will be continued (10.9 percent); because living conditions will not improve (8.8 percent) and, finally, because 1985 will be a presidential election year (6.1 percent).

Table IV--Reasons Labor Conflict Will Remain the Same

No improvement in situation	41.0
Tired of strikes	11.6
Bad policy	10.9
Election is near	6.1
Living conditions will not improve	8.8
"This is what I see"	4.2
Individuals are tired	3.8
Other reasons	6.7
Don't know or no answer	10.9

From the results of the three tables it can be concluded that it is economic, rather than political or social, reasons which those interviewed believe will be responsible for an increase in labor conflict.

#### Explanation of Methodology

Coverage: Population enrolled on the electoral register and resident on continental Portugal in localities with five or more inhabitants.

Sampling: 811 individuals contacted directly and personally.

Random selection in multiple stages, based on a structure obtained from the interrelation of the following variable factors: region, socioeconomic development and population dimensions.

Balancing effected using these variables, sex, age and April 1983 voting record.

Collection of data: Interviews held between 19 and 22 October 1984 in 126 localities by 39 supervised interviewers.

Data was gathered on the basis of the Euroexpansao balloting method, using a printed form resembling a voting ballot.

Reliability of results: The maximal reliability range (level of importance + 0.05) is 3.4 percent on the total level.

Euroexpansao is responsible for the poll and TEMPO for the questions asked and the analysis of the results.

5157

CSO: 3542/67

## PROBLEMS OF YOUTH NEED POLITICAL SOLUTIONS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Nov 84 p 6

[Editorial: "Youth Policy"]

[Text] The significantly increased scholarship amounts that have been put into effect by the Ministry of Education and Universities have not been enough to offset the profound displeasure with which university students have greeted the increase of about 80 percent in food prices at university cafeterias. Considering that scholarships benefit a very small number of students and that the cafeterias are used by almost the entire school population, the volume of protests could not fail to drown out the expressions of satisfaction.

The deteriorating living standards of the Portuguese, growing unemployment among young people--growing primarily because of the steady arrival of new candidates on the job market--the prohibitive cost of textbooks and reference works, and the burden on family budgets of reduced-fare transportation passes--all of that has been making it increasingly difficult for students to remain at the university until they earn their degrees. On the other hand, the large number of degree holders still waiting for their first job is adding well-founded apprehensions concerning the future to the concerns of daily life.

The situation of young people in Portugal is the most dramatic of our realities, and it is necessary to have the clearheadedness to recognize this and the courage to admit it. Because it poisons and erodes the present and mortgages, perhaps irremediably, the country that we will be tomorrow, the situation of young people should merit interest, commitment, and a series of steps that are not visible on the agenda of our rulers.

The education and employment of young people are a human problem and a social problem, but chiefly a political problem. They represent an unchallengeable investment in any country, since they are indispensable and irreplaceable in terms of development, progress, and social peace.

Arising from the very foundations of the educational structure, the faults start with the nonexistence of official and free preprimary education. This shortcoming means that when we enter the EEC, we will be a bizarre rarity. The tens of completely equipped preprimary schools which exist throughout the country but are not operating for lack of funds reveal, at the least, an appalling lack of



planning--unless they signify a budget imbalance so great that it made the projects unviable somewhere between approval and completion.

The preparatory and secondary schools with their cyclical crises and their permanent shortcomings have been the subject of exhaustive discussion in all the media in recent weeks. And that entire accumulation of deficiencies, improvisations, and counterfeits is eventually going to wind up in the universities even if it leaves 10,000 unsuccessful candidates by the wayside--individuals who not only are not prepared for professional life but would not find a labor market to absorb them if they were prepared. That lack of practical preparation, incidentally, is being gradually combated through the recent--and long overdue--introduction of technical-vocational streams beginning with the ninth year of schooling.

Because of the tight financial circumstances characterizing the life of the average Portuguese family, adult children have become--and it is urgent to consider the seriousness and absurdity of this statement--a permanent source of worry, either because they neither go to school nor work for reasons that are almost never their fault--and it would be redundant to list the resulting problems--or because they have obtained access to higher education, but the family income is frequently inadequate for covering the cost of books, transportation, and food.

The reaction by young people to the announced increase in university cafeteria prices--irrespective of the possible politicization it may have caused--is therefore deserving of complete sympathy. It is based on obvious causes. It is rooted in implications for the family. The students cannot solve the problem by taking part-time jobs, because there are no part-time jobs.

We do not doubt that every new minister of education and universities tries to find the best way out and the best solutions. But the situation of young people in Portugal has assumed such serious proportions that only an overall solution that is political, well thought out, structured, and applied across the board will be able--at the least--to prevent it from growing dangerously worse.

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CSO: 3542/55

## TRADE DEFICIT FALLS IN FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF 1984

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 17 Nov 84 p 17

[Text] The trade deficit fell by about 29.6 percent in dollars during the period between January and September 1984, according to provisional data calculated by the INE (National Statistics Institute).

Compared to the same period in 1983, and in dollar terms, imports showed a drop of 7.1 percent, while exports rose by 12.3 percent. In escudos, CIF imports totaled 822.9 million contos and FOB exports totaled about 535.7 million contos, resulting in a rate of cover of imports by exports on the order of 65.1 percent.

It should be noted that last year's rate of cover was only 54.3 percent, having varied in recent years between 39.3 percent (in 1977) and 52.4 percent (in 1979).

By groups of countries, the rate at which imports were covered by exports (in escudos) rose in trade with the OECD countries (from 63.1 to 82.7 percent), with the EEC countries (from 78.6 to 104.3 percent), and the EFTA countries (from 99.8 to 146.8 percent). The rate for Portugal was strongly negative in trade with the OPEC countries (9.1 percent).

In any case, the balance in trade with the OECD countries remains negative (although down by 45 percent in comparison with the same period in 1983). This is due basically to the results of trade with the United States (Portugal's biggest supplier and its fourth largest customer), in which the negative balance accounted for 25.7 percent of the total.

Our country's trade relations with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Iraq as a group were responsible during the same period for about 61.8 percent of the total deficit calculated by the INE.

Especially significant was the reversal noted in our trade balance with the European Community. This was due to the improvement noted in our trade with the United Kingdom, the FRG, France, and Holland.

In fact, the balance with the United Kingdom changed from a deficit of 1.1 million contos in 1983 to a surplus of 26.3 million contos in 1984, while the deficit with the FRG dropped from 27.5 million to 7.7 million contos.

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CSO: 3542/57

## STATISTICS ON UNEMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10 Nov 84 p 19

[Article by Jorge Wemans]

[Text] Greeted with satisfaction in government offices and viewed with strong reservations by experts who keep tabs on matters related to unemployment, the provisional statistics from the INE [National Statistics Institute] indicate an improvement in the rate of unemployment in June of 1984. In an environment recognized by everyone as being one of deep economic crisis, the rate supposedly dropped from 10.6 percent to only 10.4 percent. Despite that change, the number of workers registering with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security's employment offices as being unemployed and in search of a job is rising steadily.

In June 1984, according to the INE, the unemployed numbered about 490,000, and nearly 200,000 of those were still looking for their first job. That latter group included over 80,000 individuals who had been looking for a job for over a year. Of the 300,000 who were unemployed after having worked previously, over 60,000 had been waiting for over 2 years to return to labor activity.

The result is that the unemployment picture, which had deteriorated greatly throughout 1983--when the unemployment rate rose from 9 to over 10 percent--seems to be evolving in an ambiguous manner this year, even though we are continuing to witness the disappearance of a great many jobs without any visible sign of a new surge of emigration or of an offset in the form of new jobs.

The unfavorable developments in 1983 were also obvious in the labor market, where there was a 28-percent rise in the demand for jobs by the unemployed. That increase was accompanied by a drop of 2.4 percent in the number of jobs being offered by employers.

The combination of those two trends meant that in 1983, the ratio of job supply to job demand deteriorated to 27.5 percent, compared to 36.1 percent in 1982.

#### Compensation for 1.5 Percent

In its provisional monthly summary for August 1984, the Institute for Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP) reported--with reference only to those registered as unemployed with official agencies--that there were 310,000 jobseekers and

that it managed to place only 10,000 people in new jobs. The bulk of the total registered consisted of 243,000 unemployed, while only 56,000 applications came from jobless persons who had never worked before.

The gap between those statistics and the ones reported by the INE shows that the unemployed who have worked previously are more likely to register with the employment service than young people who have never been employed but who are looking for a chance to join the active population.

More dramatic, however, is the situation with unemployment compensation. Last August, only 1.5 percent of the total unemployed population was receiving any compensation to make up for the lack of wages. If we add to that number the workers whose wages are in arrears, we get a more realistic--although even gloomier--picture of the Portuguese state's inability to support citizens who are in a precarious economic situation due to problems related to the firms for which they work or would like to work.

In the specific case of unemployment compensation, that compensation is not widespread basically because it is difficult to obtain. To apply for unemployment compensation, a worker must not only prove that he is covered by social welfare but is also required to have worked for at least 6 months during the preceding year. That in itself is enough to exclude people looking for their first job.

In addition, unemployment compensation covers only those workers who left their jobs involuntarily, and this eliminates one more group (although a small one) of today's unemployed. But then come the restrictions based on income: even though a person is unemployed--and provided that he has no dependents--he is not entitled to unemployment compensation if his income exceeds 70 percent of the minimum wage. If one's family unit has an income exceeding 70 percent of the minimum wage, there goes the compensation. And so on.

The restrictions are such that unemployment compensation is actually granted only to those on the threshold of destitution, and even then in minute amounts. It can never exceed the nationwide minimum wage, and it equals the minimum wage only in the case of individuals with over five dependents.


#### New Insurance

To deal with that situation, the Council of Ministers last week approved unemployment insurance. The big innovation here is that this insurance increases the number of unemployed eligible for government support and increases the amount of that support.

Although called unemployment insurance, it is a tax-supported social security payment and can be applied for by any worker who has worked for 36 of the preceding 48 months. And the payment to that worker will be equal to 60 percent of the wage he was receiving when he became unemployed. Since these payments are not taxable, the worker will receive about 80 percent of his net pay in most cases. Depending on how long the beneficiary was employed, the unemployment benefit can also be extended for a longer period than the current unemployment compensation--which was limited to 450 days.




Unemployment insurance will therefore be aimed at improving the situation of those who become unemployed after a more lengthy occupational career and whose incomes were higher. Under the current system, they were generally the ones who were unable to receive any compensation at all

# Unemployment and Unemployment Compensation



The weakness of labor statistics is obvious from the graph above. Whereas the INE points to a drop in the unemployment rate in June 1984, the number of unemployed registered with employment offices set an absolute record in that month.

Key:

- 
 Unemployment rate (provisional figures) (Source: INE)
- 
 Unemployed workers seeking work, in thousands (Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MTSS))
- 
 Number of unemployed receiving unemployment compensation, in thousands (Source: MTSS)

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CSO: 3542/57



## MORE ENTERPRISES RESORT TO NONPAYMENT OF WAGES

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10 Nov 84 p 19

[Article by Jorge Wemans]


[Text] According to the latest survey by the Secretariat of State for Labor--covering only the 87,000 firms for which government departments have personnel rosters--45,000 workers were owed back wages at the beginning of June 1984. They were employed by 350 firms which owed them 2.9 million contos in wages and 730,000 contos in other payments.

There were reportedly also 329 firms that owed 52,000 workers various allowances, retroactive amounts, and other wage components other than monthly compensation proper. These firms owed a little under 1 million contos to their employees.

So this was the situation in June 1984:

1. Four out of every 1,000 Portuguese firms had not paid wages on time, and 24 out of every 1,000 Portuguese workers had not received the wages to which they were entitled.
2. Firms with wage payments in arrears (350 firms) accounted for half of the total number of firms (679) that owed monetary payments to their workers.
3. The number of workers whose wages had not been paid declined by 27.8 percent between the end of October 1983 and June 1984.
4. On the other hand, the number of firms whose wage payments were in arrears increased by 10.7 percent between January and June 1984. In the same period, the total number of workers in that situation rose by 11 percent, and total unpaid wages rose by exactly the same proportion: 11 percent.
5. Between March and June 1984, 61 firms employing 14,000 workers brought their wage payments completely up to date. During the same period, another 66 firms (with 7,123 workers) fell behind in their wage payments, and 26 units (with 1,256 people) were closed down.
6. The districts of Lisbon and Setubal account for one-half of the workers whose wages are in arrears.

## Wages in Arrears: the Figures



The graph shows the figures obtained by the General Inspectorate of Labor through a survey of 87,000 firms. According to the INE, there were 227,000 firms in Portugal in 1982, and the CGTP [General Confederation of Portuguese Workers] is therefore continuing to claim that the number of workers whose wages have not been paid totals 150,000.

Key:



Number of firms with payment of wages and other compensation in arrears



Number of firms with wage payments in arrears



Total owed to workers in thousands of contos



Total wages in arrears in thousands of contos



Number of workers with unpaid wages, in thousands



Number of workers involved, in thousands

7. Fifty-six percent of the workers affected by this suspension of payment were employed in three industries: metallurgy and metal engineering, textiles, and shipbuilding. Those three industries accounted for 65 percent of the value of wages in arrears. The shipbuilding industry alone owed 3,656,000 contos to its workers.

8. Of the firms whose wage payments were in arrears, 14.6 percent employed fewer than 10 workers, 12.6 percent employed more than 200 workers, and 5.7 percent employed more than 500. Of all the firms in the country, 70.9 percent employ fewer than 10 people, and only 1.2 percent employ more than 200. A comparison of those figures reveals the impressive concentration of the phenomenon of unpaid wages in medium-sized and large firms.

9. Of all the firms in the country, 61.4 percent (employing 55.3 percent of all workers) were considered viable, while 19.7 percent of the firms (employing 29 percent of the workers to whom back wages were due) were regarded as totally unviable.

10. Of the 350 firms whose wage payments were in arrears, 113 had already been subsidized by the Secretariat of State for Employment to the tune of over 3.2 million contos, but they still owed their 32,000 workers about 2.2 million contos.

11. The heads of 338 firms--comprising 40,000 jobs--responded in June to a survey on how to overcome the problem of their unpaid wages. They indicated the following solutions:

<u>Suggested solution</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Don't know the solution	33.1
Agreement already reached with employees	18.5
State financing	12.4
Bank financing	9.5
Recovery in construction industry	6.4
Recovery in sales	5.0
Collection of debt from customers	3.0
Agreement with creditors	0.3
Bankruptcy	none

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CSO: 3542/57

## BRIEFS

GREEK 'BLACKMAIL' RAPPED--The reservations this newspaper had set forth concerning the results of the Dublin summit meeting have just been proven pertinent. At the last minute, the European Ten have again condemned Portugal and Spain to new suffering. This time, the culprit seems to have been Greece, which in a blackmail maneuver says it is only ready to give the "green light" to membership for the Iberian countries if they will give it, free of charge, millions of contos for the development of its most backward zones. With one excuse after another and from disagreement to disagreement, the EEC is thus condemning Portugal to a new purgatory. The Grecian threat caused total stupefaction and showed to what point the socialist "comrades" are able to toss internationalist solidarity aside when it conflicts with greed for the crumbs which fall from the "capitalist" table. Community circles are now wondering about the nature of the Greek veto. There are those who fear that if its demands are not met, Athens will prevent negotiations with Portugal and Spain from going forward. A diplomat in Athens says that the negotiations can continue, but the results thereof will have to be approved by Greece in a "referendum." Be that as it may, the socialists in Piraeus will await the Brussels decision. [Excerpts] [Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 6 Dec 84 p 12] 5157

TRADE BALANCE WITH RSA--Portuguese exports to the Republic of South Africa almost doubled between January and August of this year, TEMPO has learned from the delegation representing the ICEP in that country. In fact, during that period, we exported goods and services worth approximately 3.2 million contos (36,029,000 rands). During the comparable period last year, this total came to 1.7 million contos (19,277,000 rands). Thus the increase in value in rands was about 86.9 percent. As to our imports from that country, the increase in rands was approximately 10.77 percent. In value, these imports came to about 2.3 million contos (26,097,500 rands) for the period under consideration. Our imports in 1983 came to 2.1 million contos (23,558,600 rands). As a result of these changes, our 1983 deficit trade balance with South Africa became a surplus balance in 1984 (again for the first 8 months of both years). Thus the balance seen in 1983 was approximately -400,000 contos, while our country now has a favorable balance of 1,100,000 contos. [Text] [Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 30 Nov 84 p 20] 5157

VIANA SHIPYARDS BUSY--The file of orders at the Viana do Castelo shipyards currently totals 22 million contos, an enterprise official said. Daniel Caeiro, who spoke at the presentation of the 40th anniversary commemorative program of the enterprise to the press, added that "these orders will allow the enterprise to continue work through the end of 1987." The Viana do

Castelo Shipyards Enterprise, which was founded on 3 June 1944 with company capital of 750 contos and was nationalized in 1975, currently employs 2,000 workers and pays out about a million contos annually in wages and other costs. Daniel Caeiro said that all of the debts of the shipyard will be paid off in 1985, and in 1986, the enterprise may earn net profits of about 600,000 contos. He further added that last year, the enterprise had a positive balance of 350,000 contos, and that the current improvement in the economic situation of the enterprise is due to the technological level of its work and the support and confidence given it by the ships outfitters. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Dec 84 p 12] 5157

REAL WAGES PLUMMET--Real wages dropped by about 13.1 percent in the first half of 1984, according to an IACEP [Institute for Situational Analysis and Planning Study] report covering the second quarter of this year. The IACEP is a part of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, and it regularly publishes reports on the economic situation. According to the study which has now been released, the dizzying drop evidenced in real wages is the largest in recent years. For example, during the comparable period in 1983, real wages dropped 0.9 percent, but by the second quarter that same year, the decline had accelerated to 9.35 percent. [Text] [Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7-13 Dec 84 p 9] 5157

BUSES FOR ZAIRE--The first 30 buses have been shipped to Zaire under the terms of a contract signed between that country's government and the UTIC. This is the first batch out of a total of 1,230 buses to be supplied to Zaire by the UTIC. The order has a total value of about 12 million contos. The vehicles are designed especially for the Kinshasa urban transit system, whose servicing and maintenance operations will also be the responsibility of the UTIC under the terms of a project that has had the support of President Mobutu and the ministers involved. The project, whose total value is on the order of 20 million contos, represents a significant market penetration by the UTIC and will keep a major portion of the firm's production capacity busy over the next 3 years. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 16 Nov 84 p 5] 11798

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## BRIEFS

OIL, GAS PRODUCTION INCREASES--The production and sale of gas from the A.P. Moller fields in the North Sea in conjunction with the natural gas premiere 1½ months ago have now really got going. This appears from the most recent monthly survey from the Energy Board. The survey was made in September and thus immediately precedes the opening of the Danish gas taps on land. The Tyra field almost doubled its production and the total gas volume thus exceeded 1 billion cubic meters--which is nearly five times the volume of the previous month. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Nov 84 p 3] 7262

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## EASTERN POPULATION SEES THREAT FROM OIL CONCESSION LAW

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 1-2 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Erik Meier Carlsen, INFORMATION reporter in Godthaab: "Compromise-Filled Approach to Greenland's Oil Adventure"]

[Text] The strong internal Greenland opposition to oil production on the east coast was defeated by the summer government formation. Thursday the concession agreement was signed, which is now opposed only by the eastern Greenlanders, who feel that their fishing community is threatened.

Nuuk/Godthaab, November. On Thursday the chairman of the Home Government Jonathan Motzfeldt will meet his new friends from the multinational American oil company ARCO, which will begin extensive oil exploration in eastern Greenland starting 1 January.

Thursday the concession agreement will be signed, and one phase completed in the dramatic and moving debate about this aspect of the relationship with the industrialized world and Greenland's independence.

Motzfeldt, who is a colorful and charming politician with a considerable emanation of personal authority, has enjoyed negotiating directly with the important American oil bosses.

## Tricks

"Many of us were born in the light of an oil lamp," said Motzfeldt. "Now we will begin oil exploration. We have learned that we also can negotiate with multinational giants. It has been amusing to see all the tricks they use. But I believe that we have reached a better concession agreement than the Danish Government reached with A. P. Moller."

The concession has been a hot political issue in Greenland for the past couple of years. The exploration will take place rather close to Itteqqortoormiit/Scoresbysund, a town with 450 inhabitants, and nearby villages with scarcely 100.

This isolated fishing community clearly sees its up to now style of existence threatened by the exploration and naturally especially by the later extraction and icebreaker transport of the oil to the south.

The threat is emphasized by the intensive and successful campaign which the Greenland Home Government with the participation of all the political parties has conducted for years against the Canadian oil extraction project APP, which would carry frozen oil in icebreaking oil tankers from Arctic Canada through the Davis Strait along Greenland's west coast.

The Jameson Land concession is called "Greenland's own APP project" by critics in the Greenland debate, and the leftwing party Inuit Ataatigitiit [Marxist-Leninist party favoring total independence from Denmark] led the way in pointing out the hypocrisy of leading Greenland politicians in opening the way for oil extraction in the east, while they stormed against the Canadians' plans in the west.

#### Raw Materials Agreement

IA [Inuit Ataatigitiit] was formed by splinter groups from the large Greenland government party Siumut [moderate leftist party favoring greater local autonomy]. The splinter groups' main complaint against Siumut was the compromise which the Home Government entered into about the right to Greenland's sub-surface resources. According to the raw materials arrangement in effect, Denmark and Greenland share the rights such that either side can veto development projects, and such that the two sides share any eventual economic return fifty-fifty--after, it should be noted, Denmark has first offset its annual contribution of 2-3 billion kroner in the Greenland share.

IA regarded such a compromise as totally unacceptable and recommended a no vote to the Home Government. Since then the party and its leader, Aqqaluk Lynge, have increasingly become involved in the compromise-filled political working day. But as recently as May, when the party worked for the calling of an election prematurely on the question of the EC withdrawal, the election campaign was largely based on a 5-year moratorium on oil exploration and a renegotiation of the raw materials agreement with the Danish government.

#### Into the Warmth

IA was successful in the election and doubled its seats from two to four. Siumut, which had created a minority government after the ordinary election in 1983, chose to go in a coalition with the winners, then Aqqaluk bowed to reality, dropped his test case and recovered himself in the chair of social minister. His indignant and idealistic party colleagues called their former idol, "The man who raped a generation." "Copenhagen's messenger boy," said an angry vice mayor of Siumut in Ilulissat/Jakobshavn about this pragmatic farthest leftwing in Greenland politics.

"There was a large majority in the Landsting against our position, and we could not have prevented the Jameson Land project. Instead we chose to seek

influence and limit the damaging effects," said Aqqaluk Lynge, who recognizes that he has had a difficult time explaining the matter to his fellow partisans while in the Raw Materials Committee he has become the voice for his effort for the Liberal Party's Ivar Hansen.

In the beginning of November the oil concession was approved by a massive majority in the Greenland Landsting. Out of 25 members, 23 voted for it. Only two of the opposition party voted against, and they were Atassut members from east Greenland.

#### The Economy

"Previously there has been much skepticism toward oil exploration among Greenlanders," said Joseph Motzfeldt. "When a large majority in the Landsting today is positive, that is inextricably connected to the fact that via the Home Government system we have decisive influence on the conditions for oil exploration. We have the possibility of guaranteeing that both the economic and environmental aspects are in harmony with our wishes for developing our country. It is against that background that one should understand our decision, and it has always been our hope that Greenland will never be dependent on capital transfers from Denmark and Danish taxpayers.

About the east Greenlanders opposition, he said:

"I well understand their uncertainty. On the east coast they are much less accustomed than on the west coast to combining the traditional lifestyle with the demands of modern times. But with the establishment of a special contact committee it has been assured that the local population on Jameson Land will get all the relevant information. The local population will have three seats and will thereby make up half of the committee, at the same time as the consortium is ordered to give out all information. It is very important in this way to get the experience and judgment of the local people into the work."

Regardless of the orientation the concrete experiences have not calmed the east Greenlanders. In the final phase of the concession negotiations they concentrated on trying to prevent the oil exploration from getting a base in Hurry Fjord, which cuts inland only a few kilometers west of the community at Itteqqortoormiit. Instead the local government worked to get the base moved to Flemming Fjord 100 km north of the town. Investigations undertaken by GTO indicated, however, that Flemming Fjord is unsuitable for a base, so ARCO has got its will for the time being. Next summer a supply base will be established at Constable Point on Hurry Fjord. The base will have an airport which will also have capacity for civil Greenland air services. With the establishment of the supply base, there has been no final decision on the location of the shipping port for the oil, which must be located during the next 10 years exploration period. One year ago the mayor of Itteqqortoormiit, Jonas Danielsen, who himself is a whale and seal catcher, told INFORMATION:



"If a shipping port is established in Hurry Fjord, that will completely destroy our community. We know from experience that the noise from ships' screws and engines frightens the seals away. At the present time the fjord is transited by two or three small cargo ships per year. Both seals and whales flee every time the ships come, and come back only when it is quiet in the channel.

"I do not dare think what would happen if icebreaking supertankers should run shuttle service in our fjord and along our coasts, which we use for our catches. It would completely destroy our business."

Denmark and Greenland participate equally with 25 percent of the consortium which will conduct the exploration. The rest of the consortium consists of ARCO, Atlantic Richfield Company, which is American and has extracted oil in Alaska, and the Danish Arktisk Minekompagni. If commercially extractable oil is found in the next 10 years exploration, the new Danish-Greenland company can increase its share in the consortium to 50 percent.

During the first 10 years progress in extraction can not be expected. And under the applicable conditions, the Greenland society must wait still longer and the oil production must be very rich before any money goes in the cash register.

If there is a surplus, the Danish state will have the first couple of billion annually before there is anything to divide.

That naturally makes topical IA's demand for a renegotiation of the raw materials arrangement, which Siumut has agreed to, but which the Schluter Government so far has rejected as categorically as when Anker Jorgensen stated that "there is nothing to cast dice for". If Greenland wants to control its own resources alone, it can do it as an independent state without Danish subsidies.

Motzfeldt will try, but expresses himself carefully:

"The agreement reached on oil exploration is a proof that the existing raw materials arrangement between Denmark and Greenland can function. There remain only a few simple changes to make. The majority in the Landsting believes that the raw materials administration should be moved from the Ministry of Greenland Affairs to the Greenland Home Government, and here I am especially glad to have had Atassut's support. When Siumut in its time requested this in the Home Government Commission, Atassut was against it. Now there is agreement on Siumut's request. The Landsting also agrees that we should renegotiate the question of distribution of the eventual income from oil production, such that Greenland will get a reasonable share of the income from the start."



## BRIEFS

FOLKETING APPROVES OIL LEGISLATION--A large majority in the Folketing has approved three bills presented by the minister for Greenland affairs about oil production in Greenland. One bill is concerned with the establishment of a joint Danish/Greenland company to conduct public participation in oil activity in Greenland. In the joint company the Greenland Home Government will have 50 percent of the stock and the state, with the minister for Greenland affairs as responsible for the total administration of mineral raw materials in Greenland the other 50 percent. The two other bills are related to the repeal of the law about the Nordisk Mineselskab A/S and the law about the Arktisk Minekompagni A/S. The three newly approved bills are a necessary link in the plans to resume oil exploration in Greenland, and exploration in Jameson Land can now take place beginning 1 January 1985. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Dec 84 p 15] 9287

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